Event Notification Report for August 10, 2009
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
08/09/2009 - 08/10/2009
EVENT NUMBERS
4525545256452664529747703
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45255
Facility: INDIAN POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [] [3] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: GEORGE KELLER
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [] [3] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: GEORGE KELLER
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 08/10/2009
Notification Time: 23:55 [ET]
Event Date: 08/10/2009
Event Time: 20:32 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/11/2009
Notification Time: 23:55 [ET]
Event Date: 08/10/2009
Event Time: 20:32 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/11/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
WILLIAM COOK (R1DO)
TIM McGINTY (NRR)
ANTHONY McMURTRAY (IRD)
WILLIAM COOK (R1DO)
TIM McGINTY (NRR)
ANTHONY McMURTRAY (IRD)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
INDIAN POINT UNIT 3 AUTOMATICALLY TRIPPED DURING THUNDERSTORM
"Indian Point Unit 3 automatically tripped from 100% power at 2032 [EDT] on 8/10/2009 due to [a] generator trip. Indian Point Unit 3 is currently in mode 3. All control rods inserted on the trip. No safety relief valves lifted due to the trip. The motor driven aux feedwater pumps automatically started on low steam generator level and are being used to maintain steam generator level. Condenser steam dumps are maintaining reactor temperature.
"After the trip , [the] 6.9kv bus 2 did not transfer to offsite power and is de-energized resulting in a loss of [the] '34' RCP [Reactor Coolant Pump]. [The] 480v bus 2A was energized by the diesel generator.
"Plant operators are investigating the cause of the generator trip and loss of bus 2.
"Unit 2 was unaffected and remains in mode 1 at 100% power.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
The licensee informed the State of New York and plans on issuing a press release.
"Indian Point Unit 3 automatically tripped from 100% power at 2032 [EDT] on 8/10/2009 due to [a] generator trip. Indian Point Unit 3 is currently in mode 3. All control rods inserted on the trip. No safety relief valves lifted due to the trip. The motor driven aux feedwater pumps automatically started on low steam generator level and are being used to maintain steam generator level. Condenser steam dumps are maintaining reactor temperature.
"After the trip , [the] 6.9kv bus 2 did not transfer to offsite power and is de-energized resulting in a loss of [the] '34' RCP [Reactor Coolant Pump]. [The] 480v bus 2A was energized by the diesel generator.
"Plant operators are investigating the cause of the generator trip and loss of bus 2.
"Unit 2 was unaffected and remains in mode 1 at 100% power.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
The licensee informed the State of New York and plans on issuing a press release.
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 45256
Rep Org: ATC ASSOCIATES
Licensee: ATC ASSOCIATES
Region: 3
City: INDIANAPOLIS State: IN
County:
License #: 13-17732-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BOB RAMSEY
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Licensee: ATC ASSOCIATES
Region: 3
City: INDIANAPOLIS State: IN
County:
License #: 13-17732-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BOB RAMSEY
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 08/11/2009
Notification Time: 13:55 [ET]
Event Date: 08/10/2009
Event Time: 08:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/11/2009
Notification Time: 13:55 [ET]
Event Date: 08/10/2009
Event Time: 08:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/11/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
Person (Organization):
JAMNES CAMERON (R3DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
ILTAB VIA EMAIL
JAMNES CAMERON (R3DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
ILTAB VIA EMAIL
STOLEN MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
An employee drove home [Crawfordville, IN] with the density gauge in the back of his car on Friday August 7, 2009. Sunday morning he locked the density gauge into the trunk of another car parked in the front of his home. He then left to attend a family event. The employee noticed the gauge was missing on Monday morning.
The licensee notified Montgomery County Police and Indiana Department of Health.
Seaman Nuclear Moisture Density Gauge
Model: C75A SC757582
Source: Radium-226
Activity: .00616 TBq
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
An employee drove home [Crawfordville, IN] with the density gauge in the back of his car on Friday August 7, 2009. Sunday morning he locked the density gauge into the trunk of another car parked in the front of his home. He then left to attend a family event. The employee noticed the gauge was missing on Monday morning.
The licensee notified Montgomery County Police and Indiana Department of Health.
