Event Notification Report for July 08, 2009
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
07/07/2009 - 07/08/2009
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45190
Facility: BRUNSWICK
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JOEL LEVINER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JOEL LEVINER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 07/08/2009
Notification Time: 16:05 [ET]
Event Date: 07/08/2009
Event Time: 10:13 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/08/2009
Notification Time: 16:05 [ET]
Event Date: 07/08/2009
Event Time: 10:13 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/08/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
REBECCA NEASE (R2DO)
REBECCA NEASE (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
VALID EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR ACTUATION
"On July 8, 2009, at 1013 hours, during planned maintenance activities, electrical power was lost to the 4160V emergency bus E-2. The power loss to emergency bus E-2 affected both Unit 1 and 2. Emergency diesel generator #2 automatically started and re-energized the E-2 bus.
"The loss of power to E2 resulted in Unit 1 Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) Group 2 (i.e., Drywell Equipment and Floor Drain, Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Discharge to Radwaste, and RHR Process Sample), Group 3 (i.e., Reactor Water Cleanup), Group 6 (i.e., Containment Atmosphere Control/Dilution, Containment Atmosphere Monitoring, and Post Accident Sampling Systems), and Group 10 (i.e., air isolation to the drywell) isolations. The actuations of PCIVs were completed and the affected equipment responded as designed. Per design, no Unit 2 safety system group isolations or actuations occurred.
"Other Unit 1 actuations included the Reactor Building Ventilation System isolation (i.e., Secondary Containment isolation), and the automatic start of Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System trains A and B and the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREV). Systems functioned as designed.
"Safety systems functioned as designed following the de-energization of bus E-2. The safety significance of this event is minimal. Plant systems responded as designed. The cause of the event is under investigation.
"Reporting requirements met by this notification: 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Licensee was conducting maintenance on the switchgear at the time of the loss of power.
"On July 8, 2009, at 1013 hours, during planned maintenance activities, electrical power was lost to the 4160V emergency bus E-2. The power loss to emergency bus E-2 affected both Unit 1 and 2. Emergency diesel generator #2 automatically started and re-energized the E-2 bus.
"The loss of power to E2 resulted in Unit 1 Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) Group 2 (i.e., Drywell Equipment and Floor Drain, Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Discharge to Radwaste, and RHR Process Sample), Group 3 (i.e., Reactor Water Cleanup), Group 6 (i.e., Containment Atmosphere Control/Dilution, Containment Atmosphere Monitoring, and Post Accident Sampling Systems), and Group 10 (i.e., air isolation to the drywell) isolations. The actuations of PCIVs were completed and the affected equipment responded as designed. Per design, no Unit 2 safety system group isolations or actuations occurred.
"Other Unit 1 actuations included the Reactor Building Ventilation System isolation (i.e., Secondary Containment isolation), and the automatic start of Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System trains A and B and the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREV). Systems functioned as designed.
"Safety systems functioned as designed following the de-energization of bus E-2. The safety significance of this event is minimal. Plant systems responded as designed. The cause of the event is under investigation.
"Reporting requirements met by this notification: 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Licensee was conducting maintenance on the switchgear at the time of the loss of power.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45191
Facility: CATAWBA
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: STEVE CHRISTOPHER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: STEVE CHRISTOPHER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 07/08/2009
Notification Time: 23:25 [ET]
Event Date: 07/08/2009
Event Time: 22:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/08/2009
Notification Time: 23:25 [ET]
Event Date: 07/08/2009
Event Time: 22:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/08/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
REBECCA NEASE (R2DO)
BRIAN HOLIAN (NRR)
ANTHONY McMURTRAY (IRD)
REBECCA NEASE (R2DO)
BRIAN HOLIAN (NRR)
ANTHONY McMURTRAY (IRD)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION - OSHA CONTACTED DUE TO ON-SITE FATALITY
"A non-contaminated individual was transported by ambulance from the Catawba Nuclear Station parking lot to a local hospital due to a personal illness. The individual was pronounced dead at the hospital. Catawba Nuclear Station is notifying [Occupation Safety Health Administration] OSHA of an on-site fatality."
Licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"A non-contaminated individual was transported by ambulance from the Catawba Nuclear Station parking lot to a local hospital due to a personal illness. The individual was pronounced dead at the hospital. Catawba Nuclear Station is notifying [Occupation Safety Health Administration] OSHA of an on-site fatality."
Licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 45192
Rep Org: OK DEQ RAD MANAGEMENT
Licensee: OKLAHOMA STATE UNIVERSITY
Region: 4
City: STILLWATER State: OK
County:
License #: OK-00237-03
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MIKE BRODERICK
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Licensee: OKLAHOMA STATE UNIVERSITY
Region: 4
City: STILLWATER State: OK
County:
License #: OK-00237-03
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MIKE BRODERICK
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 07/10/2009
Notification Time: 10:46 [ET]
Event Date: 07/08/2009
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/10/2009
Notification Time: 10:46 [ET]
Event Date: 07/08/2009
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/10/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL HAY (R4DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
MICHAEL HAY (R4DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING UNPLANNED CONTAMINATION
The following information was received from the State of Oklahoma via email:
"An incident involving veterinary use of 3.7 milliCuries of Iodine 131 occurred at Oklahoma State University (OSU) on the afternoon of July 8. OSU holds a broad scope license OK-00237-03 and is located in Stillwater, OK. This was the licensee's first such treatment of a cat since an incident late last Fall where a veterinarian who was not an authorized user did a similar injection and stuck himself with the needle after the injection. An inspector from Oklahoma DEQ was present for the treatment, though not in the actual injection room because of space concerns. The University RSO directly observed the procedure and reports that the technician administering the dose appeared to follow the procedure precisely. She did not report anything unusual about the injection, though she observed that the cat (whose body was enclosed in a bag) struggled somewhat. The problem was discovered when a survey of the technician was done, and contamination was discovered on protective clothing covering the hand and the outer surface of the opposite forearm.
"Licensee measurements indicate that the cat reads 0.25 mrem/hr at 30 cm from the body, while measurements in the area where the cat was injected read over 60mrem/hr without the cat present. The licensee believes that the cat did not receive the majority of the dose and that the majority of the Iodine ended up on the injection shelf and the floor of the room. Thyroid screening of the technician, the RSO, and a control person with NaI probe does not indicate any internal absorption. The technician does not have any removable contamination on her skin, and meter readings of her skin are at background. A whole body scan at a hospital is being scheduled for her. She was given 0.13 cc of SSKI mixed with 2 ounces of water shortly after the incident.
"The area where the incident occurred has been closed off. The cat is being maintained in a cage in the room. The syringe assembly, its carrying case, and all protective garments worn by the technician have been preserved. The licensee is investigating, getting the advice of a team of experts.
"The licensee has not reached a conclusion of the cause of the problem, theories include mechanical failure in the preloaded syringe assembly or that the struggling cat may have caused the needle to stick out through the subcutaneous injection site causing the dose to be ejected outside the cat."
The following information was received from the State of Oklahoma via email:
"An incident involving veterinary use of 3.7 milliCuries of Iodine 131 occurred at Oklahoma State University (OSU) on the afternoon of July 8. OSU holds a broad scope license OK-00237-03 and is located in Stillwater, OK. This was the licensee's first such treatment of a cat since an incident late last Fall where a veterinarian who was not an authorized user did a similar injection and stuck himself with the needle after the injection. An inspector from Oklahoma DEQ was present for the treatment, though not in the actual injection room because of space concerns. The University RSO directly observed the procedure and reports that the technician administering the dose appeared to follow the procedure precisely. She did not report anything unusual about the injection, though she observed that the cat (whose body was enclosed in a bag) struggled somewhat. The problem was discovered when a survey of the technician was done, and contamination was discovered on protective clothing covering the hand and the outer surface of the opposite forearm.
"Licensee measurements indicate that the cat reads 0.25 mrem/hr at 30 cm from the body, while measurements in the area where the cat was injected read over 60mrem/hr without the cat present. The licensee believes that the cat did not receive the majority of the dose and that the majority of the Iodine ended up on the injection shelf and the floor of the room. Thyroid screening of the technician, the RSO, and a control person with NaI probe does not indicate any internal absorption. The technician does not have any removable contamination on her skin, and meter readings of her skin are at background. A whole body scan at a hospital is being scheduled for her. She was given 0.13 cc of SSKI mixed with 2 ounces of water shortly after the incident.
"The area where the incident occurred has been closed off. The cat is being maintained in a cage in the room. The syringe assembly, its carrying case, and all protective garments worn by the technician have been preserved. The licensee is investigating, getting the advice of a team of experts.
"The licensee has not reached a conclusion of the cause of the problem, theories include mechanical failure in the preloaded syringe assembly or that the struggling cat may have caused the needle to stick out through the subcutaneous injection site causing the dose to be ejected outside the cat."