Event Notification Report for June 09, 2009

DOOR FOR SECONDARY CONTAINMENT BOUNDARY LEFT OPEN

"This notification is being made pursuant to NRC regulation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.

"At 1852 [CDT] on June 9, 2009, River Bend Station personnel discovered that a normally closed auxiliary building door was open. This door serves as part of the secondary containment boundary. At discovery, immediate action was taken to close the door. This action restored the secondary containment to the design configuration. Investigation determined that the door was last accessed at 1242 on June 9 and was most probably left open at that time. Further action is being taken to investigate the cause of the event.

"Secondary containment leak tightness is required to ensure that the release of radioactive materials from the primary containment is restricted to those leakage paths and associated leakage rates assumed in the accident analysis, and that fission products entrapped within the secondary containment structures will be treated by the Standby Gas Treatment System prior to discharge to the environment. With the subject door being open, the function of secondary containment would be impacted. A second door is located in the same exterior passage way as the secondary containment door found open. This door was closed during the period of time the secondary containment door was open. This second door serves a security function. However, it potentially could serve to perform the secondary containment function. An evaluation is being performed to determine the actual impact of the condition on the secondary containment function. However, based on the identified condition, this report is being made as a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * RETRACTION FROM D. WILLIAMSON TO D.PARK AT 1325 ON 6/29/09 * * *

"(This event was reported by River Bend Station on 6/10/09 at 0102 [EDT]. This update is being provided for the purpose of retracting that notification.)

"Subsequent investigation determined that the secondary containment door was left open for unknown reasons some time after 0800 on the morning of June 9. At the 1242 observation by the persons exiting the building, the door was open and it was left in that condition. However, a separate exterior door in that same passageway serves the security function, and it has been confirmed that, other than for routine access, the security door remained closed and locked during the time that the interior pressure boundary door was open.

"An engineering analysis has determined that the as-found condition did not defeat the function of secondary containment. While the security door is not air-tight, the maximum potential leakage past it under postulated accident conditions has been evaluated.

"An existing engineering calculation provides a means to determine the maximum size of a breach in the auxiliary building boundary such that the draw-down requirement prescribed by Technical Specifications is maintained. That calculation uses the additional flow area of an identified breach, in addition to the most recent test results of the standby gas treatment system (that system establishes and maintains a negative pressure in the building as part of the its design).

"Measurements taken on the door found that the potential flow area around it totaled 35 square inches. The current test results indicate that the standby gas treatment system can support the safety function of the auxiliary building with an analytical breach size of 230 square inches. As there is significant margin between the measured gap around the security door and the analytical value, this event was well bounded by the assumptions of the design basis of the building. As such, this event did not constitute a loss of the safety function of secondary containment."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R4DO (D.Powers).

AGREEMENT STATE - LOST SOURCE

The following information was received via facsimile:

"The device is a product fill level gauge that was on a line that was being disassembled and cleared out. [Proctor & Gamble] P&G had told the contractor to leave the part of the line with the gauge until Industrial Dynamics (their consultant for radioactive materials) had a chance to remove the device from the package line. However, the device was not removed and the line was sent off for disposal.

"The device was physically removed from the site on or about May 28, 2009. The Licensee discovered the [device to be missing] on June 9, 2009. The disposed-of material was sent to DH Griffin [a scrap yard] in Greensboro, NC. DH Griffin has been contacted and they are in the process of sorting and searching for the device. They say there is a good chance that the device is still at the scrap yard as the material received from P&G should be in one of two piles still at the yard.

"[The State of North Carolina] asked P&G if they needed any assistance and [P&G] said no, at this time."

The device is an Industrial Dynamics FT-50 Filtec device used to measure the fill level of liquid products. The source is an Am-241, 100 mCi source. Gauge S/N: 110585, Source S/N: 3770. The source was leak tested in Sept. 2006 and it was not leaking at that time.

The North Carolina Incident number is NC-09-25.

* * * UPDATE FROM HENRY BARNES TO DONALD NORWOOD ON 06/10/2009 AT 1307 EDT * * *

"D.H. Griffin contacted P&G [at] 10:15 am. They informed P&G that they had located the Filtec unit on site. [An employee of P&G] drove to the D.H. Griffin site [and] verified that it was their Filtec unit. The unit is now isolated on a pallet and secured in a warehouse at D.H. Griffin. P&G is in contact with their Industrial Dynamics regional resource to arrange to have the source removed. They will keep [the State] informed as to the progress on the removal of the unit."

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source

REMAINS DISCOVERED OUTSIDE OCA

"On June 9, 2009 at approximately 1200 CDT, remains not yet identified as human or animal were found by Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (PINGP) employees. The remains were discovered on Xcel Energy property just outside the PINGP owner controlled area along the transmission line path, near the railroad tracks.

"The Red Wing City Police Department and the Prairie Island Indian Community Police Department have both been notified and are on the scene. Notifications are being made to appropriate agencies and officials. No press release is planned."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The licensee is treating this as a media sensitive event.

* * * UPDATE FROM L. PASCHKE TO HOWIE CROUCH @ 2026 EDT ON 6/9/09 * * *

The licensee reported that the Prairie Island Police, Red Wing City Police and the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension have cleared the scene after they determined that the remains were that of a large bird. There has been no intense media interest at this time.

Notified R3DO (Pelke), HQPAO (Brenner) and ILTAB (Allston).