Event Notification Report for June 05, 2009
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
06/04/2009 - 06/05/2009
General Information or Other
Event Number: 45117
Rep Org: ILLINOIS EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY
Licensee: IROQUOIS PAVING CORP.
Region: 3
City: WATSEKA State: IL
County:
License #: IL-01909-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAREN PERRERO
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Licensee: IROQUOIS PAVING CORP.
Region: 3
City: WATSEKA State: IL
County:
License #: IL-01909-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAREN PERRERO
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 06/08/2009
Notification Time: 12:17 [ET]
Event Date: 06/05/2009
Event Time: 15:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/08/2009
Notification Time: 12:17 [ET]
Event Date: 06/05/2009
Event Time: 15:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/08/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
PATTY PELKE (R3DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
PATTY PELKE (R3DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
ILLINOIS AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
"On Friday June 5, the licensee's Radiation Safety Officer, called the Agency [Illinois Emergency Management Agency] to report a traffic accident involving their portable moisture density gauge that afternoon around 15:30. Apparently, a drunk driver entered the north bound construction zone on IL Rt. 49 at a speed in excess of 70 miles per hour and struck the gauge. The gauge was drug [approximately] 350 to 500 feet from the site of the impact. The car backed up to dislodge the gauge from under the vehicle and sped off. The license plate and identity of the vehicle was noted by a member of the road crew. The driver later crashed his vehicle and was apprehended by local law enforcement.
"The gauge source rod was in a shallow test position at the time of impact which separated the handle with indexing rod and source rod from the base of the gauge. The licensee attempted to recover all the pieces but some fragments of the source rod appeared to be missing. Radiation measurements taken at the scene by the RSO using a hand held instrument suggested both the Cs-137 and Am-241 sources were present. Digital pictures forwarded from the site to the Agency seemed to corroborate that finding however, after the gauge was returned to the storage location approximately one hour later, readings from the source rod definitely showed the source was no longer attached to the bottom of the rod.
"The Agency immediately dispatched an individual to investigate the matter.
"[The investigator, using] direct measurements and observation confirmed that although the Am-241:Be source was intact and in the shielded base of the destroyed gauge, the Cs-137 was no longer present with the other remaining pieces of the gauge and that the source rod tip had been cleanly severed from the source rod. Arrangements were made with the RSO and QA/QC Manager for the licensee to acquire additional safety equipment and begin a search of the section of pavement where the accident occurred. The nighttime scanning of the 1 mile section of roadway from the point of impact with a rate meter and scintillation probe produced elevated readings along the roadside off of the shoulder of the new asphalt. The readings were used to pinpoint the area where the source was located. Additional lighting eventually lead to the discovery of the source capsule within a grassy area of the shoulder some 5 feet from the road bed. The source was subsequently collected by the Agency investigator and placed into a shielded transport container. Gross monitoring of wipe tests collected at the scene showed no signs of contamination from the source or any equipment used to handle the source. The source was subsequently secured and isolated at the licensee's storage facility pending transfer to the manufacturer. Interviews with staff and assessment of radiation readings from the source indicated that no individual received a notable exposure from the actual event nor did any one handle a piece of the gauge that would result in an extremity exposure. Pocket dosimeter readings from those involved in the recovery showed no measured exposures.
"This item remains open pending transfer of the source and submission of the required report from the licensee."
The gauge contained a 8 mCi Cs-137 source and a 40 mCi Am/Be-241 source.
Illinois Event No. IL0900046
"On Friday June 5, the licensee's Radiation Safety Officer, called the Agency [Illinois Emergency Management Agency] to report a traffic accident involving their portable moisture density gauge that afternoon around 15:30. Apparently, a drunk driver entered the north bound construction zone on IL Rt. 49 at a speed in excess of 70 miles per hour and struck the gauge. The gauge was drug [approximately] 350 to 500 feet from the site of the impact. The car backed up to dislodge the gauge from under the vehicle and sped off. The license plate and identity of the vehicle was noted by a member of the road crew. The driver later crashed his vehicle and was apprehended by local law enforcement.
"The gauge source rod was in a shallow test position at the time of impact which separated the handle with indexing rod and source rod from the base of the gauge. The licensee attempted to recover all the pieces but some fragments of the source rod appeared to be missing. Radiation measurements taken at the scene by the RSO using a hand held instrument suggested both the Cs-137 and Am-241 sources were present. Digital pictures forwarded from the site to the Agency seemed to corroborate that finding however, after the gauge was returned to the storage location approximately one hour later, readings from the source rod definitely showed the source was no longer attached to the bottom of the rod.
