Event Notification Report for September 11, 2009
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
09/10/2009 - 09/11/2009
EVENT NUMBERS
453394534045341453424534345344453454534645542
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45339
Facility: ARKANSAS NUCLEAR
Region: 4 State: AR
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: CLAY REED
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Region: 4 State: AR
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: CLAY REED
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 09/11/2009
Notification Time: 11:32 [ET]
Event Date: 09/11/2009
Event Time: 10:25 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/11/2009
Notification Time: 11:32 [ET]
Event Date: 09/11/2009
Event Time: 10:25 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/11/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
DAVID PROULX (R4DO)
DAVID PROULX (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
SPDS REMOVED FROM SERVICE FOR MAINTENANCE
"Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 2 is removing the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) from service for preventative maintenance and scheduled corrective maintenance. SPDS is a computer based system that is utilized by both Unit 1 and Unit 2 to provide critical information during an emergency. Unit 2 is currently in a refueling outage. Unit 1 is on line at 100% power. Compensatory measures are being taken to ensure that necessary backup monitoring is established on Unit 1. The maintenance window is scheduled to be open for 24 hours."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The licensee made a courtesy notification to the Arkansas Department of Health.
"Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 2 is removing the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) from service for preventative maintenance and scheduled corrective maintenance. SPDS is a computer based system that is utilized by both Unit 1 and Unit 2 to provide critical information during an emergency. Unit 2 is currently in a refueling outage. Unit 1 is on line at 100% power. Compensatory measures are being taken to ensure that necessary backup monitoring is established on Unit 1. The maintenance window is scheduled to be open for 24 hours."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The licensee made a courtesy notification to the Arkansas Department of Health.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45340
Facility: DUANE ARNOLD
Region: 3 State: IA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: SCOTT AREBAUGH
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Region: 3 State: IA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: SCOTT AREBAUGH
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 09/11/2009
Notification Time: 12:40 [ET]
Event Date: 09/11/2009
Event Time: 11:01 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/11/2009
Notification Time: 12:40 [ET]
Event Date: 09/11/2009
Event Time: 11:01 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/11/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
MARK RING (R3DO)
MARK RING (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER UNAVAILABLE DUE TO MAINTENANCE
"At 1100 on Friday, September 11, 2009 a portion of the Duane Arnold Energy Center power plant (DAEC) Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system, Technical Support Center (TSC) air conditioning system, and Technical Support Center (TSC) computer system was removed from service for maintenance on Technical Support Center (TSC) electrical power supply.
"The electrical power supply being removed supports air conditioning, filtration system and computers.
"Under certain accident conditions the TSC may become unavailable due to the inability of the ventilation system to maintain a habitable atmosphere and loss of computer systems. Compensatory measures exist to rapidly restore power to the TSC if necessary based upon TSC activation requirements.
"The TSC power supply maintenance is scheduled to complete at 1800 on Friday, September 11, 2009. The licensee has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b) (3) (xiii) due to loss of an emergency response facility."
* * * UPDATE FROM SCOTT AREBAUGH TO VINCE KLCO AT 1802 ON 9/11/2009 * * *
The TSC power supply maintenance has been completed and the Technical Support Center(TSC) is now fully available.
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified the R3DO(Ring).
"At 1100 on Friday, September 11, 2009 a portion of the Duane Arnold Energy Center power plant (DAEC) Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system, Technical Support Center (TSC) air conditioning system, and Technical Support Center (TSC) computer system was removed from service for maintenance on Technical Support Center (TSC) electrical power supply.
"The electrical power supply being removed supports air conditioning, filtration system and computers.
"Under certain accident conditions the TSC may become unavailable due to the inability of the ventilation system to maintain a habitable atmosphere and loss of computer systems. Compensatory measures exist to rapidly restore power to the TSC if necessary based upon TSC activation requirements.
"The TSC power supply maintenance is scheduled to complete at 1800 on Friday, September 11, 2009. The licensee has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b) (3) (xiii) due to loss of an emergency response facility."
