Event Notification Report for August 31, 2009
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
08/30/2009 - 08/31/2009
EVENT NUMBERS
453114531345314453154531645317453184531945381
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45311
Facility: COOK
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BEN HUFFMAN
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC SIMPSON
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BEN HUFFMAN
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC SIMPSON
Notification Date: 08/31/2009
Notification Time: 08:00 [ET]
Event Date: 08/31/2009
Event Time: 07:21 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/31/2009
Notification Time: 08:00 [ET]
Event Date: 08/31/2009
Event Time: 07:21 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/31/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
STEVE ORTH (R3DO)
STEVE ORTH (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
TSC POTENTIALLY OUT OF SERVICE
"At 0721 on Monday, August 31, 2009, a portion of the Cook Nuclear Plant (CNP) Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system and Technical Support Center (TSC) air conditioning system was removed from service for maintenance on the electrical power supply Motor Control Center (MCC).
"The MCC being removed supports 3 of the 4 air conditioning units for the Technical Support Center, as well as the filtration system. The remaining air conditioning unit which is not supported by the MCC will remain in service.
"Under certain accident conditions the TSC may become unavailable due to the inability of the ventilation system to maintain a habitable atmosphere. Compensatory measures exist to relocate TSC personnel to the unaffected unit's control room if necessary based upon results of procedurally required monitoring of TSC radiological conditions.
"The TSC ventilation system maintenance is scheduled to complete at 2100 on Monday, August 31, 2009. The licensee has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) due to the loss of an emergency response facility."
* * * UPDATE AT 2147 EDT ON 8/31/09 FROM BRUCK TO HUFFMAN * * *
"The TSC ventilation system air conditioning was returned to functional status at 21:37 on Monday, August 31, 2009.
"This follow up notification is being made to provide closure from the initial notification under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) due to the loss of an emergency response facility."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R3DO (Lipa) notified.
"At 0721 on Monday, August 31, 2009, a portion of the Cook Nuclear Plant (CNP) Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system and Technical Support Center (TSC) air conditioning system was removed from service for maintenance on the electrical power supply Motor Control Center (MCC).
"The MCC being removed supports 3 of the 4 air conditioning units for the Technical Support Center, as well as the filtration system. The remaining air conditioning unit which is not supported by the MCC will remain in service.
"Under certain accident conditions the TSC may become unavailable due to the inability of the ventilation system to maintain a habitable atmosphere. Compensatory measures exist to relocate TSC personnel to the unaffected unit's control room if necessary based upon results of procedurally required monitoring of TSC radiological conditions.
"The TSC ventilation system maintenance is scheduled to complete at 2100 on Monday, August 31, 2009. The licensee has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) due to the loss of an emergency response facility."
* * * UPDATE AT 2147 EDT ON 8/31/09 FROM BRUCK TO HUFFMAN * * *
"The TSC ventilation system air conditioning was returned to functional status at 21:37 on Monday, August 31, 2009.
"This follow up notification is being made to provide closure from the initial notification under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) due to the loss of an emergency response facility."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R3DO (Lipa) notified.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45313
Facility: VERMONT YANKEE
Region: 1 State: VT
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: PATRICK RYAN
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Region: 1 State: VT
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: PATRICK RYAN
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 08/31/2009
Notification Time: 14:51 [ET]
Event Date: 08/31/2009
Event Time: 09:44 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/31/2009
Notification Time: 14:51 [ET]
Event Date: 08/31/2009
Event Time: 09:44 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/31/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
JAMES DWYER (R1DO)
JAMES DWYER (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
FITNESS FOR DUTY - SUPERVISOR TESTED POSITIVE FOR ALCOHOL
A non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's unescorted access to the plant has been revoked. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
A non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's unescorted access to the plant has been revoked. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45314
Facility: BYRON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ED BENDIS
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ED BENDIS
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 08/31/2009
Notification Time: 16:04 [ET]
Event Date: 08/31/2009
Event Time: 09:45 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/31/2009
Notification Time: 16:04 [ET]
Event Date: 08/31/2009
Event Time: 09:45 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/31/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3DO)
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
FITNESS FOR DUTY - LICENSED EMPLOYEE CONFIRMED POSITIVE FOR ALCOHOL
A licensed employee had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been suspended. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
A licensed employee had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been suspended. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45315
Facility: FT CALHOUN
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: ERICK MATZKE
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: ERICK MATZKE
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 08/31/2009
Notification Time: 18:03 [ET]
Event Date: 08/31/2009
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/01/2009
Notification Time: 18:03 [ET]
Event Date: 08/31/2009
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/01/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4DO)
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
EMERGENCY SIRENS INOPERABLE
"At 1546 CDT the control room at the Fort Calhoun Power Station was notified that a siren test conducted at 1440 CDT had failed. At this time none of the station's emergency sirens are capable of being sounded. Utility personnel are troubleshooting the problem and expect to restore siren capability. Compensatory measures have been implemented. The NRC will be notified when siren capability has been restored."