"The Agency immediately dispatched an individual to investigate the matter.
"[The investigator, using] direct measurements and observation confirmed that although the Am-241:Be source was intact and in the shielded base of the destroyed gauge, the Cs-137 was no longer present with the other remaining pieces of the gauge and that the source rod tip had been cleanly severed from the source rod. Arrangements were made with the RSO and QA/QC Manager for the licensee to acquire additional safety equipment and begin a search of the section of pavement where the accident occurred. The nighttime scanning of the 1 mile section of roadway from the point of impact with a rate meter and scintillation probe produced elevated readings along the roadside off of the shoulder of the new asphalt. The readings were used to pinpoint the area where the source was located. Additional lighting eventually lead to the discovery of the source capsule within a grassy area of the shoulder some 5 feet from the road bed. The source was subsequently collected by the Agency investigator and placed into a shielded transport container. Gross monitoring of wipe tests collected at the scene showed no signs of contamination from the source or any equipment used to handle the source. The source was subsequently secured and isolated at the licensee's storage facility pending transfer to the manufacturer. Interviews with staff and assessment of radiation readings from the source indicated that no individual received a notable exposure from the actual event nor did any one handle a piece of the gauge that would result in an extremity exposure. Pocket dosimeter readings from those involved in the recovery showed no measured exposures.
"This item remains open pending transfer of the source and submission of the required report from the licensee."
The gauge contained a 8 mCi Cs-137 source and a 40 mCi Am/Be-241 source.
Illinois Event No. IL0900046
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45114
Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: BARRY COLEMAN
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: BARRY COLEMAN
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 06/05/2009
Notification Time: 11:23 [ET]
Event Date: 06/05/2009
Event Time: 09:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/05/2009
Notification Time: 11:23 [ET]
Event Date: 06/05/2009
Event Time: 09:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/05/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
MARK LESSER (R2DO)
MARK LESSER (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
TECHNCIAL SUPPORT CENTER VENTILATION SYSTEM OUT OF SERVICE
"Planned maintenance activities are being performed today (June 5, 2009) on the Hatch Nuclear Plant's Technical Support Center (TSC). This work activity is planned to be performed and completed expeditiously within one work shift (less than 12 hours). This maintenance activity is to repair or replace solenoid for valve 1X75F003 on the TSC HVAC System which is not always reliably opening. During this work the TSC HVAC will be rendered non-functional during the performance of the work activity.
"If an emergency condition occurs that requires activation of the Technical Support Center during this work activity, it will take no more than two hours to return the equipment back to functional status, dependent on the stage of the work activity at the time the emergency occurs. Plans are to utilize the TSC for any declared emergency during the time the work activity is being performed, as long as radiological conditions allow. Procedure 73EP-EIP-063-0, Technical Support Center Activation, provides instructions to direct TSC management to the Control Room and TSC support personnel to the Simulator Building to continue TSC activities if it is necessary to relocate from the primary TSC.
"This event is reportable per 10CFR50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) as described in NUREG-1022, Rev. 2 since this work activity affects an emergency response facility for the duration of the evolution."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM B. COLEMAN TO J. KOZAL AT 1406 EDT ON 6/5/09 * * *
The planned maintenance activities are complete and the TSC ventilation system has been returned to service. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Lesser).
"Planned maintenance activities are being performed today (June 5, 2009) on the Hatch Nuclear Plant's Technical Support Center (TSC). This work activity is planned to be performed and completed expeditiously within one work shift (less than 12 hours). This maintenance activity is to repair or replace solenoid for valve 1X75F003 on the TSC HVAC System which is not always reliably opening. During this work the TSC HVAC will be rendered non-functional during the performance of the work activity.
"If an emergency condition occurs that requires activation of the Technical Support Center during this work activity, it will take no more than two hours to return the equipment back to functional status, dependent on the stage of the work activity at the time the emergency occurs. Plans are to utilize the TSC for any declared emergency during the time the work activity is being performed, as long as radiological conditions allow. Procedure 73EP-EIP-063-0, Technical Support Center Activation, provides instructions to direct TSC management to the Control Room and TSC support personnel to the Simulator Building to continue TSC activities if it is necessary to relocate from the primary TSC.
"This event is reportable per 10CFR50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) as described in NUREG-1022, Rev. 2 since this work activity affects an emergency response facility for the duration of the evolution."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM B. COLEMAN TO J. KOZAL AT 1406 EDT ON 6/5/09 * * *
The planned maintenance activities are complete and the TSC ventilation system has been returned to service. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Lesser).