Event Notification Report for September 29, 2009
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
09/28/2009 - 09/29/2009
EVENT NUMBERS
4538845389453904539145574
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45388
Facility: RIVER BEND
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: TIM VENABLE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: TIM VENABLE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 09/29/2009
Notification Time: 16:19 [ET]
Event Date: 09/29/2009
Event Time: 11:27 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/29/2009
Notification Time: 16:19 [ET]
Event Date: 09/29/2009
Event Time: 11:27 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/29/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL SHANNON (R4DO)
MICHAEL SHANNON (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
LOSS OF WATER FROM UPPER REFUEL POOL
"On 9/29/2009, at 1127 hours, with the plant in Mode 5, Refuel, upper pool filled for refuel activities, and no fuel handling or control rod movement activities in progress, River Bend Station operators manually started Low Pressure Coolant Injection Pump Charlie to facilitate filling of the upper pool. This action was necessary to offset a loss of upper pool water through a main steam line and into the drywell. Approximately 5000 gallons of water drained from the upper pool into the drywell. Initial investigation found that the leakage was past a partially de-flated main steam line plug, through Safety Relief Valve flanges, which were not fully torqued at the time. The steam line plug became deflated during ECCS testing when service air isolated to containment. The service air system provides a backup to the mechanical seal. The drywell was evacuated and actions were initiated to close containment. The steam line plug was re-inflated which stopped leakage to the main steam line and drywell. At no time during the event was River Bend Station out of compliance with Technical Specification requirements for the upper pool. River Bend personnel are performing further investigations into the cause of the event."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"On 9/29/2009, at 1127 hours, with the plant in Mode 5, Refuel, upper pool filled for refuel activities, and no fuel handling or control rod movement activities in progress, River Bend Station operators manually started Low Pressure Coolant Injection Pump Charlie to facilitate filling of the upper pool. This action was necessary to offset a loss of upper pool water through a main steam line and into the drywell. Approximately 5000 gallons of water drained from the upper pool into the drywell. Initial investigation found that the leakage was past a partially de-flated main steam line plug, through Safety Relief Valve flanges, which were not fully torqued at the time. The steam line plug became deflated during ECCS testing when service air isolated to containment. The service air system provides a backup to the mechanical seal. The drywell was evacuated and actions were initiated to close containment. The steam line plug was re-inflated which stopped leakage to the main steam line and drywell. At no time during the event was River Bend Station out of compliance with Technical Specification requirements for the upper pool. River Bend personnel are performing further investigations into the cause of the event."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45389
Facility: FT CALHOUN
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: NATHAN SEID
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: NATHAN SEID
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 09/29/2009
Notification Time: 20:09 [ET]
Event Date: 09/29/2009
Event Time: 15:09 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/30/2009
Notification Time: 20:09 [ET]
Event Date: 09/29/2009
Event Time: 15:09 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/30/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL SHANNON (R4DO)
MICHAEL SHANNON (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER UNAVAILABLE FOR EMERGENCY PLANNING RESPONSES
"At 15:09 CDT, today the Technical Support Center ventilation system stopped running. The cause for the failure of the Technical Support Center ventilation system is suspected to be an interlock between the fire detection system and the ventilation unit. The cause of the this condition renders the Technical Support Center unavailable for Emergency Planning Responses. Alternate facilities are available. This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) for Loss of Emergency Preparedness Capabilities."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM JULIE BISSEN TO JOHN KNOKE AT 1314 EDT ON 9/30/09 * * *
Technical Support Center ventilation system is now functional and is available for Emergency Planning Responses.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Mike Shannon)
"At 15:09 CDT, today the Technical Support Center ventilation system stopped running. The cause for the failure of the Technical Support Center ventilation system is suspected to be an interlock between the fire detection system and the ventilation unit. The cause of the this condition renders the Technical Support Center unavailable for Emergency Planning Responses. Alternate facilities are available. This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) for Loss of Emergency Preparedness Capabilities."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM JULIE BISSEN TO JOHN KNOKE AT 1314 EDT ON 9/30/09 * * *
Technical Support Center ventilation system is now functional and is available for Emergency Planning Responses.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Mike Shannon)
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45390
Facility: CLINTON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: JIM PETERSON
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: JIM PETERSON
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 09/29/2009
Notification Time: 20:46 [ET]
Event Date: 09/29/2009
Event Time: 18:50 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/29/2009
Notification Time: 20:46 [ET]
Event Date: 09/29/2009
Event Time: 18:50 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/29/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
Person (Organization):
JULIO LARA (R3DO)
JULIO LARA (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 97 | Power Operation | 53 | Power Operation |
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SHUTDOWN DUE TO UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE FROM RCS
"At 1850 hours CDT, operators initiated a plant shutdown required by Technical Specification 3.4.5, Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Operational Leakage, due to a greater than 2 gpm increase in unidentified leakage within the previous 24 hours in MODE 1.
