Event Notification Report for November 11, 2009
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
11/10/2009 - 11/11/2009
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45488
Facility: QUAD CITIES
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3
NRC Notified By: RANDALL DEWEEDT
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3
NRC Notified By: RANDALL DEWEEDT
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 11/11/2009
Notification Time: 18:41 [ET]
Event Date: 11/11/2009
Event Time: 12:38 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/11/2009
Notification Time: 18:41 [ET]
Event Date: 11/11/2009
Event Time: 12:38 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/11/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
STEVE ORTH (R3DO)
STEVE ORTH (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
DEGRADED TSC EMERGENCY VENTILATION
"At 1238 hours on November 11, 2009, during performance of the Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation pressure test, it was determined that the TSC could not be maintained at a positive pressure in the emergency mode due to the failure of an outside air intake damper to fully close. At this time, troubleshooting is being performed on the damper.
"If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing procedures. In the event TSC evacuation is warranted due to radiological conditions, key Emergency Response Organization members would be relocated in accordance with existing procedures.
"This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) given the impact on the emergency response facility. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
"At 1238 hours on November 11, 2009, during performance of the Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation pressure test, it was determined that the TSC could not be maintained at a positive pressure in the emergency mode due to the failure of an outside air intake damper to fully close. At this time, troubleshooting is being performed on the damper.
"If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing procedures. In the event TSC evacuation is warranted due to radiological conditions, key Emergency Response Organization members would be relocated in accordance with existing procedures.
"This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) given the impact on the emergency response facility. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45489
Facility: COOPER
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JOHN MYERS
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JOHN MYERS
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 11/11/2009
Notification Time: 22:34 [ET]
Event Date: 11/11/2009
Event Time: 17:43 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/11/2009
Notification Time: 22:34 [ET]
Event Date: 11/11/2009
Event Time: 17:43 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/11/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
Person (Organization):
JEFF CLARK (R4DO)
JEFF CLARK (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | M/R | Y | 15 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM AFTER A TURBINE HYDRAULIC FLUID LEAK
"On November 11, 2009, at 1743 CST the reactor was manually scrammed following a manual trip of the main turbine due to an un-isolable leak on the Turbine High Pressure Fluid System (TGF) governor valve 3. Initial power level when the leak was identified was approximately 70%. Power was lowered commencing at 1405 in accordance with shutdown procedures. The reactor operator scrammed the reactor at 17:43 from approximately 15% power when directed by the shutdown procedure to place the reactor in a condition to support repairs to the TGF system. In preparation for the scram, level was raised to the range specified in the shutdown procedure (approximately 46 inches). Following the scram, reactor vessel water level lowered to approximately 15 inches on the narrow range instruments, and was subsequently recovered to normal post scram range (approximately 40 inches) using the reactor feedwater system. All control rods fully inserted. No group isolations occurred since level did not reach the isolation setpoint (3 inches). At 1920, the inboard MSIVs were manually closed to stabilize plant cool down and maintain the plant in mode 3. The main condenser remained available throughout the evolution and condenser vacuum is currently being maintained by the mechanical vacuum pumps. Pressure is being controlled using the steam line drains to the main condenser.
"All equipment operated as expected and there were no difficulties encountered during the evolution.
"The TGF System has been secured and is in the process of being tagged out for repair.
"This event is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) due to a non planned reactor scram while critical. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
The plant is in its normal shutdown electrical lineup.
"On November 11, 2009, at 1743 CST the reactor was manually scrammed following a manual trip of the main turbine due to an un-isolable leak on the Turbine High Pressure Fluid System (TGF) governor valve 3. Initial power level when the leak was identified was approximately 70%. Power was lowered commencing at 1405 in accordance with shutdown procedures. The reactor operator scrammed the reactor at 17:43 from approximately 15% power when directed by the shutdown procedure to place the reactor in a condition to support repairs to the TGF system. In preparation for the scram, level was raised to the range specified in the shutdown procedure (approximately 46 inches). Following the scram, reactor vessel water level lowered to approximately 15 inches on the narrow range instruments, and was subsequently recovered to normal post scram range (approximately 40 inches) using the reactor feedwater system. All control rods fully inserted. No group isolations occurred since level did not reach the isolation setpoint (3 inches). At 1920, the inboard MSIVs were manually closed to stabilize plant cool down and maintain the plant in mode 3. The main condenser remained available throughout the evolution and condenser vacuum is currently being maintained by the mechanical vacuum pumps. Pressure is being controlled using the steam line drains to the main condenser.
