Event Notification Report for November 06, 2009

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN TROXLER GAUGE

The following notification was received from the state via e-mail:

"A Troxler moisture density gauge (model 3411, serial # 7078) was stolen from an open pickup truck sometime between 7 am and noon on 11/6/09. The gauge was taken out of the transportation container, which was secured in the back of the open pickup truck. The RSO does not know if the transportation container was locked.

"The lost gauge was reported to the Riverside Sheriff's Department. The RSO was informed that a reward should be offered for return of the gauge. He indicated he will discuss posting of a reward with the company owner. "


THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO AN UNISOLABLE LEAK ON THE TURBINE HIGH PRESSURE FLUID SYSTEM

"On November 6, 2009, at 1930 CST the reactor was manually scrammed following a manual trip of the Main Turbine due to an un-isolable leak on the Turbine High Pressure Fluid System (TGF). The RO [Reactor Operator] scrammed the reactor when [reactor vessel water] level lowered below 12 inches on the Narrow Range Instruments. All Control Rods fully inserted and a Group 2 Isolation occurred when level reached 3 inches on the Narrow Range Instruments. Reactor level lowered to approximately 22 inches on the Wide Range Instruments and was recovered in a slow and deliberate manner in order to minimize the effect on the cool down rate because of low levels of decay heat in the fuel. The Reactor Feed System was used to initially recover level. At 2043, the plant was in Mode 3 with the inboard MSIVs manually closed and level and pressure being controlled by RCIC. The MSIVs were closed to minimize the cool down rate and RCIC was started manually for level and pressure control. The Main Condenser remained available throughout the evolution and condenser vacuum is currently being maintained by the Mechanical Vacuum Pumps.

"The Group 2 Isolation was verified with no discrepancies and was reset at approximately 2010.

"All equipment operated as expected and there were no difficulties encountered during the evolution.

"The TGF System has been secured and is in the process of being tagged out for repair."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO FEED REG VALVE CLOSURE

"A Manual Reactor Trip was initiated due to closure of Main Feedwater Regulating Valve 'A' with Steam Generator 'A' Level at 35% narrow range and lowering with a Steam Flow / Feed Flow mismatch present. Both Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps (MDAFW) and the Steam Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (SDAFW) auto-started as required based on low Steam Generator Water Levels. All systems responded normally and plant operators have stabilized the unit in Mode 3."

There were no complications. All rods inserted during the trip. Decay heat is being removed via steam dumps to condensers.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

PART 21 REPORT - POTENTIAL FAILURE OF BONNET VALVE

The following is quoted selectively from the text of the original Part 21 notification received from Flowserve via fax:

"On September 8, 2009, Flowserve Corporation was notified by Exelon-LaSalle Nuclear Power Station of a failure which occurred and was initially communicated via Flowserve Complaint Report #4914.

"The Referenced Complaint Report describes an anomaly with a Size 3/4 Figure 848Y bolted bonnet valve at the LaSalle Nuclear Power Station.

"The subject valve was in service at the time of disassembly. The disassembly revealed that the disk nut, which captures the valve stem in the valve main disk, had separated from the main disk.

"The valve in question is a manually operated, non-active valve. The safety function of this valve is to retain system pressure. This safety function was not affected by separation of the stem nut from the valve disk.

"However, other Figure 848 valves may have different safety related functions that could be affected by this type of failure.

"[Flowserve has determined that] the Nuclear Industry needs to be notified concerning the potential defect and encouraged to inspect the operation of their valves, especially if they have a safety-related function in the plant that may be adversely affected.

"The valves affected are Size 2 and smaller Edward Figure 848 valves manufactured by Rockwell International at the Sulphur Springs, Texas, and the Raleigh, North Carolina, manufacturing facilities prior to 1991. These valves may be tagged 'Rockwell', 'Rockwell Edward' or 'Edward'. The valves affected have the old design stem/disk assembly.

"Valves with Figure Number A848 incorporate the new design stem/disk connection and are not affected. The total number of valves affected and their installed locations are not known."

The original report contains more technical details and information.

* * * UPDATE FROM ROBERT BERRY TO PETE SNYDER AT 1454 ON 11/24/09 * * *

"Upon further investigation, Flowserve has become aware that additional Figure Numbers, 849, 828, and 829 may also be affected by the deviation reported herein, as they share the OLD Stem/Disk Assembly Design."

Notified R1DO (Ferdas), R2DO (Sykes), R3DO (Peterson), and R4DO (O'Keefe).

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - PROCESS GAUGE SHUTTER MALFUNCTION

The following information was obtained from the State of Texas via email:

"On November 6, 2009, the [State of Texas] was notified that the shutter on a Ronan Engineering level gauge containing 2,000 millicuries of Cesium (Cs) - 137 failed to operate properly. The gauge is installed on the top of a vessel that is 16 feet high. The vessel had been taken out of service and the Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) went to the location to perform a shutter operation check. He found that the shutter could not be fully closed. Dose rates in the area were normal. Lead shielding was placed in front of the gauge as shielding. The RSO believes that as many as four people may have entered the vessel while the shutter was not fully closed. The licensee intends to repair the gauge during their next scheduled outage. The RSO was not certain on what day the event occurred, but believed it was about two weeks ago. The licensee stated that he was not aware of the reporting criteria until he received a letter sent out by [the State of Texas] regarding the reporting requirements for this type of event. The licensee is continuing their investigation. Additional information will be provided as it is received."

Texas Incident # I-8685.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST AND RECOVERED TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

On November 6, 2009, the State of Texas reported that a Troxler moisture density gauge was lost and recovered by the Troxler Electronic Laboratories, Inc. The event occurred approximately one to two years ago. The density gauge was recovered two days after it was lost. The State of Texas will provide updates as more information is available. The gauge contained an 8 mCi Cs-137 and a 40 mCi Am/Be-241 source.

Texas Incident # I-8686

* * * UPDATE FROM ART TUCKER TO CHUCK TEAL AT 1730 EST ON 1/14/10 * * *

"On November 4, 2009, while conducting a routine inspection, an agency inspector found an event that involved a Troxler moisture/density gauge model # 4640 containing one 8 millicurie Cesium (Cs) - 137 source, which was lost during shipment and returned to the licensee the next day, intact and with no damage. The gauge did not contain an Americium source. The case did not have any scuff marks on it. Neither the licensee or the shipper had notified the agency of the event. They believed that it was not reportable since there was no chance that someone could have received an exposure from it and it was lost for only one day. The licensee also believed that the shipper would be required to make any required notifications. The licensee was informed that they would have been required to notify the agency of an event [and it] would have been reportable. The licensee stated that they believed the gauge had fallen off of their truck. The truck used had a faulty latch mechanism on the door. The driver received additional instruction on securing the door."

Notified FSME (Lewis) and R4DO (Hagar).

INVALID START OF THE UNIT 2/3 EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR

"On November 6, 2009, at approximately 1532 CST, Dresden Unit 3 manually tripped the main turbine due to an Electro-Hydraulic [Control] Fluid leak. Following the turbine trip, electrical busses automatically realigned breakers which transferred power from the unit auxiliary transformer to the reserve auxiliary transformer. During this transfer, the Unit 2/3 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) automatically started. The power source transfer occurred as designed within 0.2 seconds. None of the electrical busses experienced an under-voltage condition. Therefore, the [Unit] 2/3 EDG start signal was invalid. However, the Unit 2/3 EDG started due to a 4 Kv bus breaker interlock. Both the main feed breaker and the reserve feed breaker were open concurrently for approximately 73 milliseconds, which resulted in the invalid Unit 2/3 EDG start signal.

"Following the start, the Unit 2/3 EDG operated as expected and no abnormalities were observed. Since there was no under-voltage signal experienced, the EDG output breaker did not attempt to close onto the associated bus.

"The breakers associated with the EDG interlock are scheduled to be inspected during the next refuel outage to verify proper EDG interlock interface.

"Since this ESF actuation was caused by an invalid signal, it is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) as specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), which allows a telephone notification in lieu of a written licensee event report within 60 days."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.