Event Notification Report for September 18, 2009
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
09/17/2009 - 09/18/2009
EVENT NUMBERS
45373453644536145362
General Information or Other
Event Number: 45373
Rep Org: BAYER CROPSCIENCE
Licensee: BAYER CROPSCIENCE
Region: 1
City: INSTITUTE State: WV
County:
License #: 47-04373-01
Agreement: N
Docket: 3006663
NRC Notified By: EDWARD GAZDIK
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Licensee: BAYER CROPSCIENCE
Region: 1
City: INSTITUTE State: WV
County:
License #: 47-04373-01
Agreement: N
Docket: 3006663
NRC Notified By: EDWARD GAZDIK
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 09/21/2009
Notification Time: 14:07 [ET]
Event Date: 09/18/2009
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/24/2009
Notification Time: 14:07 [ET]
Event Date: 09/18/2009
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/24/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
ANNE DEFRANCISCO (R1DO)
MICHELE BURGESS (FSME)
ANNE DEFRANCISCO (R1DO)
MICHELE BURGESS (FSME)
GAUGE SHUTTER STUCK OPEN
"On Sept 21, 2009, [the licensee discovered] a stuck shutter on an ammonia tank (top) in the catalyst area. The gauge is an Ohmart Model SH-F2, Serial 64692, containing 800 millicuries of Cesium-137. The gauge was originally installed in 2006. The stuck shutter was discovered during a routine 6 month shutter check on Sept 18, 2009. The technician tried to electrically close the shutter, but was unable to do so. [The licensee has] scheduled a service provider for repair within the week. The source is safely mounted on the side of a tank, [and the licensee] expects no exposure to occur. The Ohmart manufacturer was contacted."
* * * UPDATE ON 9/24/09 AT 0930 EDT FROM GAZDIK TO HUFFMAN * * *
An Ohmart service representative responded to the site to repair the gauge. It was determined that a fuse had blown in the gauge actuating circuit and that the shutter was not mechanically stuck. The gauge has been repaired and returned to service.
R1DO (DeFrancisco) and FSME EO (McIntosh) have been notified.
"On Sept 21, 2009, [the licensee discovered] a stuck shutter on an ammonia tank (top) in the catalyst area. The gauge is an Ohmart Model SH-F2, Serial 64692, containing 800 millicuries of Cesium-137. The gauge was originally installed in 2006. The stuck shutter was discovered during a routine 6 month shutter check on Sept 18, 2009. The technician tried to electrically close the shutter, but was unable to do so. [The licensee has] scheduled a service provider for repair within the week. The source is safely mounted on the side of a tank, [and the licensee] expects no exposure to occur. The Ohmart manufacturer was contacted."
* * * UPDATE ON 9/24/09 AT 0930 EDT FROM GAZDIK TO HUFFMAN * * *
An Ohmart service representative responded to the site to repair the gauge. It was determined that a fuse had blown in the gauge actuating circuit and that the shutter was not mechanically stuck. The gauge has been repaired and returned to service.
R1DO (DeFrancisco) and FSME EO (McIntosh) have been notified.
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 45364
Rep Org: HILLIS-CARNES ENGINEERING ASSOC
Licensee: HILLIS-CARNES ENGINEERING ASSOC
Region: 1
City: SPRINGFIELD State: VA
County:
License #: 19-30304-02
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID ATKINS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Licensee: HILLIS-CARNES ENGINEERING ASSOC
Region: 1
City: SPRINGFIELD State: VA
County:
License #: 19-30304-02
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID ATKINS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 09/18/2009
Notification Time: 17:03 [ET]
Event Date: 09/18/2009
Event Time: 16:50 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/19/2009
Notification Time: 17:03 [ET]
Event Date: 09/18/2009
Event Time: 16:50 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/19/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
DON JACKSON (R1DO)
JACK FOSTER (FSME)
DON JACKSON (R1DO)
JACK FOSTER (FSME)
TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE DAMAGED
A Hillis-Carnes operator was conducting a density test along a portion of the Fairfax County Parkway project on Fort Belvoir property when the gauge was backed over by a pick-up truck. Hillis-Carnes technician was 10-15 feet from the gauge when the incident occurred but could not get the driver's attention in time for him to stop. The gauge (Model No. 3411-B, Serial No. 15826) with 8 mCi of Cs-137 (Serial No. 50-4850) and 40 mCi of Am 241:Be (Serial No. 47-11222) was hit by the under carriage of the vehicle while in the testing mode with the source rod extended to a depth of 8 inches. The depth rod was snapped off the gauge and the source rod remained intact. However, the source rod was slightly bent which prevented the rod from being lifted to the shielded position.
