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Event Notification Report for July 01, 2009

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

EVENT REPORTS FOR
06/30/2009 - 07/01/2009

EVENT NUMBERS
451874606046888

General Information or Other
Event Number: 45187
Rep Org: MA RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM
Licensee: PERKINELMER
Region: 1
City: BOSTON   State: MA
County:
License #: 00-3200
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BRUCE PACKARD
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 07/06/2009
Notification Time: 16:55 [ET]
Event Date: 07/01/2009
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/06/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
MEL GRAY (R1DO)
DUNCAN WHITE (FSME)
ILTAB VIA EMAIL
Event Text
LOST SHIPMENT OF YTTRIUM Y-90

The following was provided from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts via fax:

"Shipment [was] made [by common carrier] from North Billerica to Stanford Medical Center, Palo Alto, CA on 6/23/09. The quantity was 10 milliCuries of Y-90. The package was reported missing as of July 1, 2009."

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source


General Information or Other
Event Number: 46060
Rep Org: GE HITACHI NUCLEAR ENERGY
Licensee: GE HITACHI NUCLEAR ENERGY
Region: 1
City: WILMINGTON   State: NC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DALE PORTER
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 07/01/2010
Notification Time: 09:27 [ET]
Event Date: 07/01/2009
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/01/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
RAY POWELL (R1DO)
BINOY DESAI (R2DO)
ROBERT DALEY (R3DO)
RYAN LANTZ (R4DO)
PART 21 E-MAIL GROUP
Event Text
PART 21 REPORT CONCERNING FAILURE OF TURBINE OVERSPEED RESET CONTROL VALVE DIAPHRAGM

The information below is a summary of a report received via facsimile from GE Hitachi; Report MFN 10-192 dated July 1, 2010.

Background:
"A diaphragm used in a 1" HPCI turbine stop valve / mechanical trip hold valve operator failed at a domestic BWR 4 in July 2009. The failure resulted in a HPCI turbine lube oil leak, which was the indication that the diaphragm had failed. The BWR 4 plant completed an Apparent Cause Evaluation and concluded that a material defect in the diaphragm allowed the diaphragm to tear after being installed for 2 years 8 months."

"The diaphragm that failed was a Robertshaw (RS) part number 25471-A2, and was installed in a Robertshaw model VC-210 diaphragm control valve operator. The diaphragm was made from Buna-n rubber and was designed to have two layers of Dacron reinforcement fabric over all pressure bearing surface areas of the diaphragm. The diaphragms are manufactured by Chicago-Allis using a 2-plate compression mold process."

"The diaphragms are purchased as commercial grade and are dedicated by GEH and supplied as safety related under GE part number Q25471-A2. The failed diaphragm was manufactured in 2006."

Discussion:
"Reinforcement fabric is considered a critical design requirement that is essential to ensure durability, reliability, and prevents tearing of the diaphragm material when these diaphragms are used in the HPCI turbine lube oil system as turbine trip and reset valves."

"An inspection was performed on six diaphragms, three manufactured in 2006 and three manufactured in 2008. All six of these diaphragms were found to have areas without fabric reinforcement. Inspection of the three samples from 2006 found non-uniform reinforcement. Inspection of the three samples from 2008 found all diaphragms were void of reinforcement in the sidewalls and inspection indicates that the reinforcement fabric was torn away from the inner sidewall during the manufacturing process. The inspections identified no diaphragms that were in full compliance with the design requirements for two layers of reinforcing fabric over all pressure bearing surfaces of the diaphragm."

Safety Analysis:
"The failure of the HPCI turbine over-speed reset control valve's diaphragm would result in a loss of HPCI turbine lube and control oil through the failed diaphragm. Depending on the amount of oil lost and the system demands, this loss could ultimately result in a failure of the HPCI System. Failure is not imminent, but cannot be precluded. Other safety related equipment is sufficient to mitigate design basis events in the event of a loss of HPCI."

Conclusion:
"Because of the similarity of the defects in all diaphragms inspected, it is credible to believe that this type of deviation from technical requirement also exists in other diaphragms manufactured by Chicago Allis and sold by GE as part number Q25471-A2 and 25471-A2Q, and as part of Control Valve Assembly DD233A3600P001. The identified defective diaphragms were present in two lots; one manufactured in 2006 and one in 2008. Based on the observations it is reasonable to believe that other diaphragms manufactured in 2006 and 2008 have similar deviations. GEH has been unable to determine if the identified manufacturing deviation exists in diaphragms manufactured prior to 2006. Since GEH is not able to rule out defects in diaphragms manufactured prior to 2006, it is credible to believe that similar deviations existed in diaphragms manufactured prior to 2006. In order to determine the possible extent of condition, all diaphragms in service or in stock at plants as spare parts inventory are suspect. Since the diaphragms have a designated service life of 5 years, and a shelf life of 10 years, the extent of condition is bounded by replacement of all diaphragms purchased by plants since 1995."

"GEH has evaluated the consequences of the failure of this diaphragm and concluded that this type of failure could result in the HPCI system not performing its safety function. The HPCI system is considered an essential safety related system. Failure of the HPCI system is considered a major degradation of essential safety related equipment. Therefore this condition is determined to be a Substantial Safety Hazard and is a Reportable condition per 10CFR Part 21."

Recommended Action:
"GEH has evaluated the consequences of the failure of this diaphragm and concluded that this type of failure could result in the HPCI system not performing its safety function. The HPCI system is considered an essential safety related system. Failure of the HPCI system is considered a major degradation of essential safety related equipment. Therefore this condition is determined to be a Substantial Safety Hazard and is a Reportable condition per 10CFR Part 21."

US Plants With Affected Diaphragms:
Fermi 2
Limerick
Peach Bottom
Duane Arnold
Cooper
Susquehanna
Brunswick
Hatch
Browns Ferry


Agreement State
Event Number: 46888
Rep Org: NEW YORK STATE DEPT. OF HEALTH
Licensee: DOMINION RESOURCES INC.
Region: 1
City: NEW HARTFORD   State: NY
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ROBERT SNYDER
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 05/25/2011
Notification Time: 16:33 [ET]
Event Date: 07/01/2009
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/25/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
GLENN DENTEL (R1DO)
LYDIA CHANG (FSME)
Event Text
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST TRITIUM SIGN

The following information was received via fax:

"Event location: Utica Compression Station, 1103 Higby Road, New Hartford, NY, 13417

"[On] 4/23/10, Dominion Resources called to inform [New York State Department of Health] that one tritium exit sign was found missing after some demolition work at their Utica, NY facility. A written report [was] received [on] 4/29/10.

"During a company wide effort to inventory all tritium exit signs it was discovered that one was missing at their Utica facility. An investigation ensued, and it was determined that during July of 2009, the entire wall on which the exit sign was located was removed during remodeling. The exit sign was likely disposed of in a 30 cubic yard roll-off container owned by Waste Management and is likely in the local AVA landfill. Dominion is reinforcing and enhancing established processes and programs for handling tritium exit signs. This event will be incorporated into training and lessons learned. All other signs at the facility are accounted for, [and] this incident is closed."

New York Event Report ID Number: NY - 11 - 05

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf