Event Notification Report for September 20, 2009
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
09/19/2009 - 09/20/2009
EVENT NUMBERS
453924536645367453684536945370
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45392
Facility: VOGTLE
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JEFF TODD
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JEFF TODD
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 09/30/2009
Notification Time: 04:30 [ET]
Event Date: 09/20/2009
Event Time: 18:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/30/2009
Notification Time: 04:30 [ET]
Event Date: 09/20/2009
Event Time: 18:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/30/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
MIKE ERNSTES (R2DO)
MIKE ERNSTES (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
INVALID ACTUATION FROM A SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITY TEST SIGNAL
"On Sunday September 20, 2009 @ 1800 hrs EDT the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Unit 1 was in Mode 5 and performing testing for Containment Ventilation Isolation. A jumper was installed per operations procedure 14238-1 for this testing. The jumper was inadvertently dislodged resulting in a B Train Containment Ventilation Isolation (CVI). There was not a valid radiation alarm signal present; only a test signal. Per Technical Specification 3.3.8 this function is applicable in MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4. The actuation occurred during a maintenance activity and was not from a valid signal.
"This is reportable under 50.73 (a)(2)(iv) based on the following: Per 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), 'Any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (a)(2)(iv)(B) of this section, except when: (1) The actuation resulted from and was part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation; or (2) The actuation was invalid and: (i) Occurred while the system was properly removed from service; or (ii) Occurred after the safety function had been already completed.'
"The event occurred during a surveillance activity and resulted in an invalid actuation from a test signal. The actuation was invalid and the system was not removed from service during this activity. The actuation was considered complete and successful. The CVI signal for Train B automatically isolated the containment ventilation system as designed."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"On Sunday September 20, 2009 @ 1800 hrs EDT the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Unit 1 was in Mode 5 and performing testing for Containment Ventilation Isolation. A jumper was installed per operations procedure 14238-1 for this testing. The jumper was inadvertently dislodged resulting in a B Train Containment Ventilation Isolation (CVI). There was not a valid radiation alarm signal present; only a test signal. Per Technical Specification 3.3.8 this function is applicable in MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4. The actuation occurred during a maintenance activity and was not from a valid signal.
"This is reportable under 50.73 (a)(2)(iv) based on the following: Per 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), 'Any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (a)(2)(iv)(B) of this section, except when: (1) The actuation resulted from and was part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation; or (2) The actuation was invalid and: (i) Occurred while the system was properly removed from service; or (ii) Occurred after the safety function had been already completed.'
"The event occurred during a surveillance activity and resulted in an invalid actuation from a test signal. The actuation was invalid and the system was not removed from service during this activity. The actuation was considered complete and successful. The CVI signal for Train B automatically isolated the containment ventilation system as designed."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45366
Facility: CALVERT CLIFFS
Region: 1 State: MD
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: ROBERT MARTIN
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Region: 1 State: MD
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: ROBERT MARTIN
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 09/20/2009
Notification Time: 05:50 [ET]
Event Date: 09/20/2009
Event Time: 01:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/20/2009
Notification Time: 05:50 [ET]
Event Date: 09/20/2009
Event Time: 01:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/20/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
DON JACKSON (R1DO)
DON JACKSON (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
EMERGENCY SIRENS INOPERABLE
"At 0130 the 800 MHZ radio [control] system failed to the 'fail soft' mode rendering all [73] emergency notification sirens inoperable. At 0305 courtesy call notifications were made to the county control centers (Calvert, Dorchester, St. Mary's and MEMA).
"The backup system was placed in service and 800 MHZ radio and ENS sirens restored to operable status at 0526 9/20/09."
Maintenance work to restore the primary system will occur today.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"At 0130 the 800 MHZ radio [control] system failed to the 'fail soft' mode rendering all [73] emergency notification sirens inoperable. At 0305 courtesy call notifications were made to the county control centers (Calvert, Dorchester, St. Mary's and MEMA).
"The backup system was placed in service and 800 MHZ radio and ENS sirens restored to operable status at 0526 9/20/09."
Maintenance work to restore the primary system will occur today.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45367
Facility: ARKANSAS NUCLEAR
Region: 4 State: AR
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: ALBERT MARTIN
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 4 State: AR
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: ALBERT MARTIN
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 09/20/2009
Notification Time: 13:17 [ET]
Event Date: 09/20/2009
Event Time: 05:11 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/20/2009
Notification Time: 13:17 [ET]
Event Date: 09/20/2009
Event Time: 05:11 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/20/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
RYAN LANTZ (R4DO)
RYAN LANTZ (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
UNPLANNED EMERGENCY DIESEL AUTO START DURING SURVEILLANCE TESTING
"This report is being made due to an auto start of the Red Train Emergency Diesel Generator (2K-4A) which was the result of an unplanned loss of power to the Red Train 4160 Volt Electrical Bus (2A3) during surveillance testing. Concurrent with the loss of power, Shutdown Cooling Flow was temporarily lost.
