Event Notification Report for October 23, 2009
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/22/2009 - 10/23/2009
EVENT NUMBERS
454584546045461454624546345464
General Information or Other
Event Number: 45458
Rep Org: HILTI INC.
Licensee: HILTI INC.
Region: 4
City: TULSA State: OK
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MARTIN SCHOFIELD
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Licensee: HILTI INC.
Region: 4
City: TULSA State: OK
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MARTIN SCHOFIELD
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 10/23/2009
Notification Time: 14:18 [ET]
Event Date: 10/23/2009
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/23/2009
Notification Time: 14:18 [ET]
Event Date: 10/23/2009
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/23/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
LAWRENCE DOERFLEIN (R1DO)
JAY HENSON (R2DO)
NEIL OKEEFE (R4DO)
JOHN THORP (e-mail) (NRR)
O. TABATABAI(e-mail) (NRO)
LAWRENCE DOERFLEIN (R1DO)
JAY HENSON (R2DO)
NEIL OKEEFE (R4DO)
JOHN THORP (e-mail) (NRR)
O. TABATABAI(e-mail) (NRO)
POTENTIAL DELIVERY OF NONCONFORMING WASHERS
Hilti provided notification of a potential delivery of nonconforming washers supplied with expansion anchors type Hilti Kwik Bolt KB3 SS316, 1/4" and 3/8" diameters, all lengths. Chemical analysis of provided samples showed the nonconforming washers were made of grade SS430Ti stainless steel instead of the specified grade SS316.
Potentially affected utilities or plants are: PSE&G Nuclear; Pilgrim; Brunswick; Arizona Public Service; Waterford 3.
Hilti provided notification of a potential delivery of nonconforming washers supplied with expansion anchors type Hilti Kwik Bolt KB3 SS316, 1/4" and 3/8" diameters, all lengths. Chemical analysis of provided samples showed the nonconforming washers were made of grade SS430Ti stainless steel instead of the specified grade SS316.
Potentially affected utilities or plants are: PSE&G Nuclear; Pilgrim; Brunswick; Arizona Public Service; Waterford 3.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45460
Facility: NORTH ANNA
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: ROBERT COUNTS
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: ROBERT COUNTS
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 10/23/2009
Notification Time: 17:34 [ET]
Event Date: 10/23/2009
Event Time: 16:34 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/23/2009
Notification Time: 17:34 [ET]
Event Date: 10/23/2009
Event Time: 16:34 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/23/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
Person (Organization):
JAY HENSON (R2DO)
BRIAN McDERMOTT (IRD)
SAMSON LEE (NRR)
JAY HENSON (R2DO)
BRIAN McDERMOTT (IRD)
SAMSON LEE (NRR)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
PLANT SHUTDOWN DUE TO EXCESS LETDOWN HEAT EXCHANGER TUBE LEAK AND AFTER-THE-FACT UNUSUAL EVENT
"On 10/23/09 at 1633, North Anna Unit 1 was placing Excess Letdown in service per 1-OP-8.5 due to a small unquantifiable throughwall leak on 1-CH-TV-1204B. At 1634 [the licensee] entered action of TS 3.4.13 due to what appears to be an Excess Letdown Heat Exchanger tube leak. The Component Cooling Water Head Tank [level] increased from 59% to 79% and the VCT [Volume Control Tank] level dropped 20 % indicating approximately 260 gallons of RCS had flowed into the Component Cooling Water System. At 1638 Excess Letdown was removed from service and the leak was terminated. At 1718 [the licensee] commenced ramping Unit 1 from service [TS Required Shutdown] to comply with TS 3.6.1, 'Containment Integrity' due to the throughwall leak on 1-CH-TV-1204B."
The licensee has placed the normal letdown system back in service while the plant is being shut down. The throughwall leak on 1-CH-TV-1204B is relatively small and unquantifiable compare to the tube leak on the excess letdown heat exchanger. The licensee plans to proceed to Mode 5 to repair both the Letdown valve and the Excess Letdown Heat Exchanger tube leak.
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM COUNTS TO HUFFMAN AT 1831 EDT ON 10/23/09 * * *
The licensee determined that it exceeded EAL SU6.1, Unidentified or Pressure Boundary Leakage greater than 10 gpm, for 4 minutes but currently does not meet the EAL Criteria. This requires the licensee to make a 1-hour notification that it has classified the event after-the-fact as an unusual event but did not actually declare the unusual event.