Harrison and Pattawattamie counties in Iowa, and Washington county in Nebraska have been notified.
The NRC resident inspector has been notified.
* * * UPDATE ON 08/31/09 AT 2055 EDT FROM ALAN PALLAS TO HUFFMAN * * *
The licensee has reset a communications device that activates the sirens and restored operability to 38 out of the 103 total sirens around the site. To re-establish operability of the remaining sirens, the licensee will need to dispatch personnel to each siren to relink with the communications system. The time frame to complete this effort is estimated to be approximately 5 hours. The compensatory notification measures will remain in place until the sirens have been restored.
The licensee will notify the Resident Inspector of this updated information.
* * * UPDATE ON 09/01/09 AT 0236 EDT FROM ALAN PALLAS TO PARK * * *
The licensee has restored 101 of 103 total sirens to service. Two sirens that are not in service are currently not accessible. They will be automatically restored to service at approximately 0330 CDT and verified in the morning.
The licensee has notified the Resident Inspector of this updated information.
Notified R4DO (Farnholtz).
* * * UPDATE ON 09/01/09 AT 0943 EDT FROM ERICK MATZKE TO PARK * * *
The licensee has restored all 103 of 103 total sirens to service. Harrison and Pattawattamie counties in Iowa, and Washington county in Nebraska have been notified.
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector of this updated information.
Notified R4DO (Farnholtz).
"At 1546 CDT the control room at the Fort Calhoun Power Station was notified that a siren test conducted at 1440 CDT had failed. At this time none of the station's emergency sirens are capable of being sounded. Utility personnel are troubleshooting the problem and expect to restore siren capability. Compensatory measures have been implemented. The NRC will be notified when siren capability has been restored."
Harrison and Pattawattamie counties in Iowa, and Washington county in Nebraska have been notified.
The NRC resident inspector has been notified.
* * * UPDATE ON 08/31/09 AT 2055 EDT FROM ALAN PALLAS TO HUFFMAN * * *
The licensee has reset a communications device that activates the sirens and restored operability to 38 out of the 103 total sirens around the site. To re-establish operability of the remaining sirens, the licensee will need to dispatch personnel to each siren to relink with the communications system. The time frame to complete this effort is estimated to be approximately 5 hours. The compensatory notification measures will remain in place until the sirens have been restored.
The licensee will notify the Resident Inspector of this updated information.
* * * UPDATE ON 09/01/09 AT 0236 EDT FROM ALAN PALLAS TO PARK * * *
The licensee has restored 101 of 103 total sirens to service. Two sirens that are not in service are currently not accessible. They will be automatically restored to service at approximately 0330 CDT and verified in the morning.
The licensee has notified the Resident Inspector of this updated information.
Notified R4DO (Farnholtz).
* * * UPDATE ON 09/01/09 AT 0943 EDT FROM ERICK MATZKE TO PARK * * *
The licensee has restored all 103 of 103 total sirens to service. Harrison and Pattawattamie counties in Iowa, and Washington county in Nebraska have been notified.
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector of this updated information.
Notified R4DO (Farnholtz).
