Event Notification Report for August 29, 2009
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
08/28/2009 - 08/29/2009
EVENT NUMBERS
45310
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 45310
Facility: AREVA NP INC RICHLAND
Region: 2 State: WA
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION
FABRICATION & SCRAP
COMMERCIAL LWR FUEL
NRC Notified By: Konrad Kulesza
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 2 State: WA
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION
FABRICATION & SCRAP
COMMERCIAL LWR FUEL
NRC Notified By: Konrad Kulesza
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 08/29/2009
Notification Time: 16:39 [ET]
Event Date: 08/29/2009
Event Time: 06:15 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 08/29/2009
Notification Time: 16:39 [ET]
Event Date: 08/29/2009
Event Time: 06:15 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 08/29/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
70.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
10 CFR Section:
70.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
MALCOLM WIDMANN (R2DO)
RAYMOND LORSON (NMSS)
MALCOLM WIDMANN (R2DO)
RAYMOND LORSON (NMSS)
NUCLEAR CRITICALITY DETECTION SYSTEM INOPERABLE
"On 08/29/2009 at 0615 PDT, during a scheduled testing of the Nuclear Criticality Detection [NCD] System, it was discovered that in one of the nine locations, two of three NCD units were non-functional. The two NCD units were non-functional apparently due to miswiring. This is still under investigation.
"All movement of SNM [Special Nuclear Material] on site was suspended during the testing of the Nuclear Criticality Detection System.
"This occurrence is reportable to the NRC in accordance with 10CFR70.50.b(2)(i). This is a 24 hour reporting requirement with a follow up 30 day written report.
"Safety Significance of Event:
"The safety significance is very low. Accidental nuclear criticality is highly unlikely. Only two of three NCD units in one of nine locations through out the plant were nonfunctional. The one deficient unit had one functional NCD that would have produced a trouble alarm if actuated. The remaining eight Criticality Detector systems were fully functional and covered the areas where SNM is processed."
The licensee will be notifying their NRC Region II Inspector.
"On 08/29/2009 at 0615 PDT, during a scheduled testing of the Nuclear Criticality Detection [NCD] System, it was discovered that in one of the nine locations, two of three NCD units were non-functional. The two NCD units were non-functional apparently due to miswiring. This is still under investigation.
"All movement of SNM [Special Nuclear Material] on site was suspended during the testing of the Nuclear Criticality Detection System.
"This occurrence is reportable to the NRC in accordance with 10CFR70.50.b(2)(i). This is a 24 hour reporting requirement with a follow up 30 day written report.
"Safety Significance of Event:
"The safety significance is very low. Accidental nuclear criticality is highly unlikely. Only two of three NCD units in one of nine locations through out the plant were nonfunctional. The one deficient unit had one functional NCD that would have produced a trouble alarm if actuated. The remaining eight Criticality Detector systems were fully functional and covered the areas where SNM is processed."
The licensee will be notifying their NRC Region II Inspector.