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector and has notified the Virginia Department of Emergency Management.
"On 10/23/09 at 1633, North Anna Unit 1 was placing Excess Letdown in service per 1-OP-8.5 due to a small unquantifiable throughwall leak on 1-CH-TV-1204B. At 1634 [the licensee] entered action of TS 3.4.13 due to what appears to be an Excess Letdown Heat Exchanger tube leak. The Component Cooling Water Head Tank [level] increased from 59% to 79% and the VCT [Volume Control Tank] level dropped 20 % indicating approximately 260 gallons of RCS had flowed into the Component Cooling Water System. At 1638 Excess Letdown was removed from service and the leak was terminated. At 1718 [the licensee] commenced ramping Unit 1 from service [TS Required Shutdown] to comply with TS 3.6.1, 'Containment Integrity' due to the throughwall leak on 1-CH-TV-1204B."
The licensee has placed the normal letdown system back in service while the plant is being shut down. The throughwall leak on 1-CH-TV-1204B is relatively small and unquantifiable compare to the tube leak on the excess letdown heat exchanger. The licensee plans to proceed to Mode 5 to repair both the Letdown valve and the Excess Letdown Heat Exchanger tube leak.
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM COUNTS TO HUFFMAN AT 1831 EDT ON 10/23/09 * * *
The licensee determined that it exceeded EAL SU6.1, Unidentified or Pressure Boundary Leakage greater than 10 gpm, for 4 minutes but currently does not meet the EAL Criteria. This requires the licensee to make a 1-hour notification that it has classified the event after-the-fact as an unusual event but did not actually declare the unusual event.
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector and has notified the Virginia Department of Emergency Management.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45461
Facility: DIABLO CANYON
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHN MACINTYRE
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHN MACINTYRE
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 10/23/2009
Notification Time: 17:44 [ET]
Event Date: 10/23/2009
Event Time: 08:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 10/23/2009
Notification Time: 17:44 [ET]
Event Date: 10/23/2009
Event Time: 08:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 10/23/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
NEIL OKEEFE (R4DO)
NEIL OKEEFE (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
POST LOCA RECIRCULATION VALVE POSITION INTERLOCKS
"During the current Unit 2 fifteenth refueling outage (2R15), with the core off-loaded to the spent fuel pool, the containment recirculation sump valve interlock position switches were found not to perform correctly. Initial investigation has determined that the valve position sensing interlock switches were left incorrectly set during the Unit 2 fourteenth refueling outage (2R14).
"In the event of a Loss of Coolant Accident, (LOCA) this condition would have prevented Residual Heat Removal (RHR) flow from reaching containment spray, high head and intermediate head safety injection pumps following alignment to long term recirculation from the containment sump without additional operator action.
"The RHR function, including the long term recirculation from the containment sump, was not adversely affected by this condition. Also, containment spray, high head and intermediate head safety injection from the refueling water storage tank (RWST) was not adversely affected by this condition.
"Unit 2 containment recirculation sump valve interlock position switches have been correctly set and are being retested during the current 2R15.
"Unit 1 containment recirculation sump valve interlock position switches have been verified as correctly set to be capable of performing their design function by testing performed during the last refueling outage.
"This condition will be reported in a Licensee Event Report (LER) within 60 days in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"During the current Unit 2 fifteenth refueling outage (2R15), with the core off-loaded to the spent fuel pool, the containment recirculation sump valve interlock position switches were found not to perform correctly. Initial investigation has determined that the valve position sensing interlock switches were left incorrectly set during the Unit 2 fourteenth refueling outage (2R14).
"In the event of a Loss of Coolant Accident, (LOCA) this condition would have prevented Residual Heat Removal (RHR) flow from reaching containment spray, high head and intermediate head safety injection pumps following alignment to long term recirculation from the containment sump without additional operator action.
"The RHR function, including the long term recirculation from the containment sump, was not adversely affected by this condition. Also, containment spray, high head and intermediate head safety injection from the refueling water storage tank (RWST) was not adversely affected by this condition.
"Unit 2 containment recirculation sump valve interlock position switches have been correctly set and are being retested during the current 2R15.
"Unit 1 containment recirculation sump valve interlock position switches have been verified as correctly set to be capable of performing their design function by testing performed during the last refueling outage.
