Event Notification Report for May 28, 2009

PART 21 REPORT - AIR CIRCUIT BREAKER DEFICIENCY

The following information was received from Westinghouse via facsimile:

Westinghouse provided information pursuant to the requirements to 10 CFR 21 to report an issue concerning the failure of a Westinghouse DB-100 circuit breaker to close after a new manufacturing cotter pin was installed during refurbishment. Westinghouse has supplied the air circuit breaker at nuclear generating stations.

When a DB-100 air circuit breaker failed to close on demand, the air circuit breaker was returned to Westinghouse to investigate the cause of this failure. The air circuit breaker was successfully cycled several times at Westinghouse before the failure to close was repeated.

Upon discovery of the DB-100 circuit breaker failing to close, Westinghouse identified plants that have purchased safety related DB-75 and DB-100 circuit breakers and reviewed the configuration of available breakers and drawings.

Westinghouse has notified the affected plants which are: R. E. Ginna, Indian Point Unit 2, Point Beach and H. B. Robinson.

Westinghouse will be issuing a Nuclear Safety Advisory Letter (NSAL) documenting this issue.

AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP RESULTING FROM A HIGH STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL TURBINE TRIP

"At 0530 EDT a power reduction commenced due to elevated vibrations on 32 MBFP [Main Boiler Feedwater Pump]. When reactor power reached 60% the team was attempting to stabilize reactor power when a level excursion occurred in 32 steam generator. When level reached its high level turbine trip set point an automatic reactor trip occurred and all systems responded as expected. Auxiliary feedwater actuated as expected. The Unit is currently in mode 3 and stable with auxiliary feed water in service and reactor temperature maintained with the steam dumps to the main condenser. Investigation into the cause of the steam generator level excursion is in progress. Offsite power is available and supplying safeguard busses. Unit 2 was unaffected and remains at 100% power. The [NRC] Resident Inspector has been notified."

No safety or relief valves lifted during this event.

CALIFORNIA AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN TRITIUM EXIT SIGN

The following information was obtained from the licensee via email:

"[The licensee] notified the [California Radiation Health Bureau] that a tritium exit sign had been stolen from a Roseville property they manage. The sign was an SRB Technologies Model 171-10-wh-s-gn."

SRB Technologies Tritium exit signs typically contain 10-20 Ci of tritium.

California Incident number: 5010-052809

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source

CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY FILTRATION SYSTEM EXCESSIVE LEAKAGE

"On 28 May 2009 the Control Room Emergency Filtration System (CREFS) was declared inoperable due to a degraded Control Room Envelope (CRE). Two CRE boundary doors were found with excessive leakage. Based on the identified leakage, reasonable assurance that CREFS would fulfill its safety function could not be established.

"The CRE boundary doors support CREFS at CNS. CREFS is a single train system and per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) an 8 hour report is required due to the fact that at the time of discovery this condition could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of an SSC [system, structure or component] that is required to mitigate the consequences of an accident.

"Actions to implement mitigating actions have been initiated in accordance with plant Technical Specifications.

"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of the condition."


* * * UPDATE FROM KIRKPATRICK TO PARK AT 16:50 EDT ON 06/11/09 * * *

The licensee is retracting this report based on the following:

"This notification is being made to retract Event Notification EN# 45103 which reported a loss of safety function due to the unplanned inoperability of the Control Room Emergency Filtration (CREF) system. The CREF system was declared inoperable on May 28, 2009, due to a degraded Control Room Envelope (CRE). Two CRE boundary doors were found with excessive leakage and reasonable assurance that the CREF system would fulfill its safety function could not be established at that time. Cooper Nuclear Station (CNS) has subsequently determined through further testing that while the CREF system was procedurally required to be declared inoperable, the ability of the CREF system to perform its safety function was not lost. CREF system safety function is to maintain the habitability of the CRE following a loss of coolant accident or fuel handling accident involving handling lately irradiated fuel.

"CNS performed testing on June 5, 2009. CRE adjacent building pressures were raised to create harsh conditions and one CRE door was cracked open to simulate a boundary leaking at about four times the CRE leakage of May 28, 2009. Testing results showed the CRE remained considerably more positive, in comparison to previous tracer gas testing performed in July 2004, and it is not credible the CRE unfiltered in-leakage exceeded maximum allowable limits. Thus, CNS determined the CREF system was still capable of performing its safety function during the timeframe when the two CRE boundary doors were identified leaking excessively.

"The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this retraction."

Notified R4DO (Geoffrey Miller)

LOSS OF CONTROL POWER TO ECCS VALVES

"At 2140 on 5/28/09 Braidwood Station identified a loss of control power for a Safety Related MCC (Motor Control Center) which provided power to SVAG (Single Valve Actuation Group) valves associated with both trains of the ECCS system. The MCC is normally de-energized to maintain the valve power removed in accordance with Tech Specs for ECCS. Loss of the control power for the associated MCC would prevent operation of these valves, which would prevent realignment of components required for transfer to cold leg recirculation and hot leg recirculation for long term core cooling.

"Entry was made into LCO 3.5.2, ECCS Operating, and LCO 3.0.3 due to inoperability of both trains of ECCS based on the inability to realign portions of both trains of the ECCS system from injection to cold leg recirculation and subsequent hot leg recirculation. At 2230 on 5/28/09 preparations had been completed for ramp off line per LCO 3.0.3.

"Troubleshooting was performed and a blown control power fuse was identified and replaced at 2319 on 5/28/09. No Unit ramp was initiated.

"The NRC Resident Inspector was notified."

* * * RETRACTION ON 6/8/09 AT 12:27 EDT FROM KELLER TO HUFFMAN * * *

"The purpose of this report is to retract the ENS report made on May 29, 2009 at 04:49 EDT (ENS #45104) under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(B), a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function.

"The initial report was made based on identification of a loss of control power for a Safety Related MCC (Motor Control Center), which provided power to SVAG (Single Valve Actuation Group) valves associated with both trains of the ECCS system. The MCC is normally de-energized to maintain the valve power removed in accordance with Technical Specifications. The loss of the control power for the associated MCC would prevent operation of these valves. It was initially concluded that this condition would prevent realignment of components required for transfer to cold leg recirculation and hot leg recirculation for long term core cooling. Therefore, the referenced ENS report was made for a loss of safety function.

"Subsequent review of UFSAR information and previously developed analytical data determined that the safety function for ECCS was not lost due to the event. The failure of the MCC to energize would have NOT affected the ability of the 1B ECCS train to perform its design function of cold and hot leg recirculation.

"A blown control power fuse, the cause of the event, was identified and replaced on May 28, 2009 at 23:19 hours.

"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this retraction."

R3DO(Pelke) notified.