* * * UPDATE FROM SCOTT AREBAUGH TO VINCE KLCO AT 1802 ON 9/11/2009 * * *
The TSC power supply maintenance has been completed and the Technical Support Center(TSC) is now fully available.
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified the R3DO(Ring).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45341
Facility: LASALLE
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: JOHN KEENAN
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: JOHN KEENAN
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 09/11/2009
Notification Time: 13:52 [ET]
Event Date: 09/11/2009
Event Time: 09:04 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/11/2009
Notification Time: 13:52 [ET]
Event Date: 09/11/2009
Event Time: 09:04 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/11/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
MARK RING (R3DO)
MARK RING (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER UNAVAILABLE
"On September 11, 2009, while performing a quarterly surveillance on the Technical Support Center Emergency Diesel Generator, the automatic transfer switch failed to swap as required. This resulted in both the normal and emergency feed to the Technical Support Center losing power. At 1026, the automatic transfer switch was mechanically transferred to the normal feed, restoring the power to the Technical Support Center.
"The Outage Control Center was staffed to prepare repair plans for the Automatic Transfer Switch. These repairs will restore backup power capability to the Technical Support Center. Actions are in progress to identify the necessary parts and generate the work packages to restore the backup power capability.
"The licensee has notified the [NRC] Senior Resident Inspector."
"On September 11, 2009, while performing a quarterly surveillance on the Technical Support Center Emergency Diesel Generator, the automatic transfer switch failed to swap as required. This resulted in both the normal and emergency feed to the Technical Support Center losing power. At 1026, the automatic transfer switch was mechanically transferred to the normal feed, restoring the power to the Technical Support Center.
"The Outage Control Center was staffed to prepare repair plans for the Automatic Transfer Switch. These repairs will restore backup power capability to the Technical Support Center. Actions are in progress to identify the necessary parts and generate the work packages to restore the backup power capability.
"The licensee has notified the [NRC] Senior Resident Inspector."
General Information or Other
Event Number: 45342
Rep Org: NC DIV OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: CARDINAL HEALTH
Region: 1
City: ASHEVILLE State: NC
County:
License #: 011-0784-7
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: HENRY BARNES
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Licensee: CARDINAL HEALTH
Region: 1
City: ASHEVILLE State: NC
County:
License #: 011-0784-7
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: HENRY BARNES
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 09/11/2009
Notification Time: 14:05 [ET]
Event Date: 09/11/2009
Event Time: 05:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/11/2009
Notification Time: 14:05 [ET]
Event Date: 09/11/2009
Event Time: 05:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/11/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
RAY POWELL (R1DO)
MARK SHAFFER (FSME)
RAY POWELL (R1DO)
MARK SHAFFER (FSME)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - CONTAMINATED PHARMACY SHIPMENT PACKAGE
'[A] contaminated package [was] received at Mission Hospital from Cardinal Health - Asheville. The RSO [Radiation Safety Officer] of Mission Hospital received a shipment of Tc-99 unit doses from Cardinal Health pharmacy. The exterior of the box was contaminated to [approximately] 180,000 dpm/100 [square centimeters].
"Upon determination of the contamination, Mission Hospital contacted Cardinal Health pharmacy and they came and picked up the box.
"Mission Hospital did not open the box.
"After the box was picked up, a small spot of contamination was found on the absorbent paper that the box had been placed on. Mission Hospital removed the paper, which removed the contamination, and placed it as waste into their decay-in-storage area. This level exceeds the reportability limit of 22,000 dpm/100 [square centimeters] of 15A NCAC [North Carolina Administrative Code] 11.1627; which references 10 CFR 71.87; which references 49 CFR 173.443.
"15A NCAC 11.1627(d) requires an immediate notification to the [North Carolina Radiation Protection Section] Agency."
North Carolina Incident 09-43.
'[A] contaminated package [was] received at Mission Hospital from Cardinal Health - Asheville. The RSO [Radiation Safety Officer] of Mission Hospital received a shipment of Tc-99 unit doses from Cardinal Health pharmacy. The exterior of the box was contaminated to [approximately] 180,000 dpm/100 [square centimeters].
