Event Notification Report for May 04, 2009
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
05/03/2009 - 05/04/2009
EVENT NUMBERS
45042
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 45042
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 2 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: BILL WALLACE
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Region: 2 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: BILL WALLACE
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 05/04/2009
Notification Time: 16:29 [ET]
Event Date: 05/04/2009
Event Time: 05:07 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/04/2009
Notification Time: 16:29 [ET]
Event Date: 05/04/2009
Event Time: 05:07 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/04/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
MIKE ERNSTES (R2DO)
GORDON BJORKMAN (NMSS)
MIKE ERNSTES (R2DO)
GORDON BJORKMAN (NMSS)
24 HOUR 91-01 BULLETIN REPORT ON LOSS OF ONE OF TWO CRITICALITY CONTROL CONTINGENCIES
"At 0507 CDT, on 05/04/09 the Plant Shift Superintendent was notified that a fissile sample buggy in C-331 Process Building was in violation of the 2-foot spacing requirement from a fissile HEPA vacuum. The buggy was pushed up against the HEPA vacuum spacing pan which resulted in approximately 21-inches of separation between the fissile material items. The situation has been remediated according to Nuclear Criticality Safety guidelines.
"Since one leg of double contingency was lost, this is being reported to the NRC as a 24-hour Event Report in accordance with NRC BL 91-01 Supplement 1.
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:
There were approximately 21-inches of separation between fissile material items, therefore, although the minimum 24-inch (2-feet) spacing was violated, there was significant spacing provided.
"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED:
Even if the items had been configured with no spacing, an additional upset would be necessary in order for a criticality to be possible.
"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS:
Geometry, interaction.
"ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL:
The assay of any material is less than or equal to 5.5 wt. % U235.
"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:
The first leg of double contingency relies on maintaining a minimum of 2 feet edge to edge between the HEPA vacuum and other fissile material; this control was violated. The second leg of double contingency, which was not violated, relies on the geometry of the HEPA vacuum cleaner and demonstrates that a single spacing violation is subcritical.
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
Control access to the area. Move the sample buggy in a direction away from the HEPA vacuum such that the spacing is always increasing until the minimum 2-feet edge to edge spacing has been re-established. Double contingency was re-established by 1300 hours on 5/4/09.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event."
"At 0507 CDT, on 05/04/09 the Plant Shift Superintendent was notified that a fissile sample buggy in C-331 Process Building was in violation of the 2-foot spacing requirement from a fissile HEPA vacuum. The buggy was pushed up against the HEPA vacuum spacing pan which resulted in approximately 21-inches of separation between the fissile material items. The situation has been remediated according to Nuclear Criticality Safety guidelines.
"Since one leg of double contingency was lost, this is being reported to the NRC as a 24-hour Event Report in accordance with NRC BL 91-01 Supplement 1.
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:
There were approximately 21-inches of separation between fissile material items, therefore, although the minimum 24-inch (2-feet) spacing was violated, there was significant spacing provided.
"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED:
Even if the items had been configured with no spacing, an additional upset would be necessary in order for a criticality to be possible.
"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS:
Geometry, interaction.
"ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL:
The assay of any material is less than or equal to 5.5 wt. % U235.
"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:
The first leg of double contingency relies on maintaining a minimum of 2 feet edge to edge between the HEPA vacuum and other fissile material; this control was violated. The second leg of double contingency, which was not violated, relies on the geometry of the HEPA vacuum cleaner and demonstrates that a single spacing violation is subcritical.
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
Control access to the area. Move the sample buggy in a direction away from the HEPA vacuum such that the spacing is always increasing until the minimum 2-feet edge to edge spacing has been re-established. Double contingency was re-established by 1300 hours on 5/4/09.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event."