Event Notification Report for April 23, 2009
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
04/22/2009 - 04/23/2009
General Information or Other
Event Number: 45723
Rep Org: UNITED CONTROLS INTERNATIONAL
Licensee: THOMAS & BETTS
Region: 1
City: TUCKER State: GA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ROBERT HALE
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Licensee: THOMAS & BETTS
Region: 1
City: TUCKER State: GA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ROBERT HALE
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 02/24/2010
Notification Time: 16:42 [ET]
Event Date: 04/23/2009
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/24/2010
Notification Time: 16:42 [ET]
Event Date: 04/23/2009
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/24/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
WAYNE SCHMIDT (R1DO)
PART 21 GRP EMAIL
WAYNE SCHMIDT (R1DO)
PART 21 GRP EMAIL
FAULTY LOGIC BOARD FOR CYBEREX 20 KVA INVERTER MODEL AC
The following is a summary of information received via fax:
On or around April 23rd, 2009, PSEG Nuclear LLC at Hope Creek Nuclear Station notified United Controls International (UCI), that they had encountered a problem with a Logic Power Supply circuit board (p/n: 90-41-974313) after installing it in their safety related inverter. This circuit board was a Logic Power Supply printed circuit board used in a Cyberex 20 KVA Inverter model AC.
Upon inspection, PSEG determined that a jumper was missing from the circuit board by comparison to the originally removed board.
The cause of this issue was due to an incorrect bill of materials (BOM) for the circuit board at the manufacturing location.
The affected facility is the Hope Creek Nuclear Power Station. Nine boards were all shipped to PSEG at Hope Creek Nuclear Power Station.
Preventive Actions Taken: The manufacturer, Thomas & Betts, has corrected the Bill of Materials (BOM) to show the jumper installed on this circuit board. Additionally, UCI has enhanced its inspection schedule for these boards by performing a component level inspection of each board against the BOM.
Corrective Actions Taken: Of the nine potentially affected circuit boards - Two circuit boards have been returned to UCI by PSEG and have had the jumpers added and retested. These two were returned to PSEG. Three circuit boards have been verified to have the jumper correctly installed.
Corrective Actions to be taken: There are four suspect circuit boards that have been shipped to PSEG (Hope Creek Nuclear Station) that need to be inspected for the correct jumper. If found to be missing the jumper, then these boards need to be returned to UCI for jumper installation and retesting.
The following is a summary of information received via fax:
On or around April 23rd, 2009, PSEG Nuclear LLC at Hope Creek Nuclear Station notified United Controls International (UCI), that they had encountered a problem with a Logic Power Supply circuit board (p/n: 90-41-974313) after installing it in their safety related inverter. This circuit board was a Logic Power Supply printed circuit board used in a Cyberex 20 KVA Inverter model AC.
Upon inspection, PSEG determined that a jumper was missing from the circuit board by comparison to the originally removed board.
The cause of this issue was due to an incorrect bill of materials (BOM) for the circuit board at the manufacturing location.
The affected facility is the Hope Creek Nuclear Power Station. Nine boards were all shipped to PSEG at Hope Creek Nuclear Power Station.
Preventive Actions Taken: The manufacturer, Thomas & Betts, has corrected the Bill of Materials (BOM) to show the jumper installed on this circuit board. Additionally, UCI has enhanced its inspection schedule for these boards by performing a component level inspection of each board against the BOM.
Corrective Actions Taken: Of the nine potentially affected circuit boards - Two circuit boards have been returned to UCI by PSEG and have had the jumpers added and retested. These two were returned to PSEG. Three circuit boards have been verified to have the jumper correctly installed.
Corrective Actions to be taken: There are four suspect circuit boards that have been shipped to PSEG (Hope Creek Nuclear Station) that need to be inspected for the correct jumper. If found to be missing the jumper, then these boards need to be returned to UCI for jumper installation and retesting.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45015
Facility: BEAVER VALLEY
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: DAN SHWER
HQ OPS Officer: KARL DIEDERICH
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: DAN SHWER
HQ OPS Officer: KARL DIEDERICH
Notification Date: 04/23/2009
Notification Time: 15:26 [ET]
Event Date: 04/23/2009
Event Time: 10:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/23/2009
Notification Time: 15:26 [ET]
Event Date: 04/23/2009
Event Time: 10:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/23/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
PAUL KROHN (R1DO)
PAUL KROHN (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
DAMAGED AREA IN CONTAINMENT LINER
"On April 21, 2009 during the Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No.1 (BVPS-1) refueling outage, an ASME XI Section IWE General Visual examination was performed on the interior containment liner. A suspect area was identified at the 738 foot elevation level of containment. This area was approximately 3 inches in diameter and exhibited blistered paint and a protruding rust product. At approximately 1015 hours on April 23, 2009 after cleaning the area and removal of the corrosion products, a rectangular area approximately 1 inch (horizontal) by 3/8 inch (vertical) was discovered that penetrated through the containment steel liner plate (nominal .375 inch thickness). The BVPS-1 containment design consists of an internal steel liner that is surrounded by reinforced concrete.
"With the plant currently shutdown and in Mode 6, the containment as specified in Technical Specification 3.6.1 is not required to be operable. The cause of this discrepancy is currently being evaluated.