"Upon determination of the contamination, Mission Hospital contacted Cardinal Health pharmacy and they came and picked up the box.
"Mission Hospital did not open the box.
"After the box was picked up, a small spot of contamination was found on the absorbent paper that the box had been placed on. Mission Hospital removed the paper, which removed the contamination, and placed it as waste into their decay-in-storage area. This level exceeds the reportability limit of 22,000 dpm/100 [square centimeters] of 15A NCAC [North Carolina Administrative Code] 11.1627; which references 10 CFR 71.87; which references 49 CFR 173.443.
"15A NCAC 11.1627(d) requires an immediate notification to the [North Carolina Radiation Protection Section] Agency."
North Carolina Incident 09-43.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 45343
Rep Org: SARGENT & LUNDY LLC
Licensee: SARGENT & LUNDY LLC
Region: 3
City: CHICAGO State: IL
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: PAULA SCHOLL
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Licensee: SARGENT & LUNDY LLC
Region: 3
City: CHICAGO State: IL
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: PAULA SCHOLL
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 09/11/2009
Notification Time: 16:00 [ET]
Event Date: 09/11/2009
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/11/2009
Notification Time: 16:00 [ET]
Event Date: 09/11/2009
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/11/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
DAVID PROULX (R4DO)
ALAN BLAMEY (R2DO)
PART 21 GROUP
DAVID PROULX (R4DO)
ALAN BLAMEY (R2DO)
PART 21 GROUP
PROBLEM WITH SEISMIC SOIL STRUCTURE ANALYSIS SOFTWARE
"ACS SASSI (Sargent & Lundy Program No. 03.7.848-2.21) by Ghiocel Predictive Technologies Inc. (GPT) is a program which performs seismic soil-structure interaction (SSI) analysis. Sargent & Lundy (S&L) purchased licenses to use ACS SASSI NQA Version 2.2.1 from GPT in 2008 and verified and validated the software under S&L's QA program.
"S&L used ACS SASSI for seismic analysis activities for South Texas Project Units 3 & 4 (STP 3&4).
"On July 14, 2009, during SSI analysis of the Control Building performed to address the STP 3&4 Shear Wave Velocity Departure, irregularities were observed in the results obtained using ACS SASSI and the analysis was halted. The irregularities in turn led us to question the results for the Ultimate Heat Sink / Reactor Service Water Pump House (UHS/RSWPH) completed earlier.
"Our investigations, including a review of other uses of the software, indicate that numerical instability may occur with high numbers of soil layers, even when soil layer properties and number of soil layers (less than or equal to 100) are within the parameters stated in the User's Manual. Our investigations indicate that the results for the Control Building with 94 layers, the Reactor Building with 84 layers, and the UHS/RSWPH with 100 layers are not reliable. Some individual results are conservative, others are not.
"S&L recommended to the South Texas Project Nuclear Operating Company (STPNOC) that the work performed using ACS SASSI NQA Version 2.2.1 relied upon to support licensing positions and to support the design basis be reanalyzed using SASSI 2000, Version 3.0. STPNOC accepted this recommendation.
"S&L is no longer using ACS SASSI for production work. In addition, we have investigated whether SASSI 2000 has similar irregularities. We concluded that SASSI 2000 does not have this condition and is fundamentally sound."
"ACS SASSI (Sargent & Lundy Program No. 03.7.848-2.21) by Ghiocel Predictive Technologies Inc. (GPT) is a program which performs seismic soil-structure interaction (SSI) analysis. Sargent & Lundy (S&L) purchased licenses to use ACS SASSI NQA Version 2.2.1 from GPT in 2008 and verified and validated the software under S&L's QA program.
"S&L used ACS SASSI for seismic analysis activities for South Texas Project Units 3 & 4 (STP 3&4).
"On July 14, 2009, during SSI analysis of the Control Building performed to address the STP 3&4 Shear Wave Velocity Departure, irregularities were observed in the results obtained using ACS SASSI and the analysis was halted. The irregularities in turn led us to question the results for the Ultimate Heat Sink / Reactor Service Water Pump House (UHS/RSWPH) completed earlier.