"This condition occurred with the unit in Mode 5 during a refueling outage. The Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Pressurizer level was 85 percent and RCS temperature was 139 degrees Fahrenheit. During the momentary loss of power, 2A3 automatically shed its loads as designed. This caused the running Shutdown Cooling Pump (Low Pressure Safety Injection Pump 2P-60A) to secure which resulted in a loss of Shutdown Cooling Flow to the RCS for approximately three and a half minutes. Shutdown Cooling was restored using the applicable Abnormal Operating Procedure. RCS temperature rose approximately five degrees Fahrenheit.
"During the performance of planned surveillance testing, 2K-4A was unexpectedly auto started. An Offsite Power Transfer Test was being performed to test automatic transfer from Startup 3 Offsite Transformer to Startup 2 Offsite Transformer. The transfer was initiated by momentarily bypassing (jumpering) a relay. When the test was initiated, a slow transfer of the Red Train 4160 Volt Electrical Bus (2A1) occurred instead of the expected fast transfer. The slow transfer of 2A1 resulted in a momentary loss of power, for approximately two seconds, to the Red Train 4160 Volt Electrical Bus (2A3) which is supplied from 2A1. The under voltage condition on 2A3 caused 2K-4A to auto start, as designed. 2K-4A did not power 2A3, since 2A3 was powered from 2A1 after the slow transfer completed."
The cause of the slow transfer versus a fast transfer is under investigation.
The licensee notified the Arkansas Department of Health and the NRC Resident Inspector.
"This report is being made due to an auto start of the Red Train Emergency Diesel Generator (2K-4A) which was the result of an unplanned loss of power to the Red Train 4160 Volt Electrical Bus (2A3) during surveillance testing. Concurrent with the loss of power, Shutdown Cooling Flow was temporarily lost.
"This condition occurred with the unit in Mode 5 during a refueling outage. The Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Pressurizer level was 85 percent and RCS temperature was 139 degrees Fahrenheit. During the momentary loss of power, 2A3 automatically shed its loads as designed. This caused the running Shutdown Cooling Pump (Low Pressure Safety Injection Pump 2P-60A) to secure which resulted in a loss of Shutdown Cooling Flow to the RCS for approximately three and a half minutes. Shutdown Cooling was restored using the applicable Abnormal Operating Procedure. RCS temperature rose approximately five degrees Fahrenheit.
"During the performance of planned surveillance testing, 2K-4A was unexpectedly auto started. An Offsite Power Transfer Test was being performed to test automatic transfer from Startup 3 Offsite Transformer to Startup 2 Offsite Transformer. The transfer was initiated by momentarily bypassing (jumpering) a relay. When the test was initiated, a slow transfer of the Red Train 4160 Volt Electrical Bus (2A1) occurred instead of the expected fast transfer. The slow transfer of 2A1 resulted in a momentary loss of power, for approximately two seconds, to the Red Train 4160 Volt Electrical Bus (2A3) which is supplied from 2A1. The under voltage condition on 2A3 caused 2K-4A to auto start, as designed. 2K-4A did not power 2A3, since 2A3 was powered from 2A1 after the slow transfer completed."
The cause of the slow transfer versus a fast transfer is under investigation.
The licensee notified the Arkansas Department of Health and the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45368
Facility: BRUNSWICK
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JOHN MILLER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JOHN MILLER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 09/20/2009
Notification Time: 17:08 [ET]
Event Date: 09/20/2009
Event Time: 14:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/20/2009
Notification Time: 17:08 [ET]
Event Date: 09/20/2009
Event Time: 14:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/20/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2DO)
BRIAN BONSER (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 40 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO INOPERABILITY OF DIESEL GENERATOR
"Event reportability, is in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), Technical Specification Required Shutdown, due to inoperability of Diesel Generator #4 extending from planned maintenance.
"Brunswick Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 are initiating unit shutdowns in anticipation of Technical Specification Required Shutdown as required by Technical Specification 3.8.1, Condition H due to the inoperability of Diesel Generator #4 lasting longer than seven (7) days. Power reduction commenced at 1400 on Unit 1, and is scheduled to commence at 2200 09/20/2009 on Unit 2 in accordance with site procedures. Both units will continue the shutdown to Mode 4 or until the emergency diesel generator is declared operable following appropriate repairs and testing."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"Event reportability, is in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), Technical Specification Required Shutdown, due to inoperability of Diesel Generator #4 extending from planned maintenance.
