Event Notification Report for August 17, 2009
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
08/16/2009 - 08/17/2009
EVENT NUMBERS
452674526845269452704532648470
General Information or Other
Event Number: 45267
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: FUGRO CONSULTANTS
Region: 4
City: PASADENA State: TX
County:
License #: L04322
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RAY JISHA
HQ OPS Officer: KARL DIEDERICH
Licensee: FUGRO CONSULTANTS
Region: 4
City: PASADENA State: TX
County:
License #: L04322
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RAY JISHA
HQ OPS Officer: KARL DIEDERICH
Notification Date: 08/17/2009
Notification Time: 15:55 [ET]
Event Date: 08/17/2009
Event Time: 04:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/17/2009
Notification Time: 15:55 [ET]
Event Date: 08/17/2009
Event Time: 04:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/17/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
WILLIAM JONES (R4DO)
ANDREW MAUER (FSME)
WILLIAM JONES (R4DO)
ANDREW MAUER (FSME)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOGRAPHY SOURCE DISCONNECTED FROM ITS CABLE
The following information was obtained from the State of Texas via email:
"On the morning of August 17, 2009, a 79.1 Curie Ir-192 source in a Sentinel Model 880 exposure device (S/N D5517) could not be retracted into the fully shielded position. After several attempts to back the source out, it was surmised that the source remained at the end of the source tube and the Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) was notified. A 2 mR/hr line was established by the radiographers and the licensee's report indicated that visual surveillance was maintained at all times. The RSO then utilized additional shielding and remote handling tools to retrieve the source and place it into another camera. It was determined after the recovery that the ball shank broke from the drive cable leaving the source pigtail in the source tube. The RSO reported that all personnel were monitored with direct reading devices and no exposures exceeded regulatory limits."
Source: QSA Global model 424-9, Serial #56552B
Texas Incident Report I-8658
The following information was obtained from the State of Texas via email:
"On the morning of August 17, 2009, a 79.1 Curie Ir-192 source in a Sentinel Model 880 exposure device (S/N D5517) could not be retracted into the fully shielded position. After several attempts to back the source out, it was surmised that the source remained at the end of the source tube and the Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) was notified. A 2 mR/hr line was established by the radiographers and the licensee's report indicated that visual surveillance was maintained at all times. The RSO then utilized additional shielding and remote handling tools to retrieve the source and place it into another camera. It was determined after the recovery that the ball shank broke from the drive cable leaving the source pigtail in the source tube. The RSO reported that all personnel were monitored with direct reading devices and no exposures exceeded regulatory limits."
Source: QSA Global model 424-9, Serial #56552B
Texas Incident Report I-8658
General Information or Other
Event Number: 45268
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: TAPPAN PHOTOMASK
Region: 4
City: ROUND ROCK State: TX
County: WILLIAMSON
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RAY JISHA
HQ OPS Officer: KARL DIEDERICH
Licensee: TAPPAN PHOTOMASK
Region: 4
City: ROUND ROCK State: TX
County: WILLIAMSON
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RAY JISHA
HQ OPS Officer: KARL DIEDERICH
Notification Date: 08/17/2009
Notification Time: 17:40 [ET]
Event Date: 08/17/2009
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/17/2009
Notification Time: 17:40 [ET]
Event Date: 08/17/2009
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/17/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
WILLIAM JONES (R4DO)
ANDREW MAUER (FSME)
ILTAB VIA E-MAIL
MEXICO VIA FAX
WILLIAM JONES (R4DO)
ANDREW MAUER (FSME)
ILTAB VIA E-MAIL
MEXICO VIA FAX
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FOUR PO-210 STATIC ELIMINATORS LOST
The following information was obtained from the State of Texas via email:
"In the afternoon of August 17, 2009, the licensee had concluded that four static eliminators, NRD Model P-2021-Y000 containing 500 microCi each could not be located and were presumed lost, probably discarded in the general refuse. The sources were removed from the machines they were mounted on while the area was undergoing some renovation or relocation of equipment. However, when the equipment in which the devices were housed were attempted to be placed back in service, the devices were noted as missing. Repeated attempts to locate the sources and devices have proved futile."
Texas Report I-8659
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
The following information was obtained from the State of Texas via email:
"In the afternoon of August 17, 2009, the licensee had concluded that four static eliminators, NRD Model P-2021-Y000 containing 500 microCi each could not be located and were presumed lost, probably discarded in the general refuse. The sources were removed from the machines they were mounted on while the area was undergoing some renovation or relocation of equipment. However, when the equipment in which the devices were housed were attempted to be placed back in service, the devices were noted as missing. Repeated attempts to locate the sources and devices have proved futile."
