Event Notification Report for August 01, 2009
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
07/31/2009 - 08/01/2009
Power Reactor
Event Number: 48462
Facility: MCGUIRE
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ERIC G. BLOUGH
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ERIC G. BLOUGH
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 10/31/2012
Notification Time: 13:34 [ET]
Event Date: 08/01/2009
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/31/2012
Notification Time: 13:34 [ET]
Event Date: 08/01/2009
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/31/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
GEORGE HOPPER (R2DO)
GEORGE HOPPER (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Hot Shutdown | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
HISTORICAL UNAVAILABILITY OF TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER VENTILATION DUE TO MAINTENANCE
"This non-emergency event report is being made per 10CFR50.72(a)(1)(ii) which requires reporting events that occurred within three years of the date of discovery.
"Based on operating experience, Engineering personnel reviewed past maintenance activities involving the Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system (VH system) and identified four (4) occasions between August 2009 and October 2012 (three years) where the VH system functions could not have been restored within the required facility activation time. The specific instances have been documented in our corrective action program.
"If an emergency had been declared during these period and TSC ERO activation was required, the TSC would have been staffed and activated unless the TSC came uninhabitable due to ambient temperatures, radiological or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC staff was necessary, the Station Emergency Coordinator would relocate the staff to the alternate TSC location.
"Practices and processes have been revised to improve control of TSC maintenance activities and to improve facility availability going forward. In addition, site reporting guidance has been revised to assure timely reporting for these types of events if required.
"This event is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as described in NUREG-1022, Rev. 2 since the maintenance activities affected an Emergency Response Facility."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
"This non-emergency event report is being made per 10CFR50.72(a)(1)(ii) which requires reporting events that occurred within three years of the date of discovery.
"Based on operating experience, Engineering personnel reviewed past maintenance activities involving the Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system (VH system) and identified four (4) occasions between August 2009 and October 2012 (three years) where the VH system functions could not have been restored within the required facility activation time. The specific instances have been documented in our corrective action program.
"If an emergency had been declared during these period and TSC ERO activation was required, the TSC would have been staffed and activated unless the TSC came uninhabitable due to ambient temperatures, radiological or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC staff was necessary, the Station Emergency Coordinator would relocate the staff to the alternate TSC location.
"Practices and processes have been revised to improve control of TSC maintenance activities and to improve facility availability going forward. In addition, site reporting guidance has been revised to assure timely reporting for these types of events if required.
"This event is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as described in NUREG-1022, Rev. 2 since the maintenance activities affected an Emergency Response Facility."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Agreement State
Event Number: 47617
Rep Org: PA BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: NUKOTE
Region: 1
City: CONNELLSVILLE State: PA
County:
License #: PA-G0247
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID J. ALLARD
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Licensee: NUKOTE
Region: 1
City: CONNELLSVILLE State: PA
County:
License #: PA-G0247
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID J. ALLARD
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 01/23/2012
Notification Time: 18:11 [ET]
Event Date: 08/01/2009
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/23/2012
Notification Time: 18:11 [ET]
Event Date: 08/01/2009
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/23/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
GLENN DENTEL (R1DO)
BRUCE WATSON (FSME)
GLENN DENTEL (R1DO)
BRUCE WATSON (FSME)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - ABANDONED GENERALLY LICENSED SOURCES
The following report was received from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania via fax:
"Event Description: International Communication Materials, Inc., (lCMI), a subsidiary of Nukote International, Inc., is a defunct manufacturer of toner and ink cartridges, which had operated a facility that closed in August 2009. This event wasn't discovered until the Department's [PA Bureau of Radiation Protection] Southwest Region inspected ICMI's factory in September 2010. The [ICMI] building was found unsecured, and [gauges were found with] the gauge shutters open and unlocked. The Department located two former ICMI employees, who secured the building and allowed the DEP to close and lock the shutters with padlocks. In August 2011, the SW Region again discovered the ICMI factory unsecure. The Department, with the Pennsylvania State Police, then conducted a joint inspection and discovered evidence that trespassers had entered the building and may have stolen copper pipes. After several unsuccessful attempts to contact Nukote International or ICMI, the Department then communicated with Nukote's largest creditor, CIT Group, and obtained their cooperation in securing both the building and the GL gauges.
"Sources: Three (3) Kay-Ray / Sensail, Inc., Cs-137 GL sources, each 25 mCi
"Serial Nos.: S96M1001, S96M1009, S96M1010
"CAUSE OF THE EVENT: Human Error - failure of ICMI to secure licensed material.
"ACTIONS: As of January 18, 2012, the purchaser / transferee intends to dispose of the generally licensed unit's all together. The transferee has already received quotes from various licensed vendors and will be selecting a vendor as soon as possible.
"Media attention: None at this time
"PA Event Report ID No: PA090045"
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
The following report was received from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania via fax:
"Event Description: International Communication Materials, Inc., (lCMI), a subsidiary of Nukote International, Inc., is a defunct manufacturer of toner and ink cartridges, which had operated a facility that closed in August 2009. This event wasn't discovered until the Department's [PA Bureau of Radiation Protection] Southwest Region inspected ICMI's factory in September 2010. The [ICMI] building was found unsecured, and [gauges were found with] the gauge shutters open and unlocked. The Department located two former ICMI employees, who secured the building and allowed the DEP to close and lock the shutters with padlocks. In August 2011, the SW Region again discovered the ICMI factory unsecure. The Department, with the Pennsylvania State Police, then conducted a joint inspection and discovered evidence that trespassers had entered the building and may have stolen copper pipes. After several unsuccessful attempts to contact Nukote International or ICMI, the Department then communicated with Nukote's largest creditor, CIT Group, and obtained their cooperation in securing both the building and the GL gauges.
"Sources: Three (3) Kay-Ray / Sensail, Inc., Cs-137 GL sources, each 25 mCi
"Serial Nos.: S96M1001, S96M1009, S96M1010
"CAUSE OF THE EVENT: Human Error - failure of ICMI to secure licensed material.
"ACTIONS: As of January 18, 2012, the purchaser / transferee intends to dispose of the generally licensed unit's all together. The transferee has already received quotes from various licensed vendors and will be selecting a vendor as soon as possible.
"Media attention: None at this time
"PA Event Report ID No: PA090045"
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf