Event Notification Report for June 10, 2009
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
06/09/2009 - 06/10/2009
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45122
Facility: CLINTON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL A. REANDEAU
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL A. REANDEAU
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 06/10/2009
Notification Time: 18:00 [ET]
Event Date: 06/10/2009
Event Time: 09:20 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/15/2009
Notification Time: 18:00 [ET]
Event Date: 06/10/2009
Event Time: 09:20 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/15/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
PATTY PELKE (R3DO)
PATTY PELKE (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 98 | Power Operation | 96 | Power Operation |
UNANALYZED CONDITION - UNKNOWN CABLE WITH COMBUSTIBLE COATING FOUND IN DIVISION I / DIVISION II CABLE TRAY
"At 0920 on June 10, 2009, technicians [performing] a Halon detection functional surveillance found a No. 10 AWG Tefzel coated conductor that ran in the Division 1, Division 2, and non-divisional cable trough in the Main Control Room subfloor panels. The conductor is terminated at a ring lug to a bus bar on one end, and the termination point on the other end is unknown. The Tefzel coating is combustible.
"This is reportable as an 8 hour report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as 'any condition that results in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety.'
"Clinton is required to have divisional separation in the event of a fire, and if the cable caught fire both Division 1 and Division 2 could be impacted.
"The station is working on determining the design function of the conductor and what the conductor is connected to."
The licensee will notify the on-site state IEMA Resident Inspector. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT 1655 EDT ON 6/15/09 FROM REANDEAU TO HUFFMAN * * *
The licensee is retracting this event based on the following:
"Further inspection of the duct run in the subfloor section reveals that the #10 AWG Tefzel coated conductor is actually 2 separate conductors, not just one. Each is a ground for the flex conduits in the divisional ducts (as described in USAR section 8.3.1.4.5.5), installed to ensure that hot shorts in the wiring inside the flex conduit will melt the upstream fuses. In addition, between the division 1 and division 2 duct sections, there is a metal barrier in the duct, providing the separation barrier between redundant Class 1E equipment (Division 1 and Division 2 cables) as described in IEEE 384.
"Also, further review shows that Tefzel is flame retardant and non-propagating, passes the IEEE 383 and UL vertical tray flame test, and is rated 'non-burning' under ASTM D635.
"There is no divisional separation issue and no condition that results in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety."
The licensee has notified the on-site state IEMA Resident Inspector and NRC Resident Inspector.
R3DO (Lipa) notified.
"At 0920 on June 10, 2009, technicians [performing] a Halon detection functional surveillance found a No. 10 AWG Tefzel coated conductor that ran in the Division 1, Division 2, and non-divisional cable trough in the Main Control Room subfloor panels. The conductor is terminated at a ring lug to a bus bar on one end, and the termination point on the other end is unknown. The Tefzel coating is combustible.
"This is reportable as an 8 hour report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as 'any condition that results in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety.'
"Clinton is required to have divisional separation in the event of a fire, and if the cable caught fire both Division 1 and Division 2 could be impacted.
"The station is working on determining the design function of the conductor and what the conductor is connected to."
The licensee will notify the on-site state IEMA Resident Inspector. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT 1655 EDT ON 6/15/09 FROM REANDEAU TO HUFFMAN * * *
The licensee is retracting this event based on the following:
"Further inspection of the duct run in the subfloor section reveals that the #10 AWG Tefzel coated conductor is actually 2 separate conductors, not just one. Each is a ground for the flex conduits in the divisional ducts (as described in USAR section 8.3.1.4.5.5), installed to ensure that hot shorts in the wiring inside the flex conduit will melt the upstream fuses. In addition, between the division 1 and division 2 duct sections, there is a metal barrier in the duct, providing the separation barrier between redundant Class 1E equipment (Division 1 and Division 2 cables) as described in IEEE 384.
