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Event Notification Report for September 08, 2009

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

EVENT REPORTS FOR
09/07/2009 - 09/08/2009

EVENT NUMBERS
453324533345334

General Information or Other
Event Number: 45332
Rep Org: FLOWSERVE US INC.
Licensee: FLOWSERVE US INC.
Region: 1
City: RALEIGH   State: NC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ROBERT D. BARRY
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 09/08/2009
Notification Time: 15:30 [ET]
Event Date: 09/08/2009
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/08/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
MARK RING (R3DO)
NRR PART 21 COORD.
Event Text
PART 21 NOTIFICATION - SOLENOID VALVE MAY NOT PERFORM ITS FUNCTION

On July 13, 2009 Flowserve US Inc. Raleigh, NC was notified by Exelon - Byron Nuclear Power Station that they identified a potential problem with a Borg-Warner (BW/IP) Solenoid Valve (BW/IP Part No. 86868) received by Exelon as it was being tested by their Electrical Maintenance Technician. Flowserve conducted an evaluation of the issue.

Flowserve's evaluation discovered that there existed dimensional deviations on the valve body parts that may cause the Solenoid Valve not to perform its intended function. Flowserve inventory discovered that the dimensional deviation also existed on 8 body parts in the current inventory and it was determined that this part was produced by the same subcontracted machining supplier since 2004. This renders the Solenoid Valve Body parts suspect from that time. This Solenoid Valve Body part is used in Solenoid Valve assembly models identified by the following Borg-Warner / Flowserve Part numbers:

86868 - Solenoid Valve Assembly - Normally Open;
86868-1 - Solenoid Valve Assembly - Normally Closed;
90628 - Solenoid Valve Assembly - Normally Open;
90638-1 - Solenoid Valve Assembly - Normally Closed.

"Based upon Flowserve, Raleigh information, Solenoid Valve Assemblies with the above model / part numbers have been provided to the following licensees and purchasers as Safety - Related products:

Exelon Company - Byron Station:
P.O. 00000375 REL 13388 Qty.: 3 each;
P.O. 00000375 REL 13573 Qty.: 3 each;
P.O. 00000375 REL 13613 Qty.: 3 each;
P.O. 00000375 REL 13650 Qty.: 2 each.

Exelon Company - Braidwood Station:
P.O. 00000375 REL 13439 Qty.: 1 each;
P.O. 00000375 REL 13514 Qty.: 1 each;
P.O. 00000375 REL 13522 Qty.: 1 each;
P.O. 00000375 REL 13566 Qty.: 8 each;
P.O. 00000375 REL 13661 Qty.: 2 each.

Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power:
P.O. U050425333 Qty,: 6 each.

Control Components Inc.:
P.O. 304835 Qty.: 2 each;
P.O. 306820 Qty.: 6 each.

"As Flowserve, Raleigh is not capable of determining if the defect could cause a substantial safety hazard based upon the service application which the Solenoid Valve Assembly may be used in. The licensees / purchasers of the subject Solenoid Valve Assembly will need to evaluate their applications to make this determination.

"Flowserve, Raleigh is in the process of manufacturing the Solenoid Valve Assembly Bodies and will rebuild the Solenoid Valve Assemblies as they are returned by the licensees / purchasers. Please contact Gary Shaw (919-831-3331) or Edna Ulsamar (919-831-3331) to obtain a Return Material Authorization."


Power Reactor
Event Number: 45333
Facility: QUAD CITIES
Region: 3     State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3
NRC Notified By: RYAN MEREMA
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 09/08/2009
Notification Time: 23:56 [ET]
Event Date: 09/08/2009
Event Time: 20:10 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/09/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
Person (Organization):
MARK RING (R3DO)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 55 Power Operation
Event Text
REACTOR SHUTDOWN REQUIRED BY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS DUE TO AN UNISOLABLE LEAK IN A CORE SPRAY MINIMUM FLOW LINE

"On September 8, 2009, during performance of quarterly Core Spray (CS) system flow rate testing, a pinhole leak was identified in the 1B Core Spray Minimum Flow Line. The pinhole leak is located just downstream of the 1B CS minimum flow valve (1-1402-38B) and cannot be isolated from primary containment.