"At 1544 hours CDT, a control room operator noticed drywell pressure increased from 0.68 to 0.81 psig. At 1552, the drywell cooler differential temperature alarm actuated, drywell cooling HVAC chiller amps increased from 50 amps to 56 amps, and the Fission Product Monitor particulate and iodine indications were trending up. At 1555, operators entered the abnormal coolant leakage procedure and evacuated containment. At 1615, drywell floor drain leakage rate alarm actuated. At 1616, plant entered the 4-hour Technical Specification action to verify the source of the unidentified leakage source is not due to service sensitive type 304 or type 316 austenitic stainless steel.
"At 1730, operators started a power reduction in an attempt to verify the source of the leak. At 1850, the leakage source could not be verified to not be service sensitive stainless steel; entered TS Required Action to be in MODE 3 within 12 hours and MODE 4 within 36 hours. A reactor shutdown has been initiated. At 1930 floor drain leakage (unidentified leakage) was 3.3 gpm and stable. MODE 3 is expected to be entered by 0350 hours on 9/30/09."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"At 1850 hours CDT, operators initiated a plant shutdown required by Technical Specification 3.4.5, Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Operational Leakage, due to a greater than 2 gpm increase in unidentified leakage within the previous 24 hours in MODE 1.
"At 1544 hours CDT, a control room operator noticed drywell pressure increased from 0.68 to 0.81 psig. At 1552, the drywell cooler differential temperature alarm actuated, drywell cooling HVAC chiller amps increased from 50 amps to 56 amps, and the Fission Product Monitor particulate and iodine indications were trending up. At 1555, operators entered the abnormal coolant leakage procedure and evacuated containment. At 1615, drywell floor drain leakage rate alarm actuated. At 1616, plant entered the 4-hour Technical Specification action to verify the source of the unidentified leakage source is not due to service sensitive type 304 or type 316 austenitic stainless steel.
"At 1730, operators started a power reduction in an attempt to verify the source of the leak. At 1850, the leakage source could not be verified to not be service sensitive stainless steel; entered TS Required Action to be in MODE 3 within 12 hours and MODE 4 within 36 hours. A reactor shutdown has been initiated. At 1930 floor drain leakage (unidentified leakage) was 3.3 gpm and stable. MODE 3 is expected to be entered by 0350 hours on 9/30/09."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45391
Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: RODNEY NACOSTE
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: RODNEY NACOSTE
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 09/30/2009
Notification Time: 04:09 [ET]
Event Date: 09/29/2009
Event Time: 23:23 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/30/2009
Notification Time: 04:09 [ET]
Event Date: 09/29/2009
Event Time: 23:23 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/30/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A) - ECCS INJECTION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A) - ECCS INJECTION
Person (Organization):
MIKE ERNSTES (R2DO)
MIKE ERNSTES (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | M/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
UNIT 2 MANUALLY SCRAMMED AFTER TRIP OF AN OPERATING CONDENSATE PUMP AND RAPIDLY LOWERING RVWL
"On 9/29/09, at 2323 [hours] Unit 2 was manually scrammed due to loss of one of the remaining two Condensate Booster Pumps due to low pump suction pressure. The cause for the Condensate Booster Pump low suction pressures is unknown at this time, but is under investigation. The operating crew was removing feedwater pump 2B from service when the condensate booster pump tripped. The condensate booster pump 2C was already out of service to support maintenance. After the reactor was scrammed manually, reactor water level lowered below the automatic scram set point (+2 inches) and below the automatic start for HPCI and RCIC (-45 inches). All expected Primary and Secondary Containment Isolation valves operated as required, isolation groups 2, 3, 6 and 8 were actuated. Both reactor recirculation pumps tripped due to the low reactor water level. HPCI and RCIC actuated as expected to restore reactor water level. Reactor pressure control was maintained on the turbine bypass valves, and no Main Steam Relief Valves (MSRVs) were opened as a result of the transient.
"At this time the unit is stable in mode 3. Reactor water level is being controlled using one Reactor Feedwater pump. HPCI and RCIC have been returned to standby readiness. Reactor pressure is being automatically maintained by the main turbine bypass valves.
"This event is reportable as a 4 hour non-emergency report due to 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A) and (B) (ECCS discharge to the reactor and Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation) and as an 8 hour non-emergency report due to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) (specified system actuations)."
Lowest observed Reactor Vessel Water Level (RVWL) was -50 inches. Following actuation of HPCI level recovered to +51 inches and then returned to the normal operating band of +33 inches. Safety-related equipment out-of-service prior to the scram included Core Spray Loop 1. All control rods fully inserted. Unit 2 is in a normal post scram electrical lineup.
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector and does not plan a press release.
* * * UPDATE FROM MIKE HUNTER TO JOE O'HARA AT 1508 ON 9/30/09 * * *
"The initial notification made at 0409 hours ET on September 30, 2009, reported that the RCIC system actuated as expected in conjunction with the HPCI to restore Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) water level. However, during a review of plant data, BFN [Browns Ferry Nuclear] determined that after receiving a valid actuation signal, RCIC failed to inject to the RPV. The cause of the failure is under investigation.