"This is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) as a condition of the principal safety barrier (i.e., containment) being seriously degraded."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"On April 21, 2009 during the Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No.1 (BVPS-1) refueling outage, an ASME XI Section IWE General Visual examination was performed on the interior containment liner. A suspect area was identified at the 738 foot elevation level of containment. This area was approximately 3 inches in diameter and exhibited blistered paint and a protruding rust product. At approximately 1015 hours on April 23, 2009 after cleaning the area and removal of the corrosion products, a rectangular area approximately 1 inch (horizontal) by 3/8 inch (vertical) was discovered that penetrated through the containment steel liner plate (nominal .375 inch thickness). The BVPS-1 containment design consists of an internal steel liner that is surrounded by reinforced concrete.
"With the plant currently shutdown and in Mode 6, the containment as specified in Technical Specification 3.6.1 is not required to be operable. The cause of this discrepancy is currently being evaluated.
"This is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) as a condition of the principal safety barrier (i.e., containment) being seriously degraded."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45016
Facility: HOPE CREEK
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: TOM FOWLER
HQ OPS Officer: KARL DIEDERICH
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: TOM FOWLER
HQ OPS Officer: KARL DIEDERICH
Notification Date: 04/23/2009
Notification Time: 16:23 [ET]
Event Date: 04/23/2009
Event Time: 09:10 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/07/2009
Notification Time: 16:23 [ET]
Event Date: 04/23/2009
Event Time: 09:10 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/07/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
PAUL KROHN (R1DO)
PAUL KROHN (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
ACTUATION OF AUTO LOAD SEQUENCER DURING FAST BUS TRANSFER TESTING
"At 0910 during planned testing of the 10A401 vital bus, an unplanned momentary loss of power was experienced when testing the fast transfer function. A delay of approximately 1 second was experienced when forcing a fast transfer (simulating a transformer lockout via the 86 device) from the alternate to the normal 4KV bus infeeds. This condition resulted in an initiation of the 'A' channel LOP sequencer (ELS) as a direct result of bus under voltage and is considered valid ESF actuation. All other equipment operated as expected that was available for service.
"The bus de-energized for <1 second and restored power automatically from the bus normal infeed. No major loads were lost. The channel is currently inoperable for planned maintenance and is not required per tech specs.
"Prior to the transient, the reactor was shut down, in operational condition 5, with all control rods fully inserted, and the reactor cavity flooded and communicating with the spent fuel pool. All other 'A' and 'C' channel equipment, including the 'A' and 'C' emergency diesel generators are inoperable for maintenance. Decay heat is being removed by the 'B' loop of residual heat removal operating in the shutdown cooling mode.
"No personnel were injured. The licensee is conducting an investigation to understand the response and cause."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will notify the township.
* * * RETRACTION ON 5/7/2009 AT 1309 FROM TOM FOWLER TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
"During a subsequent review of the event, it has been determined that this was not a valid actuation of one of the systems listed in 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B). The original report was made based on the event being an actuation of (8) Emergency AC electrical power systems, including: emergency diesel generators (EDGs); hydroelectric facilities used in lieu of EDGs at the Oconee Station; and BWR dedicated Division 3 EDGs'.
"The Hope Creek (HC) Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) º8.3.1.1.2 states that there are three potential power sources for the Class 1E AC power system: (a) normal power source, (b) alternate power source and (c) dedicated standby diesel generator (SDG). The HC UFSAR º8.3.1.1.3 lists the components of the 'Standby Power System' (Emergency AC Power System). The ELS is not one of the components listed. Additionally, the sequence of events did not complete the required logic to actuate a start of the EDG.
"Since no EDG actuation signal was generated, this was neither a valid nor invalid actuation of a system listed in 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B) and is not reportable."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified the R1DO (Caruso).
"At 0910 during planned testing of the 10A401 vital bus, an unplanned momentary loss of power was experienced when testing the fast transfer function. A delay of approximately 1 second was experienced when forcing a fast transfer (simulating a transformer lockout via the 86 device) from the alternate to the normal 4KV bus infeeds. This condition resulted in an initiation of the 'A' channel LOP sequencer (ELS) as a direct result of bus under voltage and is considered valid ESF actuation. All other equipment operated as expected that was available for service.
"The bus de-energized for <1 second and restored power automatically from the bus normal infeed. No major loads were lost. The channel is currently inoperable for planned maintenance and is not required per tech specs.
"Prior to the transient, the reactor was shut down, in operational condition 5, with all control rods fully inserted, and the reactor cavity flooded and communicating with the spent fuel pool. All other 'A' and 'C' channel equipment, including the 'A' and 'C' emergency diesel generators are inoperable for maintenance. Decay heat is being removed by the 'B' loop of residual heat removal operating in the shutdown cooling mode.
"No personnel were injured. The licensee is conducting an investigation to understand the response and cause."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will notify the township.
* * * RETRACTION ON 5/7/2009 AT 1309 FROM TOM FOWLER TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
"During a subsequent review of the event, it has been determined that this was not a valid actuation of one of the systems listed in 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B). The original report was made based on the event being an actuation of (8) Emergency AC electrical power systems, including: emergency diesel generators (EDGs); hydroelectric facilities used in lieu of EDGs at the Oconee Station; and BWR dedicated Division 3 EDGs'.
"The Hope Creek (HC) Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) º8.3.1.1.2 states that there are three potential power sources for the Class 1E AC power system: (a) normal power source, (b) alternate power source and (c) dedicated standby diesel generator (SDG). The HC UFSAR º8.3.1.1.3 lists the components of the 'Standby Power System' (Emergency AC Power System). The ELS is not one of the components listed. Additionally, the sequence of events did not complete the required logic to actuate a start of the EDG.
"Since no EDG actuation signal was generated, this was neither a valid nor invalid actuation of a system listed in 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B) and is not reportable."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified the R1DO (Caruso).