The area was immediately cleared to a minimum distance of 30 feet. Local emergency responders were the first on the scene and surveyed the area. The RSO was not on site at this time but was informed that survey readings were taken, and the levels indicated the sources were not leaking. The responders recommended the area remain cleared until personnel arrived that could address removing the gauge properly.
Hillis-Carnes attempted to contact their 24-hour emergency response service without success. The RSO was also informed by the NRC that the emergency contact numbers did not work. Subsequently, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) representative was contacted by Fort Belvoir representatives to come to the site.
Upon arrival, USACE surveyed the area. No readings were recorded at 30 feet from the gauge (established safe zone), however a reading of 10mR/hr was obtained at contact with the gauge. The RSO and USACE discussed opinions for temporary packaging of the device. It was determined that the gauge would be placed in a 55 gallon drum, sandwiched in soil. The NRC was contacted on this course of action and it was subsequently approved.
The drum was partially filled with soil, then the gauge was lifted from its test location and immediately embedded into the loose soil with the source rod down the center of the drum. Additional soil was placed over the gauge. Survey readings over the soil in the drum and around the perimeter of drum were 8 mR/hr each. Additionally, the in-place soil was surveyed with 12 to 14 microRem obtained at the test location and background noted to be 10 microRem. Only individuals with personal monitoring badges were permitted within the 30 foot safety area during the packaging of the gauge.
The drum was transported and placed in an on-site storage container and subsequently surveyed again by USACE. Readings at this point were taken at 30 cm from the container and noted to be 2 mR/hr. The storage container is labeled with radiation placards and labeling was added to the drum. The container was locked and the door barricaded with construction equipment.
Today [9/19/09], the RSO contacted Northeast Technical Services in Westminster, Maryland. They indicated that they could be on-site today to take care of properly packaging and shipping the gauge. It is to be transported to their facility. The RSO contacted others involved in the on-site activities from last evening and it was determined that the USAG [United States Army Garrison] Fort Belvoir Army Radiation representative has not been involved in the actions to date. Army representative wanted the removal of the gauge to be postponed until midday on Monday, September 21st, until the representative could be involved. Northeast Technical has subsequently been scheduled for midday Monday.
A Hillis-Carnes operator was conducting a density test along a portion of the Fairfax County Parkway project on Fort Belvoir property when the gauge was backed over by a pick-up truck. Hillis-Carnes technician was 10-15 feet from the gauge when the incident occurred but could not get the driver's attention in time for him to stop. The gauge (Model No. 3411-B, Serial No. 15826) with 8 mCi of Cs-137 (Serial No. 50-4850) and 40 mCi of Am 241:Be (Serial No. 47-11222) was hit by the under carriage of the vehicle while in the testing mode with the source rod extended to a depth of 8 inches. The depth rod was snapped off the gauge and the source rod remained intact. However, the source rod was slightly bent which prevented the rod from being lifted to the shielded position.
The area was immediately cleared to a minimum distance of 30 feet. Local emergency responders were the first on the scene and surveyed the area. The RSO was not on site at this time but was informed that survey readings were taken, and the levels indicated the sources were not leaking. The responders recommended the area remain cleared until personnel arrived that could address removing the gauge properly.
Hillis-Carnes attempted to contact their 24-hour emergency response service without success. The RSO was also informed by the NRC that the emergency contact numbers did not work. Subsequently, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) representative was contacted by Fort Belvoir representatives to come to the site.
