Event Notification Report for November 28, 2009

CONTAINMENT MINIMUM PATHWAY LEAK RATE WAS EXCEEDED

"10CFR50 Appendix J Local Leak Rate Testing determined the total 'as-found' containment minimum pathway leak rate exceeded the maximum allowable containment leak rate per the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. This was primarily due to three penetrations that could not be pressurized to full test pressure. The maximum allowable leakage was assigned to both valves in each penetration since the valves can not be tested individually.

"This condition is reportable as a condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). The condition was discovered with the plant in Mode 5. Corrective actions have already been completed and all penetrations, as well as total containment leakage, is well within limits established by the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * RETRACTION FROM JIM POLLOCK TO PETE SNYDER AT 1711 EST ON 12/2/09 * * *

"On November 29, 2009, Waterford 3 reported that the total as-found containment minimum pathway leak rate exceeded the maximum allowable containment leak rate per the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. This was primarily due to three penetrations that could not be pressurized to full test pressure. The maximum allowable leakage was assigned to both valves in each penetration since the valves could not be tested individually. This condition was determined to be reportable as a condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principle safety barriers, being seriously degraded per 10CFR72(b)(3)(ii).

"Subsequently, Waterford 3 has evaluated the leak rates for all three penetrations and determined that as-found leakage rates assigned to the penetrations should not have been recorded at 630,000 sccm each, but should have been recorded at lower values.

"After one valve was re-worked in Penetration number 48, a Local Leak Rate Test (LLRT) was completed. With the new information from the second LLRT, a revised as-found leak rate of 97 sccm was assigned to the un-worked valve.

"For Penetration number 10, an Engineering evaluation of the test results was completed. The evaluation determined that the as-found leakage from this penetration was 191,000 sccm. This was based on calculating the maximum air flow capacity that could be obtained from the Leak Rate Monitor test equipment and using the first LLRT's penetration only reaching a test pressure of 43 psig instead of the 44 psig full test pressure.

"For Penetration number 11, troubleshooting activities determined that one of the valves had no detectable leakage; however, a leak rate of 9,100 sccm was assigned based on its previous as-left leakage value.

"With the lower leakage rates, the total as-found containment minimum pathway leak rate is calculated to be 230,682 sccm, which is within the limit of 630,000 SCCM. Since Waterford 3 had not exceeded the maximum allowable containment leak rate, EN #45526 is being retracted."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R4DO (Deese).

SAFETY EQUIPMENT DISABLED DUE TO A GROUND IN THE AREA CONTROL ROOM ALARM

"At 1850 CST, on 11/28/09 the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that the C-333 Unit 6 Cell 5 UF6 Release Detection (PGLD) System was inoperable due to loss of power to the Area Control Room (ACR) alarm for this system. The purpose of the PGLD System is to detect a UF6 release and alert operators in the ACR by sounding an alarm. At the time this was discovered, G-333 Unit 6 Cell 5 was operating above atmospheric pressure. TSR 2.4.4.1 requires that at least the minimum number of detector heads in the cell are operable during steady state operations above atmospheric pressure. With the Unit 6 Cell 5 PGLD system inoperable, none of the required heads were operable. This PGLD System was declared inoperable, TSR LCO 2.4.4.1.B.1 was entered and a continuous smoke watch was put in place within one hour.

"Troubleshooting was initiated, a ground was discovered on the alarm circuit, the ground was isolated, and the system was tested and declared operable at 2305 [CST]. This event is reportable as a 24 hour event in accordance with 10CFR76.120(c)(2)(i). This is an event in which equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed when: a) the equipment is required by a TSR to prevent releases, prevent exposures to radiation and radioactive materials exceeding specified limits, mitigate the consequences of an accident, or restore this facility to a pre-established safe condition after an accident; b) the equipment is required by a TSR to be available and operable and either should have been operating or should have operated on demand, and c) no redundant equipment is available and operable to perform the required safety function.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event."