Event Notification Report for September 21, 2009
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
09/20/2009 - 09/21/2009
EVENT NUMBERS
45378453744537545383453714537245397
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
General Information or Other
Event Number: 45378
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS SOUTHWESTERN MEDICAL CENTER
Region: 4
City: DALLAS State: TX
County:
License #: L00384
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ANNIE BACKHAUS
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Licensee: UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS SOUTHWESTERN MEDICAL CENTER
Region: 4
City: DALLAS State: TX
County:
License #: L00384
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ANNIE BACKHAUS
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 09/22/2009
Notification Time: 18:32 [ET]
Event Date: 09/21/2009
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 01/27/2010
Notification Time: 18:32 [ET]
Event Date: 09/21/2009
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 01/27/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
GREG WERNER (R4DO)
KEVIN HSUEH (FSME)
GREG WERNER (R4DO)
KEVIN HSUEH (FSME)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT- PATIENT RECEIVED IMPROPER DOSAGE
On September 21, 2009, a patient undergoing mammosite brachytherapy did not receive the proper dose administration due to the Ir-192 (9.6 Ci) source failing to retract. The administering physician retrieved the source from the patient and placed it back in the device. A dose estimate is in progress, however, the licensee does not expect the dosage to exceed 50 percent of the prescribed dose. The afterloader was cleaned recently and the licensee does not expect any debris from the device. The State will report any results of the dose assessment.
Texas Incident Number: #8673
A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.
* * * RETRACTION ON 1/27/2010 AT 1703 FROM ANNIE BACKHAUS TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
The following report was received via e-mail:
"On September 22, 2009, the Agency [Texas Department of Health] was notified of an incident that occurred on September 21, 2009 involving a patient undergoing mammosite brachytherapy. The patient did not receive the proper dose due to the Iridium (Ir)-192 (9.6 Curies) source failing to retract back into the High Dose Rate after-loader unit. The administering physician retrieved the source from the patient and placed it in a shielded container. An investigation by the Agency was performed on September 29, 2009 and it determined that this was not a reportable event because the fractionated dose delivered differed from the prescribed dose, for a single fraction, by less than 50 percent or the total dose for the prescribed treatment differed from that prescribed by less than 20 percent. Because this does not meet the criteria for a reportable medical event, the State of Texas would like to retract this report."
Notified the R4DO (Pick), and FSME (Thaggard).
On September 21, 2009, a patient undergoing mammosite brachytherapy did not receive the proper dose administration due to the Ir-192 (9.6 Ci) source failing to retract. The administering physician retrieved the source from the patient and placed it back in the device. A dose estimate is in progress, however, the licensee does not expect the dosage to exceed 50 percent of the prescribed dose. The afterloader was cleaned recently and the licensee does not expect any debris from the device. The State will report any results of the dose assessment.
Texas Incident Number: #8673
A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.
* * * RETRACTION ON 1/27/2010 AT 1703 FROM ANNIE BACKHAUS TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
The following report was received via e-mail:
"On September 22, 2009, the Agency [Texas Department of Health] was notified of an incident that occurred on September 21, 2009 involving a patient undergoing mammosite brachytherapy. The patient did not receive the proper dose due to the Iridium (Ir)-192 (9.6 Curies) source failing to retract back into the High Dose Rate after-loader unit. The administering physician retrieved the source from the patient and placed it in a shielded container. An investigation by the Agency was performed on September 29, 2009 and it determined that this was not a reportable event because the fractionated dose delivered differed from the prescribed dose, for a single fraction, by less than 50 percent or the total dose for the prescribed treatment differed from that prescribed by less than 20 percent. Because this does not meet the criteria for a reportable medical event, the State of Texas would like to retract this report."
Notified the R4DO (Pick), and FSME (Thaggard).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45374
Facility: SAINT LUCIE
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: DAVID LANYI
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: DAVID LANYI
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 09/21/2009
Notification Time: 16:05 [ET]
Event Date: 09/21/2009
Event Time: 13:34 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/21/2009
Notification Time: 16:05 [ET]
Event Date: 09/21/2009
Event Time: 13:34 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/21/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2DO)
BRIAN BONSER (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | M/R | N | 0 | Startup | 0 | Hot Standby |
UNPLANNED MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DURING REACTOR STARTUP
"At 1227 EDT, a reactor startup was commenced on Unit 2. Mode 2 was entered at 1325 EDT. At 1333, a Reactor Control Operator noted that Primary Safety Valve V1202 had indications that it was leaking past its seat. Plant procedures required reducing RCS [Reactor Coolant System] pressure in 100 psi increments until the safety reseated. This event required the plant pressure to be reduced to 200 psi below Normal Operating Pressure. Prior to commencing the depressurization, a manual reactor trip was ordered by the Unit Supervisor as discussed in the pre-evolution brief. The unit was in Mode 2 approaching criticality at the time of the trip. The unit is currently stable in Mode 3, Hot Standby.