Upon arrival, USACE surveyed the area. No readings were recorded at 30 feet from the gauge (established safe zone), however a reading of 10mR/hr was obtained at contact with the gauge. The RSO and USACE discussed opinions for temporary packaging of the device. It was determined that the gauge would be placed in a 55 gallon drum, sandwiched in soil. The NRC was contacted on this course of action and it was subsequently approved.
The drum was partially filled with soil, then the gauge was lifted from its test location and immediately embedded into the loose soil with the source rod down the center of the drum. Additional soil was placed over the gauge. Survey readings over the soil in the drum and around the perimeter of drum were 8 mR/hr each. Additionally, the in-place soil was surveyed with 12 to 14 microRem obtained at the test location and background noted to be 10 microRem. Only individuals with personal monitoring badges were permitted within the 30 foot safety area during the packaging of the gauge.
The drum was transported and placed in an on-site storage container and subsequently surveyed again by USACE. Readings at this point were taken at 30 cm from the container and noted to be 2 mR/hr. The storage container is labeled with radiation placards and labeling was added to the drum. The container was locked and the door barricaded with construction equipment.
Today [9/19/09], the RSO contacted Northeast Technical Services in Westminster, Maryland. They indicated that they could be on-site today to take care of properly packaging and shipping the gauge. It is to be transported to their facility. The RSO contacted others involved in the on-site activities from last evening and it was determined that the USAG [United States Army Garrison] Fort Belvoir Army Radiation representative has not been involved in the actions to date. Army representative wanted the removal of the gauge to be postponed until midday on Monday, September 21st, until the representative could be involved. Northeast Technical has subsequently been scheduled for midday Monday.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45361
Facility: COOK
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BEN HUFFMAN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BEN HUFFMAN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 09/18/2009
Notification Time: 16:29 [ET]
Event Date: 09/18/2009
Event Time: 10:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/01/2009
Notification Time: 16:29 [ET]
Event Date: 09/18/2009
Event Time: 10:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/01/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3DO)
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
INOPERABILITY OF BOTH EDG'S DUE TO VALVE FOUND OUT OF POSITION
"At 02:00 on Friday, September 18, 2009, the Unit 2 AB Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Air Jet Assist Control Air Shutoff valve, which is required to be open, was discovered closed. At 10:30 on Friday, September 18, 2009, it was determined that with the valve closed, the EDG Air Jet Assist may not be able to support the EDG fast speed start to meet the EDG's Operability requirements. This condition renders the Unit 2 AB EDG inoperable. The valve was repositioned and verified open at 02:15 on Friday, September 18, 2009, restoring the EDG to operable status. Similar valves were verified to be in the correct position on all other EDGs in both Units.
"The Unit 2 AB Emergency Diesel Generator Air Jet Assist Control Air Shutoff valve was last confirmed open on July 21, 2009. The time the valve became closed is not known. Since July 21, 2009, there have been 3 periods of inoperability for Unit 2 CD EDG, the redundant Emergency Diesel Generator. During each of these periods, both of the Unit 2 EDGs are assumed to be inoperable. The periods are as follows:
"August 10, 2009 at 09:31 until August 10, 2009 at 23:00
August 11, 2009 at 07:30 until August 11, 2009 at 23:16
September 9, 2009 al 00:02 until September 9, 2009 at 04:40
"This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(ii)(B) due to the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety."
The licensee has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION ON 10/01/2009 AT 1634 EDT FROM JAMES SHAW TO DONALD NORWOOD * * *
"At 02:00 on Friday, September 18, 2009, the Unit 2 AB Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Air Jet Assist Control Air Shutoff valve, which is required to be open, was discovered closed. At 10:30 on Friday, September 18, 2009, it was determined that with the valve closed, the EDG Air Jet Assist may not be able to support the EDG fast speed start to meet the EDG's Operability requirements. This condition renders the Unit 2 AB EDG inoperable. The valve was repositioned and verified open at 02:15 on Friday, September 18, 2009, restoring the EDG to operable status.
"Since the last time the Turbocharger Air Jet Assist Control Air Shutoff valve was confirmed open, July 21, 2009, there were three periods where the redundant EDG was inoperable for planned maintenance and surveillance testing. During each of these periods, both of the Unit 2 EDGs are assumed to be inoperable. As such, Cook Nuclear Plant (CNP) submitted Event Notification 45361 in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) due to the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety.