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45316
Facility: GRAND GULF
Region: 4 State: MS
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: TERRY HOLCOMBE
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Region: 4 State: MS
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: TERRY HOLCOMBE
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 08/31/2009
Notification Time: 18:16 [ET]
Event Date: 08/31/2009
Event Time: 10:14 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/30/2009
Notification Time: 18:16 [ET]
Event Date: 08/31/2009
Event Time: 10:14 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/30/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
Person (Organization):
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4DO)
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
SECONDARY CONTAINMENT BOUNDARY DOOR INOPERABLE
"During normal entry / exit through secondary containment boundary door 1A401, it was discovered that the door would not latch closed due to interferences between the door and its frame. The door was unable to be latched closed for approximately 5 minutes which represented a possible path for uncontrolled release of radioactive material. No release of radioactive material occurred as a result of this event.
"The time during which the door would not latch was spent diligently troubleshooting to determine why the door would not secure. When discovered, the interference was immediately removed and the door was secured (latched). Door 1A401 is now operable as a secondary containment boundary but is currently deactivated and posted by security to prevent use as a conservative measure until further inspection and maintenance can be preformed on the door to prevent this issue from reoccurring.
"At this time secondary containment is operable with boundary door 1A401 closed and latched."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM MICHAEL J. LARSON TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1042 EDT ON 10/30/09 * * *
"Retraction of Notification EN# 45316.
"The event was reported by Grand Gulf Nuclear Station on 08/31/2009 at 1014 CDT. This update is being provided for the purpose of retracting that notification.
"On August 31, 2009, during normal entry/exit through secondary containment boundary door 1A401, it was discovered that the door would not latch closed due to interferences between the door and its frame. The door was unable to be latched closed for approximately 5 minutes which represented a possible loss of safety function since it could have provided a path for uncontrolled release of radioactive material. No release of radioactive material occurred as a result of this event.
"As part of the event investigation, the malfunction (inability to close and latch) of door 1A401 was simulated under controlled conditions. Data was obtained under normal ventilation conditions and under the condition with one train of Standby Gas Treatment System (SGT) operating. Analysis of the data determined that the SGT system was able to drawdown the secondary containment enclosure building pressure to greater than 0.311 inch of vacuum water gauge (for no assumed failures) which is above the Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.4.1 surveillance minimum requirement of 0.266 inch of vacuum water gauge (following a postulated accident with assumed failures) using one SGT subsystem.
"Therefore, this event did not constitute a loss of the safety function of secondary containment and this event is not reportable."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Powers).
"During normal entry / exit through secondary containment boundary door 1A401, it was discovered that the door would not latch closed due to interferences between the door and its frame. The door was unable to be latched closed for approximately 5 minutes which represented a possible path for uncontrolled release of radioactive material. No release of radioactive material occurred as a result of this event.
"The time during which the door would not latch was spent diligently troubleshooting to determine why the door would not secure. When discovered, the interference was immediately removed and the door was secured (latched). Door 1A401 is now operable as a secondary containment boundary but is currently deactivated and posted by security to prevent use as a conservative measure until further inspection and maintenance can be preformed on the door to prevent this issue from reoccurring.
"At this time secondary containment is operable with boundary door 1A401 closed and latched."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM MICHAEL J. LARSON TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1042 EDT ON 10/30/09 * * *
"Retraction of Notification EN# 45316.
"The event was reported by Grand Gulf Nuclear Station on 08/31/2009 at 1014 CDT. This update is being provided for the purpose of retracting that notification.
"On August 31, 2009, during normal entry/exit through secondary containment boundary door 1A401, it was discovered that the door would not latch closed due to interferences between the door and its frame. The door was unable to be latched closed for approximately 5 minutes which represented a possible loss of safety function since it could have provided a path for uncontrolled release of radioactive material. No release of radioactive material occurred as a result of this event.