Texas Report I-8659
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45269
Facility: QUAD CITIES
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3
NRC Notified By: RANDALL DEWEERDT
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3
NRC Notified By: RANDALL DEWEERDT
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 08/17/2009
Notification Time: 18:51 [ET]
Event Date: 08/17/2009
Event Time: 09:31 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/17/2009
Notification Time: 18:51 [ET]
Event Date: 08/17/2009
Event Time: 09:31 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/17/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
JOHN GIESSNER (R3DO)
JOHN GIESSNER (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
FITNESS FOR DUTY - SUPERVISOR TESTED POSITIVE FOR ALCOHOL
A licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's unescorted access to the plant has been denied. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
A licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's unescorted access to the plant has been denied. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45270
Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: GORDY ROBINSON
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: GORDY ROBINSON
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 08/18/2009
Notification Time: 02:00 [ET]
Event Date: 08/17/2009
Event Time: 12:10 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/18/2009
Notification Time: 02:00 [ET]
Event Date: 08/17/2009
Event Time: 12:10 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/18/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
RICHARD CONTE (R1DO)
RICHARD CONTE (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 94 | Power Operation | 94 | Power Operation |
LOSS OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE DATA SYSTEM AND SAFETY PARAMETER DISPLAY SYSTEM DUE TO COMPUTER PROBLEMS
"At 1210 hours on 08/17/09, reactor operators noticed [the] Plant Integrated Computer System was beginning to fail. This computer system also performs the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) and Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) functions. Investigation by computer maintenance personnel was initiated. It was determined that [the] Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) and Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) were not reliable. Redundant, normal control room indications are still available to the operators.
"At 1955 hours on 08/17/09, the Plant Integrated Computer System was restored to service, including the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) and Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) functions.
"A few hours later at 0004 hours on 08/18/09, the Plant Integrated Computer System failed, including loss of Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) and Emergency Response Data System (ERDS). Reactor power was lowered by 0.3% from the initial authorized limit of 94.4% to 94.1% due to the loss of the core thermal power heat balance provided by the computer system.
"Since the Unit 2 SPDS and ERDS computer systems were not available for greater than an 8 hour time period, this is considered a Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability and therefore reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii)."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT 1321 ON 8/17/2009 FROM JIM HUFFORD TO KARL DIEDERICH * * *
"As of 1336 hours on 08/18/09, Unit 2 ERDS and SPDS were restored to normal operation. Unit 2 reactor power was returned to full power of 94.4% shortly thereafter."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Conte).
"At 1210 hours on 08/17/09, reactor operators noticed [the] Plant Integrated Computer System was beginning to fail. This computer system also performs the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) and Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) functions. Investigation by computer maintenance personnel was initiated. It was determined that [the] Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) and Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) were not reliable. Redundant, normal control room indications are still available to the operators.
"At 1955 hours on 08/17/09, the Plant Integrated Computer System was restored to service, including the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) and Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) functions.
"A few hours later at 0004 hours on 08/18/09, the Plant Integrated Computer System failed, including loss of Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) and Emergency Response Data System (ERDS). Reactor power was lowered by 0.3% from the initial authorized limit of 94.4% to 94.1% due to the loss of the core thermal power heat balance provided by the computer system.
"Since the Unit 2 SPDS and ERDS computer systems were not available for greater than an 8 hour time period, this is considered a Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability and therefore reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii)."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT 1321 ON 8/17/2009 FROM JIM HUFFORD TO KARL DIEDERICH * * *
"As of 1336 hours on 08/18/09, Unit 2 ERDS and SPDS were restored to normal operation. Unit 2 reactor power was returned to full power of 94.4% shortly thereafter."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Conte).
