Event Notification Report for May 15, 2009
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
05/14/2009 - 05/15/2009
EVENT NUMBERS
45071450724506945539
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45071
Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: EDWEN URQUHART
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: EDWEN URQUHART
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 05/15/2009
Notification Time: 10:13 [ET]
Event Date: 05/15/2009
Event Time: 05:19 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/15/2009
Notification Time: 10:13 [ET]
Event Date: 05/15/2009
Event Time: 05:19 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/15/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
JAY HENSON (R2DO)
JAY HENSON (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
GROUP 1 ISOLATION OF ALL MAIN STEAM VALVES WHILE PERFORMING A SPECIAL PROCEDURE
"At 0519 on 5/15/09, a Group 1 isolation signal was received which resulted in all eight Main Steam Isolation Valves closing. The signal was received based upon a valid main condenser low vacuum signal coincident with reactor mode switch placed in RUN position. The isolation was an unanticipated result of a special purpose procedure which was being performed as a functional test for maintenance work that had been performed on intermediate range nuclear instrumentation. The procedure had installed jumpers to bypass the Group 1 isolation for Mode Switch in Run, but did not account for low condenser vacuum isolation. The low condenser vacuum switches were in the bypass position, but this logic does not prevent Group 1 isolation in the Run mode. The Group 1 isolation was completed successfully with all MSIVs and small bore valves closing as designed. MSIV closure with Mode Switch in Run position also caused a RPS actuation / full scram. The reactor was subcritical and all control rods were already fully inserted as the reactor was being maintained in Cold Shutdown."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"At 0519 on 5/15/09, a Group 1 isolation signal was received which resulted in all eight Main Steam Isolation Valves closing. The signal was received based upon a valid main condenser low vacuum signal coincident with reactor mode switch placed in RUN position. The isolation was an unanticipated result of a special purpose procedure which was being performed as a functional test for maintenance work that had been performed on intermediate range nuclear instrumentation. The procedure had installed jumpers to bypass the Group 1 isolation for Mode Switch in Run, but did not account for low condenser vacuum isolation. The low condenser vacuum switches were in the bypass position, but this logic does not prevent Group 1 isolation in the Run mode. The Group 1 isolation was completed successfully with all MSIVs and small bore valves closing as designed. MSIV closure with Mode Switch in Run position also caused a RPS actuation / full scram. The reactor was subcritical and all control rods were already fully inserted as the reactor was being maintained in Cold Shutdown."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45072
Facility: CLINTON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: RICHARD KISS
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: RICHARD KISS
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 05/15/2009
Notification Time: 21:37 [ET]
Event Date: 05/15/2009
Event Time: 19:42 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/15/2009
Notification Time: 21:37 [ET]
Event Date: 05/15/2009
Event Time: 19:42 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/15/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL KUNOWSKI (R3DO)
MICHAEL KUNOWSKI (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 96 | Power Operation | 96 | Power Operation |
21 OF 44 SIRENS OUT OF SERVICE DUE TO SEVERE WEATHER
"On May 15, 2009 CPS was notified by the maintenance vendor that 21 EPZ sirens are out of service. This is 48% of the EPZ sirens out of service for greater than 1 hour as of 1942 CDT, due to severe weather and power outages. "
The licensee notified the Illinois Emergency Management Agency and the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM RICHARD KISS TO PETE SNYDER ON 5/15/09 AT 2304 * * *
"As of 2130 CST only 2 sirens remain out of service which is below the 25% out of service requirement of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii)."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R3DO (Kunowski).
"On May 15, 2009 CPS was notified by the maintenance vendor that 21 EPZ sirens are out of service. This is 48% of the EPZ sirens out of service for greater than 1 hour as of 1942 CDT, due to severe weather and power outages. "
The licensee notified the Illinois Emergency Management Agency and the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM RICHARD KISS TO PETE SNYDER ON 5/15/09 AT 2304 * * *
"As of 2130 CST only 2 sirens remain out of service which is below the 25% out of service requirement of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii)."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R3DO (Kunowski).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45069
Facility: INDIAN POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [] [3] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHN BAKER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [] [3] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHN BAKER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 05/15/2009
Notification Time: 03:58 [ET]
Event Date: 05/15/2009
Event Time: 01:53 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/15/2009
Notification Time: 03:58 [ET]
Event Date: 05/15/2009
Event Time: 01:53 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/15/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
DANIEL HOLODY (R1DO)
DANIEL HOLODY (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | M/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO FAILURE OF THE MAIN FEEDWATER REGULATING VALVE
"On May 15, 2009 Indian Point Unit 3 initiated a manual Reactor Trip at 0153 in response to a failure of 33 Main Feed Regulating Valve. 33 Main Feed Regulating Valve failed open causing 33 Steam Generator Level to rise. A manual Reactor Trip signal was inserted when it was determined that the level rise in 33 Steam Generator could not be corrected. As a result of the reactor trip, the Auxiliary Feedwater System automatically actuated per plant design. Unit 3 is currently in Mode 3.