"As part of the event investigation, the malfunction (inability to close and latch) of door 1A401 was simulated under controlled conditions. Data was obtained under normal ventilation conditions and under the condition with one train of Standby Gas Treatment System (SGT) operating. Analysis of the data determined that the SGT system was able to drawdown the secondary containment enclosure building pressure to greater than 0.311 inch of vacuum water gauge (for no assumed failures) which is above the Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.4.1 surveillance minimum requirement of 0.266 inch of vacuum water gauge (following a postulated accident with assumed failures) using one SGT subsystem.
"Therefore, this event did not constitute a loss of the safety function of secondary containment and this event is not reportable."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Powers).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45317
Facility: CRYSTAL RIVER
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: JOSHUA MORSE
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: JOSHUA MORSE
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 09/01/2009
Notification Time: 09:10 [ET]
Event Date: 08/31/2009
Event Time: 14:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/01/2009
Notification Time: 09:10 [ET]
Event Date: 08/31/2009
Event Time: 14:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/01/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
MALCOLM WIDMANN (R2DO)
TABATABAI via email (NRO)
JOHN THORP via email (NRR)
MALCOLM WIDMANN (R2DO)
TABATABAI via email (NRO)
JOHN THORP via email (NRR)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
PART 21 REPORT - FAILURE OF A SPARE LIMITORQUE ACTUATOR MOTOR
"On July 31, 2009, [Crystal River Unit 3] personnel performed a video probe inspection of a spare safety-related Limitorque SB-3/SMB-3 actuator motor magnesium rotor and end rings. Visual indications were observed in the outboard end of the motor which were cause for rejection based on specified acceptance criteria. The specific indication was a cracked weld with dislodged metal in the outboard end of the motor.
"In 2007, the spare safety-related Limitorque SB-3/SMB-3 actuator motor (Motor Serial Number 7497004-001T1AL: Limitorque Part No. R-403-F04-0821) was purchased as safety-related Quality level 1 (QL-1) from AREVA under Purchase Order No. 337566. Limitorque purchased the motor from the Baldor Electric Company, doing business as the Reliance Electric Company, as commercial grade and dedicated the motor to safety related.
"The above evaluation was completed on August 28, 2009. The FPC director/responsible officer was notified of the above determination on August 31, 2009. The vendor (Limitorque) and the NRC Senior Resident Inspector have been notified of FPC's intent to report this issue under 10CFR21.21."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
"On July 31, 2009, [Crystal River Unit 3] personnel performed a video probe inspection of a spare safety-related Limitorque SB-3/SMB-3 actuator motor magnesium rotor and end rings. Visual indications were observed in the outboard end of the motor which were cause for rejection based on specified acceptance criteria. The specific indication was a cracked weld with dislodged metal in the outboard end of the motor.
"In 2007, the spare safety-related Limitorque SB-3/SMB-3 actuator motor (Motor Serial Number 7497004-001T1AL: Limitorque Part No. R-403-F04-0821) was purchased as safety-related Quality level 1 (QL-1) from AREVA under Purchase Order No. 337566. Limitorque purchased the motor from the Baldor Electric Company, doing business as the Reliance Electric Company, as commercial grade and dedicated the motor to safety related.
"The above evaluation was completed on August 28, 2009. The FPC director/responsible officer was notified of the above determination on August 31, 2009. The vendor (Limitorque) and the NRC Senior Resident Inspector have been notified of FPC's intent to report this issue under 10CFR21.21."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 45318
Rep Org: OHIO BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: NTH CONSULTANTS, LTD.
Region: 3
City: CLEVELAND State: OH
County:
License #: 31210180007
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: STEPHEN JAMES
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC SIMPSON
Licensee: NTH CONSULTANTS, LTD.
Region: 3
City: CLEVELAND State: OH
County:
License #: 31210180007
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: STEPHEN JAMES
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC SIMPSON
Notification Date: 09/01/2009
Notification Time: 14:38 [ET]
Event Date: 08/31/2009
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/01/2009
Notification Time: 14:38 [ET]
Event Date: 08/31/2009
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/01/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED TROXLER GAUGE
The following notification was received via email:
"Received call from licensee at 4:58 PM on 8/31/09, regarding a Troxler Model 3400 portable gauge containing 44 mCi of Am-241 and 9 mCi of Cs-137 which was damaged at a job site in Olmstead Falls, Ohio. Serial numbers and manufacturer of sources not currently available. Serial number of gauge not currently available.