"The reactor trip was uncomplicated. All equipment operated as expected. Main feedwater remained available during the entire event. Auxiliary Feedwater and Atmospheric Dump Valves remained in service during the entire event.
"Unit 1 was unaffected by the event and remained at full power.
"The grid remained stable throughout the event."
All control rods fully inserted.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"At 1227 EDT, a reactor startup was commenced on Unit 2. Mode 2 was entered at 1325 EDT. At 1333, a Reactor Control Operator noted that Primary Safety Valve V1202 had indications that it was leaking past its seat. Plant procedures required reducing RCS [Reactor Coolant System] pressure in 100 psi increments until the safety reseated. This event required the plant pressure to be reduced to 200 psi below Normal Operating Pressure. Prior to commencing the depressurization, a manual reactor trip was ordered by the Unit Supervisor as discussed in the pre-evolution brief. The unit was in Mode 2 approaching criticality at the time of the trip. The unit is currently stable in Mode 3, Hot Standby.
"The reactor trip was uncomplicated. All equipment operated as expected. Main feedwater remained available during the entire event. Auxiliary Feedwater and Atmospheric Dump Valves remained in service during the entire event.
"Unit 1 was unaffected by the event and remained at full power.
"The grid remained stable throughout the event."
All control rods fully inserted.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45375
Facility: BRUNSWICK
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JOHN MILLER
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JOHN MILLER
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 09/21/2009
Notification Time: 19:02 [ET]
Event Date: 09/21/2009
Event Time: 14:46 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/21/2009
Notification Time: 19:02 [ET]
Event Date: 09/21/2009
Event Time: 14:46 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/21/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2DO)
BRIAN BONSER (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Hot Shutdown | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM AND PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM ACTUATION AFTER PLACING HPCI SYSTEM INSERVICE
"On September 21, 2009, at 14:46 EDT, Unit 1 received valid actuations of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) and the Primary Containment Isolation System. Unit 1 was non-critical, operating in Mode 3, when a RPS actuation occurred. Operators were placing the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system in service for reactor pressure control, when a resulting water level shrink caused level in the Reactor Pressure Vessel to drop to Low Level 1 causing the actuation of RPS and the Primary Containment Isolation system. The HPCI system was secured, and level stabilized in the normal band.
"Primary Containment Isolation system Group 2 (i.e., Drywell Equipment and Floor Drain, Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Discharge to Radwaste, and RHR Process Sample), Group 6 (i.e., Containment Atmosphere Control/Dilution, Containment Atmosphere Monitoring, and Post Accident Sampling Systems), and Group 8 (i.e., RHR Shutdown Cooling) isolation signals were received. RHR was not in shutdown cooling at the time of the isolation signal. Actuations of the Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs) were completed and the affected equipment responded as designed, with the following exceptions: Two Group 2 valves (1-G16-F003 and 1-G16-F019) and two Group 6 valves (1-CAC-V6 and l-CAC-V9) did not automatically isolate and were manually isolated from the control panel. Investigation is under way to determine why these valves did not automatically close.
"Unit 1 was non-critical, in Mode 3, with all rods inserted at the time of the event. The four primary containment isolation valves that did not automatically close did not create an unisolated primary containment penetration. The Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS), along with Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC), were operable and available."
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
"On September 21, 2009, at 14:46 EDT, Unit 1 received valid actuations of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) and the Primary Containment Isolation System. Unit 1 was non-critical, operating in Mode 3, when a RPS actuation occurred. Operators were placing the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system in service for reactor pressure control, when a resulting water level shrink caused level in the Reactor Pressure Vessel to drop to Low Level 1 causing the actuation of RPS and the Primary Containment Isolation system. The HPCI system was secured, and level stabilized in the normal band.