Seaman Nuclear Moisture Density Gauge
Model: C75A SC757582
Source: Radium-226
Activity: .00616 TBq
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 45266
Rep Org: MA RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM
Licensee: UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS - LOWELL
Region: 1
City: LOWELL State: MA
County:
License #: 60-0049
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOSH DAEHLER
HQ OPS Officer: KARL DIEDERICH
Licensee: UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS - LOWELL
Region: 1
City: LOWELL State: MA
County:
License #: 60-0049
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOSH DAEHLER
HQ OPS Officer: KARL DIEDERICH
Notification Date: 08/17/2009
Notification Time: 13:49 [ET]
Event Date: 08/10/2009
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/17/2009
Notification Time: 13:49 [ET]
Event Date: 08/10/2009
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/17/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
RICHARD CONTE (R1DO)
GLENDA VILLAMAR (FSME)
RICHARD CONTE (R1DO)
GLENDA VILLAMAR (FSME)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - IMPROPERLY PACKAGED RADIOACTIVE SHIPMENT
The following was received from the State via FAX:
"The Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) for the University of Massachusetts - Lowell (UMASS - Lowell) reported an improper shipment of radioactive material where the package was prepared for shipment as a regular package and should have been prepared for shipment as a Class 7 (radioactive) package.
"On Friday, August 14, 2009, the RSO discovered, from information received by General Dynamics C4 Systems (GD), that GD received, on Tuesday, August 12, 2009 a regular package sent by UMASS-Lowell on Monday, August 10, 2009 that should have been prepared as Class 7. The package was reported by GD to UMASS-Lowell to have radiation levels of 2.6 mrad/hr at 2 cm above the package or contents of package as measured with a Ludlum G-M instrument.
"The RSO reports that the package contained electronic components subjected to irradiation from UMASS - Lowell's research reactor and that the radioactive materials contained in the package was likely Bromine-82. The RSO reports that he does not believe that there was any contamination discovered on the outside of the package.
"The RSO reports that based on calculations performed, the estimated activity of the package, for Bromine-82, was one (1) MBq and that the specific activity of bromine-82 of the samples (electronics) was likely between 42 and 170 Becquerel's/gram. The address reported for GD, the recipient of the package, is Scottsdale, AZ 85252 and any radioactive materials license number for GD was not known at time of this report."
The following was received from the State via FAX:
"The Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) for the University of Massachusetts - Lowell (UMASS - Lowell) reported an improper shipment of radioactive material where the package was prepared for shipment as a regular package and should have been prepared for shipment as a Class 7 (radioactive) package.
"On Friday, August 14, 2009, the RSO discovered, from information received by General Dynamics C4 Systems (GD), that GD received, on Tuesday, August 12, 2009 a regular package sent by UMASS-Lowell on Monday, August 10, 2009 that should have been prepared as Class 7. The package was reported by GD to UMASS-Lowell to have radiation levels of 2.6 mrad/hr at 2 cm above the package or contents of package as measured with a Ludlum G-M instrument.
"The RSO reports that the package contained electronic components subjected to irradiation from UMASS - Lowell's research reactor and that the radioactive materials contained in the package was likely Bromine-82. The RSO reports that he does not believe that there was any contamination discovered on the outside of the package.
"The RSO reports that based on calculations performed, the estimated activity of the package, for Bromine-82, was one (1) MBq and that the specific activity of bromine-82 of the samples (electronics) was likely between 42 and 170 Becquerel's/gram. The address reported for GD, the recipient of the package, is Scottsdale, AZ 85252 and any radioactive materials license number for GD was not known at time of this report."
General Information or Other
Event Number: 45297
Rep Org: USEC
Licensee: COLUMBIANA HI TECH
Region: 0
City: State:
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ROBERT VAN NAMEN
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Licensee: COLUMBIANA HI TECH
Region: 0
City: State:
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ROBERT VAN NAMEN
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 08/25/2009
Notification Time: 15:14 [ET]
Event Date: 08/10/2009
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 08/25/2009
Notification Time: 15:14 [ET]
Event Date: 08/10/2009
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 08/25/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
JOHN WHITE (R1DO)
SCOTT SHAEFFER (R2DO)
JOHN WHITE (R1DO)
SCOTT SHAEFFER (R2DO)
PART 21 REPORT - MISSING RETRACTING BALL IN BALL LOCK PINS ON URANIUM CYLINDER
"On August 10, 2009, a failure to comply was identified during USEC's routine refurbishment of a UX-30 transportation overpack. The overpack was being prepared for shipment of a clean empty 30B cylinder to a Russian facility where the cylinder would be filled with enriched uranium hexafluoride and returned to the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant (PGDP). The failure to comply involves a missing retracting ball in a ball lock pin that is designed with two required retracting balls. Ten of these ball lock pins are used to hold the top and bottom half of the UX-30 overpack together during transport.
"The firm supplying the ball lock pins was Columbiana Hi Tech (CHT). USEC has received 3,732 ball lock pins from CHT since July 2008, in five separate purchase orders. This report is the only instance to USEC's knowledge that a ball lock pin has had a missing retracting ball. Six hundred eighty-six of these pins have been supplied by USEC to its shipping agent.