"The gauge user completed work with the gauge, locked the gauge, and then placed it on the ground under the tailgate of his truck. The user then went to the cab of the truck to perform some other tasks. While in the cab of the truck, the user noticed that heavy equipment operating at the job site was moving closer to his location, so he decided to move his truck. Forgetting that the gauge had been left outside the vehicle under the tailgate, the user backed over the gauge, causing damage to the case and shearing off the source rod at the case top. The portion of the rod containing the radioactive material remained inside the shielded body of the gauge.
"The licensee's RSO immediately responded to the event and took readings to verify that the source was in the shielded case and that there was no contamination on the ground where the gauge was run over. The damaged gauge has been moved to the licensee's facility in Cleveland where it is in secure storage. The licensee intends to transport the damaged gauge to their licensed repair contractor's facility in Michigan.
"ODH will be inspecting the licensee"
Ohio Report No.: OH090009
Notified R3DO (Lipa) and FSME (McIntosh).
The following notification was received via email:
"Received call from licensee at 4:58 PM on 8/31/09, regarding a Troxler Model 3400 portable gauge containing 44 mCi of Am-241 and 9 mCi of Cs-137 which was damaged at a job site in Olmstead Falls, Ohio. Serial numbers and manufacturer of sources not currently available. Serial number of gauge not currently available.
"The gauge user completed work with the gauge, locked the gauge, and then placed it on the ground under the tailgate of his truck. The user then went to the cab of the truck to perform some other tasks. While in the cab of the truck, the user noticed that heavy equipment operating at the job site was moving closer to his location, so he decided to move his truck. Forgetting that the gauge had been left outside the vehicle under the tailgate, the user backed over the gauge, causing damage to the case and shearing off the source rod at the case top. The portion of the rod containing the radioactive material remained inside the shielded body of the gauge.
"The licensee's RSO immediately responded to the event and took readings to verify that the source was in the shielded case and that there was no contamination on the ground where the gauge was run over. The damaged gauge has been moved to the licensee's facility in Cleveland where it is in secure storage. The licensee intends to transport the damaged gauge to their licensed repair contractor's facility in Michigan.
"ODH will be inspecting the licensee"
Ohio Report No.: OH090009
Notified R3DO (Lipa) and FSME (McIntosh).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45319
Facility: CLINTON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: RICHARD KISS
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: RICHARD KISS
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 09/01/2009
Notification Time: 14:58 [ET]
Event Date: 08/31/2009
Event Time: 21:55 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/01/2009
Notification Time: 14:58 [ET]
Event Date: 08/31/2009
Event Time: 21:55 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/01/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3DO)
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE DISOVERED ON SITE IN PROTECTED AREA
Controlled substance discovered in protected area. Contact HOO for additional information.
Controlled substance discovered in protected area. Contact HOO for additional information.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 45381
Rep Org: COLORADO DEPT OF HEALTH
Licensee: COLORADO STATE UNIVERSITY
Region: 4
City: FORT COLLINS State: CO
County:
License #: 002-19
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES JARVIS
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Licensee: COLORADO STATE UNIVERSITY
Region: 4
City: FORT COLLINS State: CO
County:
License #: 002-19
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES JARVIS
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 09/24/2009
Notification Time: 17:46 [ET]
Event Date: 08/31/2009
Event Time: 00:00 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 09/24/2009
Notification Time: 17:46 [ET]
Event Date: 08/31/2009
Event Time: 00:00 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 09/24/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL SHANNON (R4DO)
LANCE ENGLISH (EMAIL (ILTA)
KEVIN HSUEH (FSME)
MICHAEL SHANNON (R4DO)
LANCE ENGLISH (EMAIL (ILTA)
KEVIN HSUEH (FSME)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISSING RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
The following report was received from the state via facsimile:
"On September 21, 2009 the Radiation Safety Officer for a Colorado Licensee - Colorado State University (CSU), provided verbal notification of a past error in its inventory of unsealed radioactive materials used in one of its laboratories on campus. The specific laboratory had been using unsealed radioactive materials since the 1980's and accumulated numerous containers of improperly characterized and labeled waste materials. The licensee followed up the verbal report with a written report dated September 18, 2009 that was received via fax by the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment on September 22, 2009. Colorado State University is a broad scope non-human use research licensee and has approximately 150 labs using unsealed radioactive materials. The reported inventory discrepancy applies to only one of these labs.