"On September 25, 2009, CNP conducted two EDG fast speed starts, one with the Turbocharger Air Jet Assist Control Air Shutoff valve closed, and one with the valve open. Based on a review of the data collected and observed performance of the EDG, the determination has been made that having the Turbocharger Air Jet Assist Control Air valve closed does not adversely impact operability of an EDG.
"The circumstances discussed in the notification did not result in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
Notified R3DO (Lara).
"At 02:00 on Friday, September 18, 2009, the Unit 2 AB Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Air Jet Assist Control Air Shutoff valve, which is required to be open, was discovered closed. At 10:30 on Friday, September 18, 2009, it was determined that with the valve closed, the EDG Air Jet Assist may not be able to support the EDG fast speed start to meet the EDG's Operability requirements. This condition renders the Unit 2 AB EDG inoperable. The valve was repositioned and verified open at 02:15 on Friday, September 18, 2009, restoring the EDG to operable status. Similar valves were verified to be in the correct position on all other EDGs in both Units.
"The Unit 2 AB Emergency Diesel Generator Air Jet Assist Control Air Shutoff valve was last confirmed open on July 21, 2009. The time the valve became closed is not known. Since July 21, 2009, there have been 3 periods of inoperability for Unit 2 CD EDG, the redundant Emergency Diesel Generator. During each of these periods, both of the Unit 2 EDGs are assumed to be inoperable. The periods are as follows:
"August 10, 2009 at 09:31 until August 10, 2009 at 23:00
August 11, 2009 at 07:30 until August 11, 2009 at 23:16
September 9, 2009 al 00:02 until September 9, 2009 at 04:40
"This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(ii)(B) due to the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety."
The licensee has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION ON 10/01/2009 AT 1634 EDT FROM JAMES SHAW TO DONALD NORWOOD * * *
"At 02:00 on Friday, September 18, 2009, the Unit 2 AB Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Air Jet Assist Control Air Shutoff valve, which is required to be open, was discovered closed. At 10:30 on Friday, September 18, 2009, it was determined that with the valve closed, the EDG Air Jet Assist may not be able to support the EDG fast speed start to meet the EDG's Operability requirements. This condition renders the Unit 2 AB EDG inoperable. The valve was repositioned and verified open at 02:15 on Friday, September 18, 2009, restoring the EDG to operable status.
"Since the last time the Turbocharger Air Jet Assist Control Air Shutoff valve was confirmed open, July 21, 2009, there were three periods where the redundant EDG was inoperable for planned maintenance and surveillance testing. During each of these periods, both of the Unit 2 EDGs are assumed to be inoperable. As such, Cook Nuclear Plant (CNP) submitted Event Notification 45361 in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) due to the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety.
"On September 25, 2009, CNP conducted two EDG fast speed starts, one with the Turbocharger Air Jet Assist Control Air Shutoff valve closed, and one with the valve open. Based on a review of the data collected and observed performance of the EDG, the determination has been made that having the Turbocharger Air Jet Assist Control Air valve closed does not adversely impact operability of an EDG.
"The circumstances discussed in the notification did not result in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
Notified R3DO (Lara).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45362
Facility: CLINTON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: RICHARD KISS
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: RICHARD KISS
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 09/18/2009
Notification Time: 16:38 [ET]
Event Date: 09/18/2009
Event Time: 14:50 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/18/2009
Notification Time: 16:38 [ET]
Event Date: 09/18/2009
Event Time: 14:50 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/18/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3DO)
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 97 | Power Operation | 97 | Power Operation |
FITNESS FOR DUTY - NON-DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION BY A NON-LICENSED CONTRACTOR
A non-licensed contractor failed to report derogatory information to the licensee at the time of processing. Upon discovery of the discrepancy, the contractor's plant access was terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
A non-licensed contractor failed to report derogatory information to the licensee at the time of processing. Upon discovery of the discrepancy, the contractor's plant access was terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.