Event Notification Report for September 27, 2009
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
09/26/2009 - 09/27/2009
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 45384
Rep Org: KAKIVIK ASSET MANAGEMENT
Licensee: KAKIVIK ASSET MANAGEMENT
Region: 4
City: ANCHORAGE State: AK
County:
License #: 50-27667-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KEENAN REMELE
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Licensee: KAKIVIK ASSET MANAGEMENT
Region: 4
City: ANCHORAGE State: AK
County:
License #: 50-27667-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KEENAN REMELE
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 09/27/2009
Notification Time: 12:30 [ET]
Event Date: 09/27/2009
Event Time: 02:00 [YDT]
Last Update Date: 09/27/2009
Notification Time: 12:30 [ET]
Event Date: 09/27/2009
Event Time: 02:00 [YDT]
Last Update Date: 09/27/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL SHANNON (R4DO)
KEVIN HSUEH (FSME)
MICHAEL SHANNON (R4DO)
KEVIN HSUEH (FSME)
RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA SOURCE FAILS TO FULLY RETRACT INTO CAMERA
Technicians were performing radiography at the Kuparuk Oil Field in Prudhoe Bay, Alaska. The IR-100 camera experienced a lockout with the source within the camera but not fully retracted. The technicians were trained on this problem and were able to reset the lockout and fully retract the source. No exposure resulted from resetting the lockout.
The IR-100 camera contains less than 100 Ci of Ir-192.
Technicians were performing radiography at the Kuparuk Oil Field in Prudhoe Bay, Alaska. The IR-100 camera experienced a lockout with the source within the camera but not fully retracted. The technicians were trained on this problem and were able to reset the lockout and fully retract the source. No exposure resulted from resetting the lockout.
The IR-100 camera contains less than 100 Ci of Ir-192.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45511
Facility: KEWAUNEE
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: JACK GADZALA
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: JACK GADZALA
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 11/19/2009
Notification Time: 16:45 [ET]
Event Date: 09/27/2009
Event Time: 16:48 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/19/2009
Notification Time: 16:45 [ET]
Event Date: 09/27/2009
Event Time: 16:48 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/19/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
ERIC DUNCAN (R3DO)
ERIC DUNCAN (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
OPTIONAL 60-DAY TELEPHONIC NOTIFICATION FOR INVALID SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION
"[This is a] telephone notification made under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) in lieu of submitting written Licensee Event Report.
"On September 27, 2009, following reactor shutdown and cooldown for a planned refueling outage, 4160 VAC Safeguard Bus 5 was being restored to normal electrical lineup. Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) A was powering Bus 5 following successful completion of planned testing to satisfy Technical Specification requirements for testing of EDG automatic start, load shedding, and restoration, initiated by a simulated loss of all normal AC power.
"At 1648, while restoring Bus 5 to normal electrical lineup, breaker 1-503, Tertiary Auxiliary Transformer (TAT) supply to Bus 5, reopened after being closed. EDG A continued to supply Bus 5 without interruption. The following equipment tripped when breaker 1-503 opened: Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Pump A, Containment Fan Coil Units (CFCUs) A & B, Shield Building Ventilation (SBV) Fan A, and Service Water (SW) Pump A1. Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Pump A, Component Cooling (CC) Pump A, and SW Pump A2 were tripped and restarted by the blackout sequencer. All actuations were completed as designed and the components started and functioned successfully. AFW Train A had been properly removed from service for the EDG test and operated on minimum recirculation following AFW Pump A start.
"The equipment actuations resulted from an invalid signal caused by an electrical jumper for the blackout signal remaining installed during Bus 5 restoration. The jumper continued to inject a simulated loss of voltage (blackout) signal, causing the TAT supply breaker opening and load shedding and sequencer operation as designed.
"Inspection of breaker 1-503 was completed with no abnormalities noted. The jumper was removed and Bus 5 was restored to normal lineup. Corrective actions were initiated to revise the test procedure to more appropriately control bus restoration.
"Although the actuating signal that caused this event was invalid and the electrical bus had been appropriately aligned for the EDG test, this event is being reported because of the multiple and diverse components that were inadvertently actuated."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"[This is a] telephone notification made under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) in lieu of submitting written Licensee Event Report.
"On September 27, 2009, following reactor shutdown and cooldown for a planned refueling outage, 4160 VAC Safeguard Bus 5 was being restored to normal electrical lineup. Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) A was powering Bus 5 following successful completion of planned testing to satisfy Technical Specification requirements for testing of EDG automatic start, load shedding, and restoration, initiated by a simulated loss of all normal AC power.
"At 1648, while restoring Bus 5 to normal electrical lineup, breaker 1-503, Tertiary Auxiliary Transformer (TAT) supply to Bus 5, reopened after being closed. EDG A continued to supply Bus 5 without interruption. The following equipment tripped when breaker 1-503 opened: Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Pump A, Containment Fan Coil Units (CFCUs) A & B, Shield Building Ventilation (SBV) Fan A, and Service Water (SW) Pump A1. Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Pump A, Component Cooling (CC) Pump A, and SW Pump A2 were tripped and restarted by the blackout sequencer. All actuations were completed as designed and the components started and functioned successfully. AFW Train A had been properly removed from service for the EDG test and operated on minimum recirculation following AFW Pump A start.
"The equipment actuations resulted from an invalid signal caused by an electrical jumper for the blackout signal remaining installed during Bus 5 restoration. The jumper continued to inject a simulated loss of voltage (blackout) signal, causing the TAT supply breaker opening and load shedding and sequencer operation as designed.
"Inspection of breaker 1-503 was completed with no abnormalities noted. The jumper was removed and Bus 5 was restored to normal lineup. Corrective actions were initiated to revise the test procedure to more appropriately control bus restoration.
"Although the actuating signal that caused this event was invalid and the electrical bus had been appropriately aligned for the EDG test, this event is being reported because of the multiple and diverse components that were inadvertently actuated."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.