"This condition will be reported in a Licensee Event Report (LER) within 60 days in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45462
Facility: SAN ONOFRE
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: M. W. MCBREARTY
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: M. W. MCBREARTY
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 10/23/2009
Notification Time: 17:46 [ET]
Event Date: 10/23/2009
Event Time: 12:05 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 10/23/2009
Notification Time: 17:46 [ET]
Event Date: 10/23/2009
Event Time: 12:05 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 10/23/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
NEIL OKEEFE (R4DO)
NEIL OKEEFE (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
LOSS OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS CAPABILITIES
"On Friday October 23, 2009, at approximately 1205 PDT, Southern California Edison (SCE) evacuated Building E-50, which includes the SONGS [San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station] Emergency Operations Facility (EOF). This Building is located outside of both the Protected Area and the Owner Controlled Area. The evacuation was initiated due to personnel reports of a smoky odor in Building E-50. SONGS Fire Department responded to the incident and, at approximately 1222 PDT, the majority of Building E 50, including the EOF, was cleared for personnel to re-enter the building. SCE is continuing to investigate the source of the smoky odor.
The EOF was considered unavailable (but fully functional) for approximately 17 minutes.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"On Friday October 23, 2009, at approximately 1205 PDT, Southern California Edison (SCE) evacuated Building E-50, which includes the SONGS [San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station] Emergency Operations Facility (EOF). This Building is located outside of both the Protected Area and the Owner Controlled Area. The evacuation was initiated due to personnel reports of a smoky odor in Building E-50. SONGS Fire Department responded to the incident and, at approximately 1222 PDT, the majority of Building E 50, including the EOF, was cleared for personnel to re-enter the building. SCE is continuing to investigate the source of the smoky odor.
The EOF was considered unavailable (but fully functional) for approximately 17 minutes.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45463
Facility: BEAVER VALLEY
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: ROBERT HADDOCK
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: ROBERT HADDOCK
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 10/23/2009
Notification Time: 20:20 [ET]
Event Date: 10/23/2009
Event Time: 17:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/23/2009
Notification Time: 20:20 [ET]
Event Date: 10/23/2009
Event Time: 17:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/23/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
LAWRENCE DOERFLEIN (R1DO)
LAWRENCE DOERFLEIN (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
SMALL CIRCUMFERENTIAL INDICATIONS FOUND ON TWO REACTOR VESSEL HEAD PENETRATIONS
"On October 23, 2009 during the Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No. 2 (BVPS-2) refueling outage, it was determined that the results of planned ultrasonic (UT) examinations performed on two penetrations of the reactor vessel head would not meet the applicable acceptance criteria. Both require repair prior to returning the vessel head to service. Each of these penetrations has a small circumferential indication near the toe of the J-groove weld. The indications are not through wall and there was no evidence of leakage based on inspections performed on the top of the reactor vessel head. The examinations were being performed to meet the requirements of 10CFR50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(D) and ASME Code Case N-729-1, to find potential flaws/indications well before they grow to a size that could potentially jeopardize the structural integrity of the reactor vessel head pressure boundary. Currently 43 of 66 penetrations have been examined; all of the penetrations will be examined during the current refueling outage.
"The plant is currently shutdown and in an undefined mode as the fuel has been offloaded from the reactor to the spent fuel pool. The reactor vessel head is not currently installed. Repairs are currently being planned and will be completed prior to startup.
"This is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) since the as found indications did not meet the applicable acceptance criteria referenced in ASME Code Case N-729-1 to remain in-service without repair.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
"On October 23, 2009 during the Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No. 2 (BVPS-2) refueling outage, it was determined that the results of planned ultrasonic (UT) examinations performed on two penetrations of the reactor vessel head would not meet the applicable acceptance criteria. Both require repair prior to returning the vessel head to service. Each of these penetrations has a small circumferential indication near the toe of the J-groove weld. The indications are not through wall and there was no evidence of leakage based on inspections performed on the top of the reactor vessel head. The examinations were being performed to meet the requirements of 10CFR50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(D) and ASME Code Case N-729-1, to find potential flaws/indications well before they grow to a size that could potentially jeopardize the structural integrity of the reactor vessel head pressure boundary. Currently 43 of 66 penetrations have been examined; all of the penetrations will be examined during the current refueling outage.