General Information or Other
Event Number: 45326
Rep Org: ENGINE SYSTEMS, INC
Licensee: ENGINE SYSTEMS, INC
Region: 1
City: ROCKY MOUNT State: NC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: PAUL STEPANTSCHENKO
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC SIMPSON
Licensee: ENGINE SYSTEMS, INC
Region: 1
City: ROCKY MOUNT State: NC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: PAUL STEPANTSCHENKO
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC SIMPSON
Notification Date: 09/03/2009
Notification Time: 16:12 [ET]
Event Date: 08/17/2009
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/03/2009
Notification Time: 16:12 [ET]
Event Date: 08/17/2009
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/03/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
DANIEL RICH (R2DO)
PART 21 GROUP
DANIEL RICH (R2DO)
PART 21 GROUP
PART 21 - FAULTY EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR START-UP SOLENOID VALVE
The following is excerpted from a fax received from the reporting organization:
"Engine Systems Inc. (ESI) began a 10CFR21 deviation evaluation on 08/17/09 after Brunswick Nuclear Plant (BNP) notified ESI of a failure of one of their air start solenoid valves. The valve failure reportedly occurred on 08/02/09 as indicated by a slow start of the safety-related emergency diesel generator during a surveillance run. This caused the diesel generator to be declared inoperable. Subsequently, ESI opened up an internal work order to receive back the failed valve (S/N 1230588) as well as two more valves believed to be suspect (S/Ns 1230583 and 1230586). Soon after, another internal work order was opened up to receive and evaluate 10 additional air start solenoid valves from BNP inventory. ESI completed the evaluation on 8/31/09 and determined the issue to be reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 21, 'Reporting of Defects and Non-compliance.'"
The solenoid actuated valve in question opens when energized and closes when de-energized. "The valve is installed in-line with the starting air piping via 2" NPT connections in the valve body and is utilized for two applications on the Nordberg diesel engine. Upon receipt of a diesel generator start signal, the valve is energized and directs the starting air supply to either the starting air header of the diesel engine or turbocharger jet assist piping. Failure of the valve in these applications could result in a failure of the diesel engine to start and therefore prevent the diesel generator from performing its safety-related function. A total quantity of four valves are used per engine; one installed in the left bank starting air piping, one in the right bank starting air piping, and two in parallel supplying the turbocharger jet assist.
"ESI's investigation determined that in failed valves, the upper DC sleeve had dislodged from the solenoid housing and slid down the bonnet, contacting the lower DC sleeve. This action disrupts the magnetic field to the extent that the valve will not function properly.
"ESI has supplied a total quantity of 33 [of the affected] solenoid valves and all were supplied to BNP. There are only two utilities that use Nordberg diesel engines for safety-related power supply and BNP is the only nuclear site ESI is aware of that uses the [affected] valve."
The following is excerpted from a fax received from the reporting organization:
"Engine Systems Inc. (ESI) began a 10CFR21 deviation evaluation on 08/17/09 after Brunswick Nuclear Plant (BNP) notified ESI of a failure of one of their air start solenoid valves. The valve failure reportedly occurred on 08/02/09 as indicated by a slow start of the safety-related emergency diesel generator during a surveillance run. This caused the diesel generator to be declared inoperable. Subsequently, ESI opened up an internal work order to receive back the failed valve (S/N 1230588) as well as two more valves believed to be suspect (S/Ns 1230583 and 1230586). Soon after, another internal work order was opened up to receive and evaluate 10 additional air start solenoid valves from BNP inventory. ESI completed the evaluation on 8/31/09 and determined the issue to be reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 21, 'Reporting of Defects and Non-compliance.'"
The solenoid actuated valve in question opens when energized and closes when de-energized. "The valve is installed in-line with the starting air piping via 2" NPT connections in the valve body and is utilized for two applications on the Nordberg diesel engine. Upon receipt of a diesel generator start signal, the valve is energized and directs the starting air supply to either the starting air header of the diesel engine or turbocharger jet assist piping. Failure of the valve in these applications could result in a failure of the diesel engine to start and therefore prevent the diesel generator from performing its safety-related function. A total quantity of four valves are used per engine; one installed in the left bank starting air piping, one in the right bank starting air piping, and two in parallel supplying the turbocharger jet assist.
"ESI's investigation determined that in failed valves, the upper DC sleeve had dislodged from the solenoid housing and slid down the bonnet, contacting the lower DC sleeve. This action disrupts the magnetic field to the extent that the valve will not function properly.
"ESI has supplied a total quantity of 33 [of the affected] solenoid valves and all were supplied to BNP. There are only two utilities that use Nordberg diesel engines for safety-related power supply and BNP is the only nuclear site ESI is aware of that uses the [affected] valve."
Agreement State
Event Number: 48470
Rep Org: GEORGIA RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL PGM
Licensee: ATLANTA HEART ASSOCIATES, P.C.
Region: 1
City: ATLANTA State: GA
County:
License #: GA 1271-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TRAVIS CARTOSKI
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Licensee: ATLANTA HEART ASSOCIATES, P.C.