"Primary Containment Isolation system Group 2 (i.e., Drywell Equipment and Floor Drain, Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Discharge to Radwaste, and RHR Process Sample), Group 6 (i.e., Containment Atmosphere Control/Dilution, Containment Atmosphere Monitoring, and Post Accident Sampling Systems), and Group 8 (i.e., RHR Shutdown Cooling) isolation signals were received. RHR was not in shutdown cooling at the time of the isolation signal. Actuations of the Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs) were completed and the affected equipment responded as designed, with the following exceptions: Two Group 2 valves (1-G16-F003 and 1-G16-F019) and two Group 6 valves (1-CAC-V6 and l-CAC-V9) did not automatically isolate and were manually isolated from the control panel. Investigation is under way to determine why these valves did not automatically close.
"Unit 1 was non-critical, in Mode 3, with all rods inserted at the time of the event. The four primary containment isolation valves that did not automatically close did not create an unisolated primary containment penetration. The Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS), along with Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC), were operable and available."
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
Hospital
Event Number: 45383
Rep Org: VETERANS ADMINISTRATION SAN DIEGO
Licensee: VETERANS ADMINISTRATION
Region: 4
City: SAN DIEGO State: CA
County: SAN DIEGO
License #: 03-23853-01VA
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: EDWIN M LEIDHOLDT JR
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Licensee: VETERANS ADMINISTRATION
Region: 4
City: SAN DIEGO State: CA
County: SAN DIEGO
License #: 03-23853-01VA
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: EDWIN M LEIDHOLDT JR
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 09/26/2009
Notification Time: 16:31 [ET]
Event Date: 09/21/2009
Event Time: 00:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 09/26/2009
Notification Time: 16:31 [ET]
Event Date: 09/21/2009
Event Time: 00:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 09/26/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
35.3045(a)(1) - DOSE <> PRESCRIBED DOSAGE
10 CFR Section:
35.3045(a)(1) - DOSE <> PRESCRIBED DOSAGE
Person (Organization):
PATTY PELKE (R3DO)
MICHAEL SHANNON (R4DO)
KEVIN HSUEH (FSME)
PATTY PELKE (R3DO)
MICHAEL SHANNON (R4DO)
KEVIN HSUEH (FSME)
MEDICAL EVENT - PATIENT UNDER DOSE
"This is a notification, pursuant to 10 CFR 35.3045, of a medical event that occurred at the VA San Diego Healthcare System in San Diego, California.
"A dosage of 194 millicuries of I-131 sodium iodide was administered to a patient through a feeding tube on September 21, 2009. The patient was kept in a shielded room at the facility. Daily measurements of the exposure rate at one meter from the patient showed only a small decrease, consistent with radioactive decay, but not the expected biological elimination. The feeding tube was replaced on September 25, 2009. The activity in the feeding tube after removal from the patient was estimated as over 80 millicuries. At this time, it is estimated that the patient received less than half of the administered dose.
"The basis for the medical event is that the total dosage delivered differs from the prescribed dosage by more than 20 percent. The facility has notified the patient of the medical event and is in the process of notifying the referring physician. The facility is in the process of assessing any possible medical effects on the patient.
"The NHPP will perform a reactive inspection regarding the medical event. A 15-day written report for the medical event will be submitted to NRC Region III. National Health Physics Program will notify the NRC Project Manager, Cassandra Frasier, NRC Region III, of the medical event.
Additional information
"The Department of Veterans Affairs holds NRC License No. 03-23853-01VA, a master materials license. Permits are issued under the license to Veterans Health Administration facilities. The VHA permit number for the facility involved in this medical event is 04-15030-01. National Health Physics Program makes required notifications to NRC."
A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.
"This is a notification, pursuant to 10 CFR 35.3045, of a medical event that occurred at the VA San Diego Healthcare System in San Diego, California.
"A dosage of 194 millicuries of I-131 sodium iodide was administered to a patient through a feeding tube on September 21, 2009. The patient was kept in a shielded room at the facility. Daily measurements of the exposure rate at one meter from the patient showed only a small decrease, consistent with radioactive decay, but not the expected biological elimination. The feeding tube was replaced on September 25, 2009. The activity in the feeding tube after removal from the patient was estimated as over 80 millicuries. At this time, it is estimated that the patient received less than half of the administered dose.
"The basis for the medical event is that the total dosage delivered differs from the prescribed dosage by more than 20 percent. The facility has notified the patient of the medical event and is in the process of notifying the referring physician. The facility is in the process of assessing any possible medical effects on the patient.
"The NHPP will perform a reactive inspection regarding the medical event. A 15-day written report for the medical event will be submitted to NRC Region III. National Health Physics Program will notify the NRC Project Manager, Cassandra Frasier, NRC Region III, of the medical event.