"This results in a condition that resulted in an actuation of the Reactor Protection System which is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B).
"The valid actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)."
All rods inserted during the trip. There were no relief or safety valves that lifted during the transient. The electrical grid is stable and is in the normal shutdown electrical lineup. The plant is being maintained at normal operating temperature and pressure using steam dumps to condenser to remove decay heat. Unit 2 was not affected by the trip.
The licensee notified the New York Public Service Commission and the NRC Resident Inspector.
"On May 15, 2009 Indian Point Unit 3 initiated a manual Reactor Trip at 0153 in response to a failure of 33 Main Feed Regulating Valve. 33 Main Feed Regulating Valve failed open causing 33 Steam Generator Level to rise. A manual Reactor Trip signal was inserted when it was determined that the level rise in 33 Steam Generator could not be corrected. As a result of the reactor trip, the Auxiliary Feedwater System automatically actuated per plant design. Unit 3 is currently in Mode 3.
"This results in a condition that resulted in an actuation of the Reactor Protection System which is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B).
"The valid actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)."
All rods inserted during the trip. There were no relief or safety valves that lifted during the transient. The electrical grid is stable and is in the normal shutdown electrical lineup. The plant is being maintained at normal operating temperature and pressure using steam dumps to condenser to remove decay heat. Unit 2 was not affected by the trip.
The licensee notified the New York Public Service Commission and the NRC Resident Inspector.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 45539
Rep Org: ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: DESERT INDUSTRIAL X-RAY
Region: 4
City: BEEBE State: AR
County:
License #: ARK-1010-3320
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ROBERT PEMBERTON
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Licensee: DESERT INDUSTRIAL X-RAY
Region: 4
City: BEEBE State: AR
County:
License #: ARK-1010-3320
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ROBERT PEMBERTON
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 12/03/2009
Notification Time: 15:20 [ET]
Event Date: 05/15/2009
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/03/2009
Notification Time: 15:20 [ET]
Event Date: 05/15/2009
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/03/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
RICK DEESE (R4DO)
BILL VONTILL (FSME)
RICK DEESE (R4DO)
BILL VONTILL (FSME)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT- RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA SOURCE FAILED TO FULLY RETRACT
The following report was provided by the Arkansas Department of Health via facsimile:
"On October 26, 2009, during a routine inspection of Desert Industrial X-Ray, ARK-1010-3320, in Beebe AR it was discovered that an INC IR-100 exposure device (SN#4772, Source Model#32, SN#N475, Ir-192, 32 Ci) had failed to retract the source to the fully shielded position. The failure to retract had occurred on May 15, 2009. The Radiation Safety Officer for the location was properly trained and had to disassemble and clean the locking mechanism in order to retract the source to the fully shielded position. INC informed Desert Industrial X-Ray that this failure to retract occurs when the exposure devices are getting dirty. The licensee reports that corrective actions have been taken to that there have been no further problems with this device. Desert Industrial X-Ray personnel reported no unusual survey readings, and no personnel exposures occurred during this incident.
"The Department [Arkansas Department of Health] has concluded that the root cause of this incident is improper maintenance of the INC IR-100 exposure device. The licensee has implemented corrective action by introducing an enhanced maintenance program. The Department considers this incident to be closed."
See similar report EN#45538.
The following report was provided by the Arkansas Department of Health via facsimile:
"On October 26, 2009, during a routine inspection of Desert Industrial X-Ray, ARK-1010-3320, in Beebe AR it was discovered that an INC IR-100 exposure device (SN#4772, Source Model#32, SN#N475, Ir-192, 32 Ci) had failed to retract the source to the fully shielded position. The failure to retract had occurred on May 15, 2009. The Radiation Safety Officer for the location was properly trained and had to disassemble and clean the locking mechanism in order to retract the source to the fully shielded position. INC informed Desert Industrial X-Ray that this failure to retract occurs when the exposure devices are getting dirty. The licensee reports that corrective actions have been taken to that there have been no further problems with this device. Desert Industrial X-Ray personnel reported no unusual survey readings, and no personnel exposures occurred during this incident.
"The Department [Arkansas Department of Health] has concluded that the root cause of this incident is improper maintenance of the INC IR-100 exposure device. The licensee has implemented corrective action by introducing an enhanced maintenance program. The Department considers this incident to be closed."
See similar report EN#45538.