"Our investigations, including a review of other uses of the software, indicate that numerical instability may occur with high numbers of soil layers, even when soil layer properties and number of soil layers (less than or equal to 100) are within the parameters stated in the User's Manual. Our investigations indicate that the results for the Control Building with 94 layers, the Reactor Building with 84 layers, and the UHS/RSWPH with 100 layers are not reliable. Some individual results are conservative, others are not.
"S&L recommended to the South Texas Project Nuclear Operating Company (STPNOC) that the work performed using ACS SASSI NQA Version 2.2.1 relied upon to support licensing positions and to support the design basis be reanalyzed using SASSI 2000, Version 3.0. STPNOC accepted this recommendation.
"S&L is no longer using ACS SASSI for production work. In addition, we have investigated whether SASSI 2000 has similar irregularities. We concluded that SASSI 2000 does not have this condition and is fundamentally sound."
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 45344
Rep Org: HAWAII ADVANCED IMAGING INSTITUTE
Licensee: QUEENS MEDICAL CENTER
Region: 4
City: HONOLULU State: HI
County:
License #: 53-16533-02
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RONALD FRICK
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Licensee: QUEENS MEDICAL CENTER
Region: 4
City: HONOLULU State: HI
County:
License #: 53-16533-02
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RONALD FRICK
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 09/11/2009
Notification Time: 15:54 [ET]
Event Date: 09/11/2009
Event Time: 09:00 [HST]
Last Update Date: 09/11/2009
Notification Time: 15:54 [ET]
Event Date: 09/11/2009
Event Time: 09:00 [HST]
Last Update Date: 09/11/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.1906(d)(1) - SURFACE CONTAM LEVELS > LIMITS
10 CFR Section:
20.1906(d)(1) - SURFACE CONTAM LEVELS > LIMITS
Person (Organization):
DAVID PROULX (R4DO)
MARK SHAFFER (FSME)
DAVID PROULX (R4DO)
MARK SHAFFER (FSME)
EXTERNAL CONTAMINATION ON RECEIVED SHIPMENT
The Hawaii Advanced Imaging Institute received a daily shipment of F18 isotopes in two separate packages that indicated a contamination level of 5086 dpm/100 square centimeters on package #1 and 12936 dpm/100 square centimeters on package #2. The limit is 2200 dpm/ 100 square centimeters. The packages are currently stored in the hot lab at the Hawaii Advanced Imaging Institute.
The carrier company (Queens Medical Center of Honolulu) was notified of the contamination event.
The Hawaii Advanced Imaging Institute received a daily shipment of F18 isotopes in two separate packages that indicated a contamination level of 5086 dpm/100 square centimeters on package #1 and 12936 dpm/100 square centimeters on package #2. The limit is 2200 dpm/ 100 square centimeters. The packages are currently stored in the hot lab at the Hawaii Advanced Imaging Institute.
The carrier company (Queens Medical Center of Honolulu) was notified of the contamination event.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45345
Facility: MCGUIRE
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: WARREN MOORE
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: WARREN MOORE
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 09/11/2009
Notification Time: 18:08 [ET]
Event Date: 09/11/2009
Event Time: 17:18 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/11/2009
Notification Time: 18:08 [ET]
Event Date: 09/11/2009
Event Time: 17:18 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/11/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xii) - OFFSITE MEDICAL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xii) - OFFSITE MEDICAL
Person (Organization):
ALAN BLAMEY (R2DO)
ALAN BLAMEY (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
TRANSPORT OF A POTENTIALLY CONTAMINATED INDIVIDUAL OFFSITE
A potentially contaminated individual was transported offsite for medical treatment due to an injury in a normally clean area inside the site's radiologically controlled area (RCA). The individual was a contractor working for Bartlett Nuclear and initial indications are that a fall caused a back injury. The individual was transported to the Carolina Medical Center in Mecklenburg County, North Carolina. A site senior health physics technician accompanied the individual to the medical center.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM THAD REAMES TO PETE SNYDER ON 9/11/09 AT 1900 * * *
The contract employee taken to the hospital has been confirmed not to be radioactively contaminated, nor is the Ambulance or other areas contaminated.