"Brunswick Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 are initiating unit shutdowns in anticipation of Technical Specification Required Shutdown as required by Technical Specification 3.8.1, Condition H due to the inoperability of Diesel Generator #4 lasting longer than seven (7) days. Power reduction commenced at 1400 on Unit 1, and is scheduled to commence at 2200 09/20/2009 on Unit 2 in accordance with site procedures. Both units will continue the shutdown to Mode 4 or until the emergency diesel generator is declared operable following appropriate repairs and testing."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45369
Facility: RIVER BEND
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: JOHN PIPKIN JR
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: JOHN PIPKIN JR
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 09/20/2009
Notification Time: 21:32 [ET]
Event Date: 09/20/2009
Event Time: 17:47 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/20/2009
Notification Time: 21:32 [ET]
Event Date: 09/20/2009
Event Time: 17:47 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/20/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
Person (Organization):
RYAN LANTZ (R4DO)
RYAN LANTZ (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | M/R | Y | 23 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
MANUAL SCRAM DUE TO REACTOR RECIRC PUMP TRIP
"At 1747 hours on September 20, 2009, at River Bend Station, during plant shut down for a planned outage, an unplanned manual reactor scram was initiated by plant operators. As part of the planned shutdown, the reactor recirculation pumps were being transferred from fast to slow speed. This transfer did not occur as expected. Instead, the pumps tripped to off. After this occurred, the operators entered the manual reactor scram. Power level was approximately 23 percent at the time of the scram. All other plant equipment and systems performed as expected. Plant personnel are investigating the cause of the pump trip. The plant is proceeding with planned outage activities."
All rods fully inserted. Decay heat is being removed via main steam drains and bypass valves to the condenser. Reactor pressure is at 200 psig. The electrical lineup is normal and all safety related equipment is available if required. No safety or relief valves lifted during the manual scram.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"At 1747 hours on September 20, 2009, at River Bend Station, during plant shut down for a planned outage, an unplanned manual reactor scram was initiated by plant operators. As part of the planned shutdown, the reactor recirculation pumps were being transferred from fast to slow speed. This transfer did not occur as expected. Instead, the pumps tripped to off. After this occurred, the operators entered the manual reactor scram. Power level was approximately 23 percent at the time of the scram. All other plant equipment and systems performed as expected. Plant personnel are investigating the cause of the pump trip. The plant is proceeding with planned outage activities."
All rods fully inserted. Decay heat is being removed via main steam drains and bypass valves to the condenser. Reactor pressure is at 200 psig. The electrical lineup is normal and all safety related equipment is available if required. No safety or relief valves lifted during the manual scram.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45370
Facility: SEQUOYAH
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JULIOUS WHITWORTH
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JULIOUS WHITWORTH
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL
Notification Date: 09/21/2009
Notification Time: 01:44 [ET]
Event Date: 09/20/2009
Event Time: 18:26 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/21/2009
Notification Time: 01:44 [ET]
Event Date: 09/20/2009
Event Time: 18:26 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/21/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2DO)
BRIAN BONSER (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
MAJOR LOSS OF COMMUNICATIONS DUE TO LIGHTNING STRIKE
"At 1826 on Sept 20, 2009, a lightning strike caused a disruption of power to offsite communications. At 1853, ENS communications from Sequoyah Nuclear Plant to the NRC were verified. At 2129, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant was notified the ERDS was not linked to the CECC (Offsite Emergency Operating Facility) or the NRC. At 2218, it was discovered the NRC could not contact Sequoyah Nuclear Plant by the ENS, but Sequoyah Nuclear Plant could still contact the NRC using ENS. At 2240, backup phone communications with satellite phone and cell phones were established between Sequoyah Nuclear Plant and the NRC. Efforts are in progress to restore power to the communications NODE building to restore normal communications."
At 0155 the NRC verified 2 way communications via ENS with the licensee.
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
"At 1826 on Sept 20, 2009, a lightning strike caused a disruption of power to offsite communications. At 1853, ENS communications from Sequoyah Nuclear Plant to the NRC were verified. At 2129, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant was notified the ERDS was not linked to the CECC (Offsite Emergency Operating Facility) or the NRC. At 2218, it was discovered the NRC could not contact Sequoyah Nuclear Plant by the ENS, but Sequoyah Nuclear Plant could still contact the NRC using ENS. At 2240, backup phone communications with satellite phone and cell phones were established between Sequoyah Nuclear Plant and the NRC. Efforts are in progress to restore power to the communications NODE building to restore normal communications."
At 0155 the NRC verified 2 way communications via ENS with the licensee.
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.