Event Notification Report for December 10, 2009
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
12/09/2009 - 12/10/2009
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45559
Facility: BELLEFONTE
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-R-LP (205),[2] B&W-R-LP (205)
NRC Notified By: ZACKERY RAD
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-R-LP (205),[2] B&W-R-LP (205)
NRC Notified By: ZACKERY RAD
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 12/10/2009
Notification Time: 16:23 [ET]
Event Date: 12/10/2009
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/10/2009
Notification Time: 16:23 [ET]
Event Date: 12/10/2009
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/10/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.55(e) - CONSTRUCT DEFICIENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.55(e) - CONSTRUCT DEFICIENCY
Person (Organization):
REBECCA NEASE (R2DO)
REBECCA NEASE (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Decommissioned | 0 | Decommissioned |
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Decommissioned | 0 | Decommissioned |
CONTAINMENT VERTICAL TENDON FAILED
"Inspection of failed Unit 1 Reactor Building Containment Vertical Tendon V9 coupling indicates a potential for an unknown common mode failure mechanism for BLN Containment vertical tendon rock anchor couplings. Unit 1 Reactor Building Containment Vertical Tendon V9 experienced a failure of the rock anchor/tendon anchor coupling on August 17, 2009 at approximately 1400 CDT. The time of failure was identified based on a loud noise bang reported by several individuals. Initial investigation failed to reveal the source of the noise. The failed tendon was discovered on August 24, 2009 during a tour of U1 Tendon Gallery, elevation 607. Unsafe conditions previously precluded an inspection of the failed coupling for proper installation or component specific damage. The failed tendon coupling was inspected on 11/23/2009 and showed no signs of component specific damage or improper installation creating the potential for an unknown common mode failure.
"Safety significance: Until the mechanism of failure is identified the extent of condition will not be known. If multiple containment tendons are found to be losing the capability to carry tendon design force and this condition was left uncorrected, this could jeopardize the ability of the containment structure to perform its design function.
"Causes of deficiency: The cause of this deficiency is unknown at this time. Further analysis is in progress and when completed, an update to this report will be provided.
"Interim progress: Grease from the lower anchor head can has been analyzed for moisture content. Results were within vendor specifications. Additional samples have been sent for further analysis as described in Regulatory Guide 1.25 'In-service Inspection of Ungrouted Tendon in Prestressed Concrete Containments.'
"After successful safe securing of the tendon load, the failed coupling was visually inspected. The visual inspection of the failed coupling did not indicate a component-specific failure mechanism or indication of visually apparent common mode failure mechanism. Based on this inspection visual inspection of additional tendon coupling tendon couplers is not warranted at this time. The coupling has been removed from both the tendon anchorhead and the rock anchor tendon anchorhead and sent to the TVA Central Lab for metallurgical analysis.
"Records are being reviewed to identify previous non-conformance reports and certificates of compliances for the coupler. An extent of condition and extent of cause investigation will apply to vertical tendons are similar in design, these tendons do not utilize an anchorhead coupler in the design. However, these tendons will be considered in the analysis.
"Future updates: TVA plans to provide an update to this report by March 31, 2010 following the completion of the metallurgical analysis."
"Inspection of failed Unit 1 Reactor Building Containment Vertical Tendon V9 coupling indicates a potential for an unknown common mode failure mechanism for BLN Containment vertical tendon rock anchor couplings. Unit 1 Reactor Building Containment Vertical Tendon V9 experienced a failure of the rock anchor/tendon anchor coupling on August 17, 2009 at approximately 1400 CDT. The time of failure was identified based on a loud noise bang reported by several individuals. Initial investigation failed to reveal the source of the noise. The failed tendon was discovered on August 24, 2009 during a tour of U1 Tendon Gallery, elevation 607. Unsafe conditions previously precluded an inspection of the failed coupling for proper installation or component specific damage. The failed tendon coupling was inspected on 11/23/2009 and showed no signs of component specific damage or improper installation creating the potential for an unknown common mode failure.
"Safety significance: Until the mechanism of failure is identified the extent of condition will not be known. If multiple containment tendons are found to be losing the capability to carry tendon design force and this condition was left uncorrected, this could jeopardize the ability of the containment structure to perform its design function.
"Causes of deficiency: The cause of this deficiency is unknown at this time. Further analysis is in progress and when completed, an update to this report will be provided.
"Interim progress: Grease from the lower anchor head can has been analyzed for moisture content. Results were within vendor specifications. Additional samples have been sent for further analysis as described in Regulatory Guide 1.25 'In-service Inspection of Ungrouted Tendon in Prestressed Concrete Containments.'
"After successful safe securing of the tendon load, the failed coupling was visually inspected. The visual inspection of the failed coupling did not indicate a component-specific failure mechanism or indication of visually apparent common mode failure mechanism. Based on this inspection visual inspection of additional tendon coupling tendon couplers is not warranted at this time. The coupling has been removed from both the tendon anchorhead and the rock anchor tendon anchorhead and sent to the TVA Central Lab for metallurgical analysis.