"Also, further review shows that Tefzel is flame retardant and non-propagating, passes the IEEE 383 and UL vertical tray flame test, and is rated 'non-burning' under ASTM D635.
"There is no divisional separation issue and no condition that results in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety."
The licensee has notified the on-site state IEMA Resident Inspector and NRC Resident Inspector.
R3DO (Lipa) notified.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 45134
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: BECKMAN COULTER INSTRUMENTS
Region: 4
City: BREA State: CA
County:
License #: 0441-30
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KATHLEEN HARKNESS
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Licensee: BECKMAN COULTER INSTRUMENTS
Region: 4
City: BREA State: CA
County:
License #: 0441-30
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KATHLEEN HARKNESS
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 06/16/2009
Notification Time: 15:10 [ET]
Event Date: 06/10/2009
Event Time: 00:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 06/16/2009
Notification Time: 15:10 [ET]
Event Date: 06/10/2009
Event Time: 00:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 06/16/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
CHUCK CAIN (R4DO)
ANDREA KOCK (FSME)
CHUCK CAIN (R4DO)
ANDREA KOCK (FSME)
AGREEMENT STATE - LEAKING LIQUID SCINTILLATION COUNTER SOURCE
The following information was received from the State of California Radiologic Health Branch via e-mail:
"On June 10, 2009, the RSO for Beckman Coulter Instruments reported that a 21.5 year old Cs-137 source removed during decommissioning from a Beckman Coulter LSC (Liquid Scintillation Counter): model LS 5801 counter (s/n 7015110) was found to have 0.013 microcuries removable contamination. The reportable limit is 0.005 microcuries. It was removed from the LS counter by a Beckman Field Service Technician and returned to the Beckman Coulter facility in Fullerton for disposal, where the leak test was performed. No other contamination was found inside the LS device. The source part number is 598860, lot # ST1022018 - reference date was 12/18/87. The most probable cause of the leakage was the source holder was cracked due to age. Beckman Coulter has determined that the useful life is 8 years for these sources. The company is replacing all sources older than 8 years as corrective action."
The State provided additional information indicating that the original source activity was 30 microcuries.
CA Report Number 5010-061009
The following information was received from the State of California Radiologic Health Branch via e-mail:
"On June 10, 2009, the RSO for Beckman Coulter Instruments reported that a 21.5 year old Cs-137 source removed during decommissioning from a Beckman Coulter LSC (Liquid Scintillation Counter): model LS 5801 counter (s/n 7015110) was found to have 0.013 microcuries removable contamination. The reportable limit is 0.005 microcuries. It was removed from the LS counter by a Beckman Field Service Technician and returned to the Beckman Coulter facility in Fullerton for disposal, where the leak test was performed. No other contamination was found inside the LS device. The source part number is 598860, lot # ST1022018 - reference date was 12/18/87. The most probable cause of the leakage was the source holder was cracked due to age. Beckman Coulter has determined that the useful life is 8 years for these sources. The company is replacing all sources older than 8 years as corrective action."
The State provided additional information indicating that the original source activity was 30 microcuries.
CA Report Number 5010-061009
General Information or Other
Event Number: 45144
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: METCO
Region: 4
City: HOUSTON State: TX
County:
License #: L-03-018
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Licensee: METCO
Region: 4
City: HOUSTON State: TX
County:
License #: L-03-018
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 06/19/2009
Notification Time: 10:02 [ET]
Event Date: 06/10/2009
Event Time: 02:35 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/19/2009
Notification Time: 10:02 [ET]
Event Date: 06/10/2009
Event Time: 02:35 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/19/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
CHUCK CAIN (R4DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
CHUCK CAIN (R4DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - UNABLE TO RETRACT RADIOGRAPHY SOURCE
The following information was obtained from the State of Texas via email:
"On June 10, 2009, at approximately 2:35 a.m. while performing radiographic operations at GE Oil & Gas, two radiographers found they were unable to retract the radioactive material into the shielded position.