"At 1935, hours it was determined that structural integrity of the piping could not be assured. Technical Specification 3.6.1.1, Required Action B.1, was entered and a plant shutdown was initiated at 2010 hours.

"In addition, the 1B Core Spray system was declared inoperable. All other ECCS systems remain operable. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

"This event is being reported under 50.72(b)(2)(i) due to the initiation of a shutdown required by the plant's Technical Specifications."

The licensee estimates reactor shutdown will be achieved at 0130 CDT.


Power Reactor
Event Number: 45334
Facility: COOPER
Region: 4     State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAVID MADSEN
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 09/09/2009
Notification Time: 14:53 [ET]
Event Date: 09/08/2009
Event Time: 09:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/09/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
DAVID PROULX (R4DO)
PART 21 COORDINATOR (NRR)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 95 Power Operation 95 Power Operation
Event Text
DEFECT FOUND IN BUSSMANN FUSES

"On September 8, 2009, Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD) completed a reportability determination which concluded that a Bussmann fuse with a batch code of R18 contained an underlying fabrication vulnerability consisting of a missing fuse link. NPPD has concluded this condition is reportable per 10 CFR Part 21.

"This fuse is part of a batch of fuses purchased as Commercial Grade items and dedicated by NPPD for use at the Cooper Nuclear Station (CNS). The fuses are shipped directly from an authorized Bussmann facility to CNS. The fuse purchasing description is as follows: FUSE; 10 AMP; 250VAC; ONE-TIME; 50KA I.R. ; GENERAL PURPOSE; Manufacturer Part Number NON-10. The missing fuse link was discovered via destructive testing at CNS. The destructive test was prompted when the fuse failed a field continuity test prior to installation. The fuse had passed CNS dedication, which included a continuity test of 100% of the batch by the manufacturer. Although, none of the other fuses in this batch exhibited missing links via continuity testing, the fuse with the missing link is considered to be a continuation of quality problems previously reported to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) per Emergency Notification Number 44634, as followed up by a written report from NPPD to the NRC dated December 2, 2008. That report identified that Several Bussmann fuses, Manufacturer Part Number NON-10, batch code J47, contained poor solder joints internal to the fuse assembly.

"Bussmann NON-10 fuses are authorized by NPPD for use in both safety related and non safety related applications. The applicable dedication package identifies one of the safety functions as 'fuses are required to conduct the design basis load current without interruption.' If the fuses were installed without the condition being detected and failed upon valid demand of the associated circuit, the mission of the associated safety related equipment may not have been accomplished. Since the condition was found prior to installation, the safety function of the installed fuses remains unaffected and the supported equipment remains unaffected. Other locations where the batch R18 fuses are installed have been determined to be operable through actual circuit operation or measurements across the fuses. Therefore, this condition is NOT reportable under 10 CFR 50.72 or 50.73.

"Vendor testing and current dedication practices should have precluded the possibility of placing a fuse with a similar condition into unrestricted spares. However, these barriers failed. This provided a potential for a Substantial Safety Hazard. This regulation does not credit pre-installation or post-maintenance testing for the detection of a defect. The dedication does not require CNS to perform a continuity check as credit is given to the vendor, per NUPIC survey, for performing the continuity check at the manufacturer's facility.

"Since the fuses were stocked in unrestricted spares for essential applications, 10 CFR 21 applies, and the condition is reportable under 10 CFR 21.21. The responsible Corporate Officer has been notified of this condition per 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i) on September 8, 2009 at approximately 0930 CDT. Pursuant to 10 CFR 21.21 (d)(3)(ii) written notification is due to the NRC within 30 days of this notification."

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.