"In accordance with Section 4.51.1.2 (equivalent to 10 CFR 20.2201) of the Colorado Rules and Regulations Pertaining to Radiation Control, within 30 days the licensee is required to report to the Colorado Department of Public and Health and Environment (CDPHE) any lost, stolen, or missing radioactive materials exceeding 10 times the Appendix 4C (equivalent to 10 CFR Part 20 Appendix C) quantities.
"Following completion of an in-depth, multi-year radioactive materials inventory review that was first initiated in 1997, re-established in 2004, and ultimately concluded in August 2009, CSU reported an inventory discrepancy of radioactive materials in one of its laboratories. The inventory review consisted of evaluation of thousands of records, and collection and analysis of greater than 1000 samples from greater than 700 vials, test tubes, and bottles of unknown substances potentially containing radioactive materials that had accumulated over many years in the specific laboratory. Upon completion of the data and inventory review in August 2009, the licensee reported that it could not account for approximately 24 milliCi of H3 (tritium), based upon an accounting evaluation of incoming radioactive materials and outgoing radioactive materials (disposal records). The licensee however, believes that the radioactive material was in fact disposed of properly with other waste materials, but cannot necessarily provide the records to demonstrate this. The licensee has stated that they do not believe the radioactive materials have been stolen, but rather the discrepancy is attributed to poor inventory and waste disposal records by the laboratory personnel over many years and personnel changes."
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source
The following report was received from the state via facsimile:
"On September 21, 2009 the Radiation Safety Officer for a Colorado Licensee - Colorado State University (CSU), provided verbal notification of a past error in its inventory of unsealed radioactive materials used in one of its laboratories on campus. The specific laboratory had been using unsealed radioactive materials since the 1980's and accumulated numerous containers of improperly characterized and labeled waste materials. The licensee followed up the verbal report with a written report dated September 18, 2009 that was received via fax by the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment on September 22, 2009. Colorado State University is a broad scope non-human use research licensee and has approximately 150 labs using unsealed radioactive materials. The reported inventory discrepancy applies to only one of these labs.
"In accordance with Section 4.51.1.2 (equivalent to 10 CFR 20.2201) of the Colorado Rules and Regulations Pertaining to Radiation Control, within 30 days the licensee is required to report to the Colorado Department of Public and Health and Environment (CDPHE) any lost, stolen, or missing radioactive materials exceeding 10 times the Appendix 4C (equivalent to 10 CFR Part 20 Appendix C) quantities.
"Following completion of an in-depth, multi-year radioactive materials inventory review that was first initiated in 1997, re-established in 2004, and ultimately concluded in August 2009, CSU reported an inventory discrepancy of radioactive materials in one of its laboratories. The inventory review consisted of evaluation of thousands of records, and collection and analysis of greater than 1000 samples from greater than 700 vials, test tubes, and bottles of unknown substances potentially containing radioactive materials that had accumulated over many years in the specific laboratory. Upon completion of the data and inventory review in August 2009, the licensee reported that it could not account for approximately 24 milliCi of H3 (tritium), based upon an accounting evaluation of incoming radioactive materials and outgoing radioactive materials (disposal records). The licensee however, believes that the radioactive material was in fact disposed of properly with other waste materials, but cannot necessarily provide the records to demonstrate this. The licensee has stated that they do not believe the radioactive materials have been stolen, but rather the discrepancy is attributed to poor inventory and waste disposal records by the laboratory personnel over many years and personnel changes."
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source