Event Notification Report for June 06, 2009

VOLUNTARY NOTIFICATION - MOVING IRRADIATED STEAM DRYER IN A SHIELDED CONTAINER

The NRC Operations Center was pre-notified of the following activity:

"The following was determined to be an Event of Potential Public Interest (EPPI) and required reporting to the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (PEMA).

"On Saturday, 06/06/09 and Sunday, 06/07/09, Susquehanna will be moving an irradiated steam dryer from the reactor building to an onsite storage area. The dryer will be in a shielded container to minimize personnel dose during the move. In addition, access to the owner controlled areas near the site will be restricted. The presence of these controls may result in public inquiries about this planned activity.

"If onsite emergency response is required during the move, offsite agencies that support Susquehanna will not be impacted. Susquehanna will maintain the ability of Fire and Emergency Medical personnel to access the site."

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION MADE DUE TO ELEVATED LEVELS OF TRITIUM

"This notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) due to the fact that Exelon Nuclear has informed the Illinois Emergency Management Agency and Illinois Environmental Protection Agency of recent groundwater monitoring results at Dresden Station. This notification was made at 15:22 hours CDT on June 6, 2009.

"As part of the Station's continuing environmental monitoring and sampling program, sample results from some of the monitoring wells have indicated elevated levels of tritium requiring notification of the State of Illinois. Based on sampling data obtained to date, the tritium in the groundwater is confined to Exelon property and poses no threat to public health or safety.

"The IEPA/ IEMA regulation requires notification when a release to soil, groundwater, or surface water goes off-site at greater than 200 pCi/L or remains on-site greater than 0.002 Curies. Based upon the monitoring well results and the volume and concentration of groundwater infiltration into the nearby storm sewer, it is likely that the 0.002 Curie on-site threshold has been exceeded.

"The Station continues to track this issue by monitoring the existing wells and initiation of mitigative actions to contain any release and ensure it remains on-site. At this time, the source of the tritium has not been identified.

"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

STOLEN MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

The following was received from the State of Kansas via facsimile:

"Case number: KS090005.

"Kansas Division of Emergency Management reported that the duty officer received a call at 5:29 on 6/9/09 from licensee that a moisture density gauge had been stolen from a job site in Roeland Park, KS, Johnson County, on 6/6/09. The Roeland Park police were notified at 5:12 pm on 6/9/09. [The responding officer] stated he observed the vehicle and chains used to secure the gauge. The chains were rusty and did not appear to have been tampered with (no scrape marks or areas where the rust had been disturbed). The licensee employee stated the gauge transport case was secured by the chains through the handles. KDHE [Kansas Department of Health and Environment] was notified 0905 6/10/09."

The gauge was a Humboldt Scientific model number 5001, with sealed sources of 50 mCi Am-241:BE and 11 mCi Cs-137.


THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

INVALID CONTAINMENT VENTILATION ISOLATION SYSTEM ACTUATION

"This telephone notification is provided in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(1), to report an invalid actuation reportable per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), 'Any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any system in paragraph (a)(2)(iv)(B) ' General containment isolation signals affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system is identified in paragraph (a)(2)(iv)(B). Although the Containment Ventilation Isolation signal affects multiple containment isolation valves in several systems, at the time of the invalid actuation, only containment isolation valves associated with the containment area radiation monitor were open. Therefore, this notification is being conservatively made. NUREG 1022 Revision 2 identifies the information that needs to be reported as discussed below.

"(A) The specific train(s) and system(s) that were actuated.

"On June 6, 2009 at 2246 hours, with Unit 1 in Mode 1, a containment area radiation monitor failed high, resulting in an invalid A and B train automatic Containment Ventilation Isolation (CVI). Four containment isolation valves, associated with a containment radiation air monitor, that was in-service at the time of the actuation, closed. Additionally, valves (non-containment isolation valves) in the Auxiliary building closed in response to the actuation.

"(B) Whether each train actuation was complete or partial.

"The actuation was considered complete. The CVI signal automatically isolated all valves that were open at the time of the actuation.

"(c) Whether or not the system started and functioned successfully.

"The Containment Ventilation Isolation signal automatically actuated and functioned successfully. The CVI signal was not in response to actual plant conditions and is therefore considered invalid.

"In reviewing this CVI actuation it was also discovered that on July 6, 2007 a similar CVI had occurred on Unit 1 when a circuit board associated with the containment vent radiation monitor failed. The failure resulted in an actuation of CVI train A and Train B. The actuation was considered complete since all valves that were open at the time of the actuation isolated as required. The CVI was not in response to actual plant conditions and was therefore considered invalid."

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.