"Records are being reviewed to identify previous non-conformance reports and certificates of compliances for the coupler. An extent of condition and extent of cause investigation will apply to vertical tendons are similar in design, these tendons do not utilize an anchorhead coupler in the design. However, these tendons will be considered in the analysis.
"Future updates: TVA plans to provide an update to this report by March 31, 2010 following the completion of the metallurgical analysis."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45560
Facility: HOPE CREEK
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: TOM FOWLER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: TOM FOWLER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 12/10/2009
Notification Time: 16:37 [ET]
Event Date: 12/10/2009
Event Time: 13:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/10/2009
Notification Time: 16:37 [ET]
Event Date: 12/10/2009
Event Time: 13:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/10/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
DANIEL HOLODY (R1DO)
DANIEL HOLODY (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO ONSITE FATALITY
"A mechanical maintenance employee died this afternoon from an apparent heart attack. The individual was not actively working at the time and lost consciousness in a shop area. The individual was treated by onsite EMT's who administered CPR and AED (automatic external defibrillator). The death was not the result of any industrial safety issue and did not occur in a contaminated area. He was transported via ambulance to Salem Memorial hospital where he was pronounced dead."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and local authorities in Lower Alloway Creek Township.
"A mechanical maintenance employee died this afternoon from an apparent heart attack. The individual was not actively working at the time and lost consciousness in a shop area. The individual was treated by onsite EMT's who administered CPR and AED (automatic external defibrillator). The death was not the result of any industrial safety issue and did not occur in a contaminated area. He was transported via ambulance to Salem Memorial hospital where he was pronounced dead."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and local authorities in Lower Alloway Creek Township.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45558
Facility: NORTH ANNA
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: MEGAN SHARROW
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: MEGAN SHARROW
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 12/10/2009
Notification Time: 12:48 [ET]
Event Date: 12/10/2009
Event Time: 10:35 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/10/2009
Notification Time: 12:48 [ET]
Event Date: 12/10/2009
Event Time: 10:35 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/10/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
REBECCA NEASE (R2DO)
REBECCA NEASE (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Hot Standby | 0 | Hot Standby |
BEARING COOLING WATER DISCHARGED INTO LAKE
"On December 9, 2009, at 1423 hours, Unit 2 tripped offline due to the loss of 'C' Reserve Station Service Transformer. This resulted in a loss of power to one of the bearing cooling system level control valves (LCV). The affected LCV failed open, which caused the bearing cooling tower basin to overflow and release bearing cooling water to Lake Anna. By approximately 1530 hours, plant personnel had manually isolated the bearing cooling water system and the flow to the lake stopped shortly afterwards. Based on the duration of the event (approximately 70 minutes) and the maximum discharge flow rate of a bearing cooling water make-up pump (850 gpm), no more than 59,500 gal. of water were discharged to the lake. Based on visual observation of the actual flow going to the lake, it was estimated that approximately 35,000 gal. were discharged. The bearing cooling water was sampled on 12/09/09 by the Chemistry Department as part of their routine chemistry surveillance. All chemical parameters analyzed were within VPDES (Virginia Pollutant Discharge Elimination System) permit limits. There was no violation of permit parameters from this discharge and no adverse impact to the environment was observed. Bearing cooling system chemistry is maintained to meet VPDES discharge limits.
"At 1035 hours on December 10, 2009, a 24-hour notification of the unusual discharge was made to the Virginia Department of Environmental Quality in accordance with the North Anna VPDES permit.
"This issue is being reported per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) as an event where notification of other government agencies has been made.
"The NRC resident inspector has been notified."
"On December 9, 2009, at 1423 hours, Unit 2 tripped offline due to the loss of 'C' Reserve Station Service Transformer. This resulted in a loss of power to one of the bearing cooling system level control valves (LCV). The affected LCV failed open, which caused the bearing cooling tower basin to overflow and release bearing cooling water to Lake Anna. By approximately 1530 hours, plant personnel had manually isolated the bearing cooling water system and the flow to the lake stopped shortly afterwards. Based on the duration of the event (approximately 70 minutes) and the maximum discharge flow rate of a bearing cooling water make-up pump (850 gpm), no more than 59,500 gal. of water were discharged to the lake. Based on visual observation of the actual flow going to the lake, it was estimated that approximately 35,000 gal. were discharged. The bearing cooling water was sampled on 12/09/09 by the Chemistry Department as part of their routine chemistry surveillance. All chemical parameters analyzed were within VPDES (Virginia Pollutant Discharge Elimination System) permit limits. There was no violation of permit parameters from this discharge and no adverse impact to the environment was observed. Bearing cooling system chemistry is maintained to meet VPDES discharge limits.
"At 1035 hours on December 10, 2009, a 24-hour notification of the unusual discharge was made to the Virginia Department of Environmental Quality in accordance with the North Anna VPDES permit.
"This issue is being reported per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) as an event where notification of other government agencies has been made.
"The NRC resident inspector has been notified."