Region: 1
City: ATLANTA State: GA
County:
License #: GA 1271-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TRAVIS CARTOSKI
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 11/01/2012
Notification Time: 14:56 [ET]
Event Date: 08/17/2009
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 01/30/2013
Notification Time: 14:56 [ET]
Event Date: 08/17/2009
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 01/30/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JAMES NOGGLE (R1DO)
FSME EVENT RESOURCE (EMAI)
JAMES NOGGLE (R1DO)
FSME EVENT RESOURCE (EMAI)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LATE REPORTING FOR DIAGNOSTIC MISADMINISTRATION
The following information was provided by the State of Georgia via email:
"Licensee informed the Department [Georgia Radioactive Materials Program] via written correspondence dated 8/28/09 that a patient who underwent a nuclear cardiology treadmill stress test on 8/17/09 resulted in an embryo/fetus exposure greater than 500 mRem. Prior to treatment the patient declared to the licensee that she was not pregnant and the licensee followed in house protocols in which all female patients under the age of 55 are asked if they are currently pregnant or breastfeeding. In the event that a patient is unsure the licensee postpones testing until a negative pregnancy test can be obtained. The patient later informed the licensee of her pregnancy on 8/27/09. Isotopes and activity administered to the patient were as follows: Tc-99m 26.9 mCi & Tl-201 5.38 mCi with a Total Activity of 32.28 mCi. RSO for the licensee & consulting medical physicists conducted a dose determination and the conclusion was that the embryo/fetus did receive an effective dose equivalent in excess of 500 mRem. The results were forwarded to the patient's OBGYN."
This was a diagnostic misadministration that did not involve contamination.
* * * UPDATE FROM TRAVIS CARTOSKI TO VINCE KLCO ON 1/30/13 AT 0943 EST * * *
The following information was excerpted from a received facsimile:
"[The update is concerned with] the radiopharmaceutical dose administration that a female patient recently received at testing facility. It was subsequently determined that this patient was 9 weeks pregnant. The patient received two dose administrations, one dose of Tc-99m - Myoview for the Stress Myocardial Perfusion scan and one dose of TI-201 as Thallous Chloride for the Rest Myocardial Perfusion scan. The patient received 26.9 mCi of Tc-99m-Myoview and 5.38 mCi of TI-201.
"The dose to the conceptus was approximately 2.53 Rad. Determination of dose is limited by patient habitus and physiology."
Notified the R1DO(Bellamy) and FSME Resources via email.
Report: GA-2009-18i
NMED# 090812
The following information was provided by the State of Georgia via email:
"Licensee informed the Department [Georgia Radioactive Materials Program] via written correspondence dated 8/28/09 that a patient who underwent a nuclear cardiology treadmill stress test on 8/17/09 resulted in an embryo/fetus exposure greater than 500 mRem. Prior to treatment the patient declared to the licensee that she was not pregnant and the licensee followed in house protocols in which all female patients under the age of 55 are asked if they are currently pregnant or breastfeeding. In the event that a patient is unsure the licensee postpones testing until a negative pregnancy test can be obtained. The patient later informed the licensee of her pregnancy on 8/27/09. Isotopes and activity administered to the patient were as follows: Tc-99m 26.9 mCi & Tl-201 5.38 mCi with a Total Activity of 32.28 mCi. RSO for the licensee & consulting medical physicists conducted a dose determination and the conclusion was that the embryo/fetus did receive an effective dose equivalent in excess of 500 mRem. The results were forwarded to the patient's OBGYN."
This was a diagnostic misadministration that did not involve contamination.
* * * UPDATE FROM TRAVIS CARTOSKI TO VINCE KLCO ON 1/30/13 AT 0943 EST * * *
The following information was excerpted from a received facsimile:
"[The update is concerned with] the radiopharmaceutical dose administration that a female patient recently received at testing facility. It was subsequently determined that this patient was 9 weeks pregnant. The patient received two dose administrations, one dose of Tc-99m - Myoview for the Stress Myocardial Perfusion scan and one dose of TI-201 as Thallous Chloride for the Rest Myocardial Perfusion scan. The patient received 26.9 mCi of Tc-99m-Myoview and 5.38 mCi of TI-201.
"The dose to the conceptus was approximately 2.53 Rad. Determination of dose is limited by patient habitus and physiology."
Notified the R1DO(Bellamy) and FSME Resources via email.
Report: GA-2009-18i
NMED# 090812