Additional information
"The Department of Veterans Affairs holds NRC License No. 03-23853-01VA, a master materials license. Permits are issued under the license to Veterans Health Administration facilities. The VHA permit number for the facility involved in this medical event is 04-15030-01. National Health Physics Program makes required notifications to NRC."
A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45371
Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: AL MANNING
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: AL MANNING
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL
Notification Date: 09/21/2009
Notification Time: 10:45 [ET]
Event Date: 09/21/2009
Event Time: 08:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/21/2009
Notification Time: 10:45 [ET]
Event Date: 09/21/2009
Event Time: 08:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/21/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2DO)
BRIAN BONSER (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER UNAVAILABLE DUE TO PLANNED MAINTENANCE
"Planned preventive maintenance and testing activities are being performed on the Hatch Nuclear Plant's Technical Support Center (TSC) HVAC system on September 21, 2009. These maintenance activities include the performance of preventive maintenance on the TSC air handling unit, condensing unit and fan and testing of the filter train. These work activities are planned to be completed within the (12) hour day shift on 9/21/2009.
"During the time these activities are being performed, the TSC air handling unit, TSC condensing unit, TSC filter train and the fan unit for the TSC filter train will not be available for operation. As such, the TSC HVAC will be rendered non-functional during the performance of this work activity. If an emergency condition occurs during the time these work activities are being performed which requires activation of the TSC, the contingency plan calls for utilization of the TSC, as long as radiological conditions allow for habitability of the facility. Procedure 73EP-EIP-063-0, Technical Support Center Activation, provides instructions to direct TSC management to the Control Room and TSC support personnel to the Simulator Building to continue TSC activities if it is necessary to relocate from the primary TSC so that TSC functions can be continued.
"This event is reportable per 10CFR50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) as described in NUREG-1022, Rev. 1 since this work activity affects an emergency response facility for the duration of the evolution."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM URQUHART TO PARK AT 1704 EDT ON 9/21/09 * * *
Maintenance to the TSC has been completed and the TSC is fully functional.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
R2DO (Bonser) notified.
"Planned preventive maintenance and testing activities are being performed on the Hatch Nuclear Plant's Technical Support Center (TSC) HVAC system on September 21, 2009. These maintenance activities include the performance of preventive maintenance on the TSC air handling unit, condensing unit and fan and testing of the filter train. These work activities are planned to be completed within the (12) hour day shift on 9/21/2009.
"During the time these activities are being performed, the TSC air handling unit, TSC condensing unit, TSC filter train and the fan unit for the TSC filter train will not be available for operation. As such, the TSC HVAC will be rendered non-functional during the performance of this work activity. If an emergency condition occurs during the time these work activities are being performed which requires activation of the TSC, the contingency plan calls for utilization of the TSC, as long as radiological conditions allow for habitability of the facility. Procedure 73EP-EIP-063-0, Technical Support Center Activation, provides instructions to direct TSC management to the Control Room and TSC support personnel to the Simulator Building to continue TSC activities if it is necessary to relocate from the primary TSC so that TSC functions can be continued.
"This event is reportable per 10CFR50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) as described in NUREG-1022, Rev. 1 since this work activity affects an emergency response facility for the duration of the evolution."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM URQUHART TO PARK AT 1704 EDT ON 9/21/09 * * *
Maintenance to the TSC has been completed and the TSC is fully functional.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
R2DO (Bonser) notified.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45372
Facility: VOGTLE
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: CECIL WILLIAMS
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: CECIL WILLIAMS
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 09/21/2009
Notification Time: 12:54 [ET]
Event Date: 09/21/2009
Event Time: 05:51 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/21/2009
Notification Time: 12:54 [ET]
Event Date: 09/21/2009
Event Time: 05:51 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/21/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xii) - OFFSITE MEDICAL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xii) - OFFSITE MEDICAL
Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2DO)
BRIAN BONSER (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
TRANSPORT OF A POTENTIALLY CONTAMINATED INDIVIDUAL OFFSITE
"Earlier this morning, a contract worker fell from a ladder inside the Unit One Containment. The distance fallen is estimated to be eight and one half feet. First Responders arrived at the individual and after examining him secured him to a backboard, after which he was carried from [the] containment. Health Physics Technicians were not able to survey the individual's back since he was strapped to the back board. The ambulance containing the individual exited the PA [Protected Area] at 0551 and a Health Physics Technician accompanied the individual to the hospital. Upon arrival at the hospital and examination by a physician, the Health Physics Technician was allowed to fully check the individual and determined that there was no contamination present.
"This report is being made under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xii) since it could not be positively determined that the injured individual was not contaminated when he was transported off site."