"The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector of the update and does not plan a press release."
Notified R2DO(Ernstes).
"On 9/29/09, at 2323 [hours] Unit 2 was manually scrammed due to loss of one of the remaining two Condensate Booster Pumps due to low pump suction pressure. The cause for the Condensate Booster Pump low suction pressures is unknown at this time, but is under investigation. The operating crew was removing feedwater pump 2B from service when the condensate booster pump tripped. The condensate booster pump 2C was already out of service to support maintenance. After the reactor was scrammed manually, reactor water level lowered below the automatic scram set point (+2 inches) and below the automatic start for HPCI and RCIC (-45 inches). All expected Primary and Secondary Containment Isolation valves operated as required, isolation groups 2, 3, 6 and 8 were actuated. Both reactor recirculation pumps tripped due to the low reactor water level. HPCI and RCIC actuated as expected to restore reactor water level. Reactor pressure control was maintained on the turbine bypass valves, and no Main Steam Relief Valves (MSRVs) were opened as a result of the transient.
"At this time the unit is stable in mode 3. Reactor water level is being controlled using one Reactor Feedwater pump. HPCI and RCIC have been returned to standby readiness. Reactor pressure is being automatically maintained by the main turbine bypass valves.
"This event is reportable as a 4 hour non-emergency report due to 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A) and (B) (ECCS discharge to the reactor and Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation) and as an 8 hour non-emergency report due to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) (specified system actuations)."
Lowest observed Reactor Vessel Water Level (RVWL) was -50 inches. Following actuation of HPCI level recovered to +51 inches and then returned to the normal operating band of +33 inches. Safety-related equipment out-of-service prior to the scram included Core Spray Loop 1. All control rods fully inserted. Unit 2 is in a normal post scram electrical lineup.
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector and does not plan a press release.
* * * UPDATE FROM MIKE HUNTER TO JOE O'HARA AT 1508 ON 9/30/09 * * *
"The initial notification made at 0409 hours ET on September 30, 2009, reported that the RCIC system actuated as expected in conjunction with the HPCI to restore Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) water level. However, during a review of plant data, BFN [Browns Ferry Nuclear] determined that after receiving a valid actuation signal, RCIC failed to inject to the RPV. The cause of the failure is under investigation.
"The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector of the update and does not plan a press release."
Notified R2DO(Ernstes).
General Information or Other
Event Number: 45574
Rep Org: HYDROAIRE
Licensee: HYDROAIRE
Region: 3
City: CHICAGO State: IL
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: SESHA GIRI
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Licensee: HYDROAIRE
Region: 3
City: CHICAGO State: IL
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: SESHA GIRI
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 12/16/2009
Notification Time: 17:11 [ET]
Event Date: 09/29/2009
Event Time: 09:02 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/22/2010
Notification Time: 17:11 [ET]
Event Date: 09/29/2009
Event Time: 09:02 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/22/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
TAMARA BLOOMER (R3DO)
PART 21 COORDINATOR (NRR)
RICHARD BARKLEY (R1DO)
TAMARA BLOOMER (R3DO)
PART 21 COORDINATOR (NRR)
RICHARD BARKLEY (R1DO)
PART 21 INVOLVING A PUMP SHAFT COUPLING FAILURE
A service water pump failed during operation on 9/29/2009. Upon disassembly it was detected that a shaft coupling installed on a repaired service water pump failed while in service. The failed coupling was replaced with a new coupling of a different heat code. According to the manufacturer, the threaded coupling design was only supplied for Palisades.
* * * UPDATE FROM SESHA GIRI TO PETE SNYDER AT 1529 ON 2/22/10 * * *
HydroAire conducted a root cause analysis on the issue. They and their heat treat vendor, BodyCote, reviewed all of their safety related work records for the past three years and monitored heat treating of recent orders.
"Records showed that this anomaly occurred only on one piece and it is a random isolated incident."
The vendor believes that corrective actions that they and BodyCote have taken "should remove concerns in the future heat treatments and past review of records confirms adequacy of the heat treat at least for the past three years."
Notified R3DO (Stone) and Part 21 Group via email.
A service water pump failed during operation on 9/29/2009. Upon disassembly it was detected that a shaft coupling installed on a repaired service water pump failed while in service. The failed coupling was replaced with a new coupling of a different heat code. According to the manufacturer, the threaded coupling design was only supplied for Palisades.
* * * UPDATE FROM SESHA GIRI TO PETE SNYDER AT 1529 ON 2/22/10 * * *
HydroAire conducted a root cause analysis on the issue. They and their heat treat vendor, BodyCote, reviewed all of their safety related work records for the past three years and monitored heat treating of recent orders.
"Records showed that this anomaly occurred only on one piece and it is a random isolated incident."
The vendor believes that corrective actions that they and BodyCote have taken "should remove concerns in the future heat treatments and past review of records confirms adequacy of the heat treat at least for the past three years."
Notified R3DO (Stone) and Part 21 Group via email.