"The plant is currently shutdown and in an undefined mode as the fuel has been offloaded from the reactor to the spent fuel pool. The reactor vessel head is not currently installed. Repairs are currently being planned and will be completed prior to startup.
"This is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) since the as found indications did not meet the applicable acceptance criteria referenced in ASME Code Case N-729-1 to remain in-service without repair.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45464
Facility: THREE MILE ISLAND
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: KEVIN COUGHLIN
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: KEVIN COUGHLIN
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 10/23/2009
Notification Time: 22:23 [ET]
Event Date: 10/23/2009
Event Time: 17:41 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 12/11/2009
Notification Time: 22:23 [ET]
Event Date: 10/23/2009
Event Time: 17:41 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 12/11/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
Person (Organization):
LAWRENCE DOERFLEIN (R1DO)
LAWRENCE DOERFLEIN (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 83 | Power Operation | 60 | Power Operation |
STEAM GENERATOR SAFETY RELIEF VALVES DID NOT OPEN AT REQUIRED SETPOINT
"Online testing of the secondary side pressure relief valves revealed that 3 valves did not open at the required pressure set point on the initial tests. All valves did open on subsequent tests at a higher pressure and have been restored to operable status. These 3 valves and 3 other similar valves were installed during the last refueling outage and it is concluded that all 6 valves have the same set point drift failure mechanism. All 6 valves are assumed to have been inoperable at some time during the last operating cycle. The steam generator design analysis specifies a minimum pressure relief capability to prevent a failure of the steam generator and subsequent potential loss of decay heat removal capability. This condition could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function needed to remove residual heat. An engineering analysis is in progress to determine the actual impact on the safety function.
"Per Technical Specifications 3.4.1.2.3, reactor power was reduced to below 66.3% due to the remaining 3 inoperable relief valves."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * EVENT RETRACTION FROM ADAM MILLER TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1130 EST ON 12/11/2009 * * *
"In addition to the 6 valves discussed in EN 45464, an additional valve was found to be inoperable. Thus, it is assumed that 7 of the 18 secondary side pressure relief valves were inoperable at some time during the last operating cycle. An engineering analysis has determined that the inoperable secondary side pressure relief valves did not result in a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function needed to remove residual heat. The impact of the inoperable secondary side pressure relief valves on the steam generators and associated secondary side piping integrity was assessed by comparison to an existing analysis. A qualitative assessment of that analysis indicates that with the reduced steam relief capacity, the pressure in the steam generators and associated secondary side piping would remain below the ASME code allowable. Thus, there would have been no failure of the steam generators and no subsequent potential loss of decay heat removal capability. Therefore, this event does not meet the criteria of 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) and is being retracted. This event will be reported as a 60 day LER in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R1DO (Holody).
"Online testing of the secondary side pressure relief valves revealed that 3 valves did not open at the required pressure set point on the initial tests. All valves did open on subsequent tests at a higher pressure and have been restored to operable status. These 3 valves and 3 other similar valves were installed during the last refueling outage and it is concluded that all 6 valves have the same set point drift failure mechanism. All 6 valves are assumed to have been inoperable at some time during the last operating cycle. The steam generator design analysis specifies a minimum pressure relief capability to prevent a failure of the steam generator and subsequent potential loss of decay heat removal capability. This condition could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function needed to remove residual heat. An engineering analysis is in progress to determine the actual impact on the safety function.
"Per Technical Specifications 3.4.1.2.3, reactor power was reduced to below 66.3% due to the remaining 3 inoperable relief valves."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * EVENT RETRACTION FROM ADAM MILLER TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1130 EST ON 12/11/2009 * * *
"In addition to the 6 valves discussed in EN 45464, an additional valve was found to be inoperable. Thus, it is assumed that 7 of the 18 secondary side pressure relief valves were inoperable at some time during the last operating cycle. An engineering analysis has determined that the inoperable secondary side pressure relief valves did not result in a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function needed to remove residual heat. The impact of the inoperable secondary side pressure relief valves on the steam generators and associated secondary side piping integrity was assessed by comparison to an existing analysis. A qualitative assessment of that analysis indicates that with the reduced steam relief capacity, the pressure in the steam generators and associated secondary side piping would remain below the ASME code allowable. Thus, there would have been no failure of the steam generators and no subsequent potential loss of decay heat removal capability. Therefore, this event does not meet the criteria of 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) and is being retracted. This event will be reported as a 60 day LER in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R1DO (Holody).