"They had made approximately 13 radiographic exposures prior to the malfunction. One of the radiographers contacted an approved Source Retrieval Supervisor, who was at the jobsite grading film. The Source Retrieval Supervisor immediately went to the area where the radiographic operation was located, assessed the situation and ensured the barricaded area was at less than 2 mR/hour. He determined the source was located within the collimator, but would not retract by normal means. The source tube was positioned with a fairly sharp bend which he felt may have put the drive cable in a bind, so he ran to the exposure device and repositioned it to reduce the source tube's bend. This action had no effect.
"The Source Retrieval Supervisor contacted the Site Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) by phone and reported the situation. They agreed that the Source Retrieval Supervisor should attempt to return the source to the exposure device by hand pulling the drive cable. After obtaining tools, the Source Retrieval Supervisor and one of the radiographers approached the crankout assembly, disassembled the crankout, and pulled the drive cable to return the source to the shielded position. After ensuring the source was in the exposure device, the crankout was further disassembled so that it could be disconnected from the source pigtail, the exposure device was locked and the source tube removed. The Source Retrieval Supervisor then called the RSO at approximately 3:00 a.m. to report the successful source retrieval. There were no members of the public in the immediate area.
"Pocket dosimeter reading for Source Retrieval Supervisor: 10 mR at start of retrieval operation, 15 mR at finish.
"Pocket dosimeter reading for Radiographer Aiding in Source Retrieval: 15 mR at start of retrieval operation, 15 mR at finish.
"Pocket dosimeter reading for Other Radiographer: 0
"Equipment involved:
Exposure device: Spec-150, s/n 0181
Source: QSA Global, 969, s/n 52911B, 35.8 curies
Source tube: NDT Repair & Supply, 7', serial number B13-2
Crankout: SPEC, 35', s/n 0603"
Texas Incident No. I-8641
The following information was obtained from the State of Texas via email:
"On June 10, 2009, at approximately 2:35 a.m. while performing radiographic operations at GE Oil & Gas, two radiographers found they were unable to retract the radioactive material into the shielded position.
"They had made approximately 13 radiographic exposures prior to the malfunction. One of the radiographers contacted an approved Source Retrieval Supervisor, who was at the jobsite grading film. The Source Retrieval Supervisor immediately went to the area where the radiographic operation was located, assessed the situation and ensured the barricaded area was at less than 2 mR/hour. He determined the source was located within the collimator, but would not retract by normal means. The source tube was positioned with a fairly sharp bend which he felt may have put the drive cable in a bind, so he ran to the exposure device and repositioned it to reduce the source tube's bend. This action had no effect.
"The Source Retrieval Supervisor contacted the Site Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) by phone and reported the situation. They agreed that the Source Retrieval Supervisor should attempt to return the source to the exposure device by hand pulling the drive cable. After obtaining tools, the Source Retrieval Supervisor and one of the radiographers approached the crankout assembly, disassembled the crankout, and pulled the drive cable to return the source to the shielded position. After ensuring the source was in the exposure device, the crankout was further disassembled so that it could be disconnected from the source pigtail, the exposure device was locked and the source tube removed. The Source Retrieval Supervisor then called the RSO at approximately 3:00 a.m. to report the successful source retrieval. There were no members of the public in the immediate area.
"Pocket dosimeter reading for Source Retrieval Supervisor: 10 mR at start of retrieval operation, 15 mR at finish.
"Pocket dosimeter reading for Radiographer Aiding in Source Retrieval: 15 mR at start of retrieval operation, 15 mR at finish.
"Pocket dosimeter reading for Other Radiographer: 0
"Equipment involved:
Exposure device: Spec-150, s/n 0181
Source: QSA Global, 969, s/n 52911B, 35.8 curies
Source tube: NDT Repair & Supply, 7', serial number B13-2
Crankout: SPEC, 35', s/n 0603"
Texas Incident No. I-8641