"All equipment operated as expected and there were no difficulties encountered during the evolution.
"The TGF System has been secured and is in the process of being tagged out for repair.
"This event is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) due to a non planned reactor scram while critical. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
The plant is in its normal shutdown electrical lineup.
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 45491
Facility: GLOBAL NUCLEAR FUEL - AMERICAS
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 TO UO2)
LEU FABRICATION
LWR COMMERICAL FUEL
NRC Notified By: SCOTT MURRAY
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 TO UO2)
LEU FABRICATION
LWR COMMERICAL FUEL
NRC Notified By: SCOTT MURRAY
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 11/12/2009
Notification Time: 11:47 [ET]
Event Date: 11/11/2009
Event Time: 15:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/12/2009
Notification Time: 11:47 [ET]
Event Date: 11/11/2009
Event Time: 15:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/12/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (b)(1) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (b)(1) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
MARK LESSER (R2DO)
E. WILLIAM BRACH (NMSS)
MARK LESSER (R2DO)
E. WILLIAM BRACH (NMSS)
INCOMPLETE DOCUMENTATION OF CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROLS IN INTEGRATED SAFETY ANALYSIS SUMMARY
"During a GNF-A ongoing review of the Fuel Manufacturing Operation (FMO) Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA), it was discovered at 3pm yesterday (11/11/09) that there may be an incomplete list of criticality safety controls associated with the Pellet and Rod Load Fabrication areas in the ISA Summary.
"At 7pm, it was determined that the list of Items Relied On For Safety (IROFS) was incomplete and the affected equipment was shut down pending revision of the ISA to document IROFS for these processes. Notwithstanding the documentation deficiency, the controls associated with moderator intrusion and geometry remained in place, functional, and maintained with appropriate management controls.
"While this discovery did not result in an unsafe condition, it is being reported on 11/12/09 pursuant to the reporting requirements of 10CFR70 Appendix A(b)(1) within 24 hours.
"Safety Significance of Events: Low safety significance - All process criticality safety controls remained intact and functioning for this processes.
"Safety Equipment Status: Pellet and Fuel Load fabrication areas are shutdown and will remain shutdown until the ISA review is completed.
"Status of Corrective Actions: Pellet and Rod Load Fabrication areas will remain shutdown pending final investigation results and identification of additional IROFS."
The licensee notified NRC Region 2 Inspector (Crespo) and will notify state and local authorities.
"During a GNF-A ongoing review of the Fuel Manufacturing Operation (FMO) Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA), it was discovered at 3pm yesterday (11/11/09) that there may be an incomplete list of criticality safety controls associated with the Pellet and Rod Load Fabrication areas in the ISA Summary.
"At 7pm, it was determined that the list of Items Relied On For Safety (IROFS) was incomplete and the affected equipment was shut down pending revision of the ISA to document IROFS for these processes. Notwithstanding the documentation deficiency, the controls associated with moderator intrusion and geometry remained in place, functional, and maintained with appropriate management controls.
"While this discovery did not result in an unsafe condition, it is being reported on 11/12/09 pursuant to the reporting requirements of 10CFR70 Appendix A(b)(1) within 24 hours.
"Safety Significance of Events: Low safety significance - All process criticality safety controls remained intact and functioning for this processes.
"Safety Equipment Status: Pellet and Fuel Load fabrication areas are shutdown and will remain shutdown until the ISA review is completed.
"Status of Corrective Actions: Pellet and Rod Load Fabrication areas will remain shutdown pending final investigation results and identification of additional IROFS."
The licensee notified NRC Region 2 Inspector (Crespo) and will notify state and local authorities.