"USEC Quality Control inspected approximately one thousand one hundred sixty-four ball lock pins currently on site, but not yet installed, to insure the pins had both balls installed and the pins functioned correctly. This was completed on August 24, 2009. Not additional defective pins were discovered.
"The USEC shipping agent was ordered, on August 21, 2009, to return to PGDP the remaining uninstalled ball lock pins from the six hundred eighty-six supplied and in its possession. A USEC Quality Control inspection will verify both balls installed and the pins function correctly.
"USEC intends to perform an assessment of the supplier (CHT) to ensure the supplier is adequately implementing its quality programs and is ensuring its sub tier suppliers are meeting established quality requirements. This assessment is scheduled to be conducted beginning September 28, 2009, barring any unforeseen circumstances."
"On August 10, 2009, a failure to comply was identified during USEC's routine refurbishment of a UX-30 transportation overpack. The overpack was being prepared for shipment of a clean empty 30B cylinder to a Russian facility where the cylinder would be filled with enriched uranium hexafluoride and returned to the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant (PGDP). The failure to comply involves a missing retracting ball in a ball lock pin that is designed with two required retracting balls. Ten of these ball lock pins are used to hold the top and bottom half of the UX-30 overpack together during transport.
"The firm supplying the ball lock pins was Columbiana Hi Tech (CHT). USEC has received 3,732 ball lock pins from CHT since July 2008, in five separate purchase orders. This report is the only instance to USEC's knowledge that a ball lock pin has had a missing retracting ball. Six hundred eighty-six of these pins have been supplied by USEC to its shipping agent.
"USEC Quality Control inspected approximately one thousand one hundred sixty-four ball lock pins currently on site, but not yet installed, to insure the pins had both balls installed and the pins functioned correctly. This was completed on August 24, 2009. Not additional defective pins were discovered.
"The USEC shipping agent was ordered, on August 21, 2009, to return to PGDP the remaining uninstalled ball lock pins from the six hundred eighty-six supplied and in its possession. A USEC Quality Control inspection will verify both balls installed and the pins function correctly.
"USEC intends to perform an assessment of the supplier (CHT) to ensure the supplier is adequately implementing its quality programs and is ensuring its sub tier suppliers are meeting established quality requirements. This assessment is scheduled to be conducted beginning September 28, 2009, barring any unforeseen circumstances."
Agreement State
Event Number: 47703
Rep Org: TENNESSEE DIV OF RAD HEALTH
Licensee: SAINT THOMAS HOSPITAL
Region: 1
City: NASHVILLE State: TN
County:
License #: R-19190-H14
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DEBRA SHULTS
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Licensee: SAINT THOMAS HOSPITAL
Region: 1
City: NASHVILLE State: TN
County:
License #: R-19190-H14
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DEBRA SHULTS
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 02/28/2012
Notification Time: 13:09 [ET]
Event Date: 08/10/2009
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/28/2012
Notification Time: 13:09 [ET]
Event Date: 08/10/2009
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/28/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
MARC FERDAS (R1DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
MARC FERDAS (R1DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - EFFLUENT CONCENTRATIONS EXCEEDED REGULATORY LIMITS
The following was received from the State of Tennessee via facsimile:
"A pharmacy technician noted that the exhaust fan connected to the I-131 glove box was not working. Maintenance was contacted and found a broken fan belt which was repaired the same day. Up to 35% of the air exhaust of the I-131 vapor was not available for dilution. On 8/28/09, it was noted the effluent concentration of I-131 was over the limit of state regulations. It was immediately reported to the Radiation Safety Officer. An investigation revealed a bolus of I-131 was released through the ventilation system. Minor release in the room but the continuous air concentration in the pharmacist's breathing zone remained under regulatory limits. Surveys of the room revealed three locations of fixed contamination which were covered with cardboard and allowed to decay to background. All staff bioassays were below detectable limits."
Event Report ID No.: TN-09-110
The following was received from the State of Tennessee via facsimile:
"A pharmacy technician noted that the exhaust fan connected to the I-131 glove box was not working. Maintenance was contacted and found a broken fan belt which was repaired the same day. Up to 35% of the air exhaust of the I-131 vapor was not available for dilution. On 8/28/09, it was noted the effluent concentration of I-131 was over the limit of state regulations. It was immediately reported to the Radiation Safety Officer. An investigation revealed a bolus of I-131 was released through the ventilation system. Minor release in the room but the continuous air concentration in the pharmacist's breathing zone remained under regulatory limits. Surveys of the room revealed three locations of fixed contamination which were covered with cardboard and allowed to decay to background. All staff bioassays were below detectable limits."
Event Report ID No.: TN-09-110