Notified R2DO (Blamey).
A potentially contaminated individual was transported offsite for medical treatment due to an injury in a normally clean area inside the site's radiologically controlled area (RCA). The individual was a contractor working for Bartlett Nuclear and initial indications are that a fall caused a back injury. The individual was transported to the Carolina Medical Center in Mecklenburg County, North Carolina. A site senior health physics technician accompanied the individual to the medical center.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM THAD REAMES TO PETE SNYDER ON 9/11/09 AT 1900 * * *
The contract employee taken to the hospital has been confirmed not to be radioactively contaminated, nor is the Ambulance or other areas contaminated.
Notified R2DO (Blamey).
General Information or Other
Event Number: 45346
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: BOEING
Region: 4
City: LONG BEACH State: CA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ROBERT GREGER
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Licensee: BOEING
Region: 4
City: LONG BEACH State: CA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ROBERT GREGER
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 09/11/2009
Notification Time: 19:05 [ET]
Event Date: 09/11/2009
Event Time: 00:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 09/11/2009
Notification Time: 19:05 [ET]
Event Date: 09/11/2009
Event Time: 00:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 09/11/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
DAVID PROULX (R4DO)
MARK SHAFFER (FSME)
DAVID PROULX (R4DO)
MARK SHAFFER (FSME)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST TRITIUM EXIT SIGNS
On 9/11/09 at 1246, the State of California was notified by Boeing that 15 tritium exit signs could not be accounted for in their Long Beach, CA location. The signs were manufactured by Safety Light Corporation and the serial numbers are as follows: 387873, 387874, 387875, 392809, 392810, 392811, 392812, 392813, 392814, 392815, 392816, 392817, 392818, 392819, 392820. The original activity of these signs is typically 11.5 Curies each.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source
On 9/11/09 at 1246, the State of California was notified by Boeing that 15 tritium exit signs could not be accounted for in their Long Beach, CA location. The signs were manufactured by Safety Light Corporation and the serial numbers are as follows: 387873, 387874, 387875, 392809, 392810, 392811, 392812, 392813, 392814, 392815, 392816, 392817, 392818, 392819, 392820. The original activity of these signs is typically 11.5 Curies each.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source
General Information or Other
Event Number: 45542
Rep Org: MA RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM
Licensee: UMASS MEMORIAL HEALTH CARE
Region: 1
City: WORCESTER State: MA
County:
License #: 60-0092
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MIKE WHALEN
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Licensee: UMASS MEMORIAL HEALTH CARE
Region: 1
City: WORCESTER State: MA
County:
License #: 60-0092
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MIKE WHALEN
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 12/07/2009
Notification Time: 11:47 [ET]
Event Date: 09/11/2009
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/07/2009
Notification Time: 11:47 [ET]
Event Date: 09/11/2009
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/07/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
WAYNE SCHMIDT (R1DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
WAYNE SCHMIDT (R1DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT- POTENTIAL LOSS OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
The following information was received from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts via facsimile:
"On 9/11/09 a package containing 1 mCi of P-32 was received by the licensee Radiation Safety Office, [who then] opened the package to confirm RAM [radioactive material] was in the box, surveyed the package, and then delivered [the package] to the research lab. The research lab signed for the package. One week later the research lab reported to the RSO that the package did not contain the ordered P-32. A search of lab, adjacent labs, and waste removed from the lab did not locate the missing radioactive material."
MA Docket Number: 10-8699
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source
The following information was received from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts via facsimile:
"On 9/11/09 a package containing 1 mCi of P-32 was received by the licensee Radiation Safety Office, [who then] opened the package to confirm RAM [radioactive material] was in the box, surveyed the package, and then delivered [the package] to the research lab. The research lab signed for the package. One week later the research lab reported to the RSO that the package did not contain the ordered P-32. A search of lab, adjacent labs, and waste removed from the lab did not locate the missing radioactive material."
MA Docket Number: 10-8699
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source