The individual has been released from the hospital.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"Earlier this morning, a contract worker fell from a ladder inside the Unit One Containment. The distance fallen is estimated to be eight and one half feet. First Responders arrived at the individual and after examining him secured him to a backboard, after which he was carried from [the] containment. Health Physics Technicians were not able to survey the individual's back since he was strapped to the back board. The ambulance containing the individual exited the PA [Protected Area] at 0551 and a Health Physics Technician accompanied the individual to the hospital. Upon arrival at the hospital and examination by a physician, the Health Physics Technician was allowed to fully check the individual and determined that there was no contamination present.
"This report is being made under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xii) since it could not be positively determined that the injured individual was not contaminated when he was transported off site."
The individual has been released from the hospital.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 45397
Rep Org: ILLINOIS EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY
Licensee: LOYOLA UNVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER
Region: 3
City: MAYWOOD State: IL
County:
License #: IL-01131-02
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAREN PERRERO
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Licensee: LOYOLA UNVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER
Region: 3
City: MAYWOOD State: IL
County:
License #: IL-01131-02
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAREN PERRERO
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 10/01/2009
Notification Time: 13:04 [ET]
Event Date: 09/21/2009
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/01/2009
Notification Time: 13:04 [ET]
Event Date: 09/21/2009
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/01/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JULIO LARA (R3DO)
GLENDA VILLAMAR (FSME)
JULIO LARA (R3DO)
GLENDA VILLAMAR (FSME)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DOSE TO EMBRYO GREATER THAN 5 REM
The following was received via E-mail:
"On September 30, 2009 the licensee's radiation safety officer contacted the Agency [Illinois EMA] to advise that a dose to an embryo likely to have exceeded 5 Rem occurred as a result of an administration of I-131 to a mother under going thyroid treatment. Twenty five milliCi of I-131 was administered on September 21, 2009. As per hospital protocol, the patient had undergone [pregnancy] screening consisting of interviews and a urine based pregnancy test with negative results. Eight days subsequent to the administration, the patient missed an expected [menstrual] cycle and conducted a home based [pregnancy] test with positive results. Those test results were confirmed with a positive serum based test on that same day administered by her physician.
"The authorized user estimates the embryo would potentially have progressed as much as 3 weeks at that time. TEDE estimates are roughly 6.7 Rem to the embryo, with no thyroid likely to have developed at this stage of pregnancy. The confirmed presence or absence of permanent functional damage is unknown, but the expectation is that there would no effect on the embryo. The patient was advised of this information the same day and further advised that a spontaneous termination was still a potential due to the early developmental stage involved although the radionuclide would not likely play a role in that outcome.
"As a matter of practice, the radiation safety office is investigating details regarding this specific event to ensure all expected procedures were followed. Based on the initial report, no apparent violations are noted, nor any failures made that would have prevented the event from occurring. A formal report will be submitted within the required 15 days. At this time, no general corrective measures are anticipated but the event will be used as an opportunity for refresher training and a risk audit."
Illinois Report #: IL-0900074.
The following was received via E-mail:
"On September 30, 2009 the licensee's radiation safety officer contacted the Agency [Illinois EMA] to advise that a dose to an embryo likely to have exceeded 5 Rem occurred as a result of an administration of I-131 to a mother under going thyroid treatment. Twenty five milliCi of I-131 was administered on September 21, 2009. As per hospital protocol, the patient had undergone [pregnancy] screening consisting of interviews and a urine based pregnancy test with negative results. Eight days subsequent to the administration, the patient missed an expected [menstrual] cycle and conducted a home based [pregnancy] test with positive results. Those test results were confirmed with a positive serum based test on that same day administered by her physician.
"The authorized user estimates the embryo would potentially have progressed as much as 3 weeks at that time. TEDE estimates are roughly 6.7 Rem to the embryo, with no thyroid likely to have developed at this stage of pregnancy. The confirmed presence or absence of permanent functional damage is unknown, but the expectation is that there would no effect on the embryo. The patient was advised of this information the same day and further advised that a spontaneous termination was still a potential due to the early developmental stage involved although the radionuclide would not likely play a role in that outcome.
"As a matter of practice, the radiation safety office is investigating details regarding this specific event to ensure all expected procedures were followed. Based on the initial report, no apparent violations are noted, nor any failures made that would have prevented the event from occurring. A formal report will be submitted within the required 15 days. At this time, no general corrective measures are anticipated but the event will be used as an opportunity for refresher training and a risk audit."
Illinois Report #: IL-0900074.