Event Notification Report for April 22, 2009

HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI) SYSTEM INOPERABLE

"On 4/22/09 at approximately 1121, during surveillance testing on the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System, the associated Primary Containment Isolation valves closed. This isolation rendered the HPCI system incapable of performing its safety function and is, therefore, reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). Technical Specification LCO 3.5.1 Condition C had been entered at 0837 to support testing. The cause of the isolation is unknown at this time. Troubleshooting is in progress. LCO 3.5.1 Condition C provides 14 days for restoration of the HPCI System, the plant will remain in the LCO until the cause is determined and any associated repairs have been completed.

"A follow-up Licensee Event Report will be filed within 60 days.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI) SYSTEM DECLARED INOPERABLE

"On 4/22/2009 during an inspection of the HPCI (High Pressure Coolant Injection) Suppression Pool Suction piping it was identified that the suction piping was in contact with a piping support clamp. Per the design of the support, the clamp ring to pipe clearance should be 1/2 inch. With the identified contact, the integrity of the pipe support cannot be assured during a seismic event. At the time of discovery, the HPCI suction was aligned to the Suppression Pool. Subsequently, the suction has been realigned to the Condensate Storage Tank with both Suppression Pool suction valves deenergized in the closed position. HPCI remains available with suction aligned to the Condensate Storage Tank.

"Due to this, HPCI was declared INOPERABLE on 4/22/2009 at 7:45 PM (local time). This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) for a single train safely system potentially unable to perform its safely function of accident mitigation.

The licensee entered a 14 day LCO (Limiting Condition of Operation) associated with the inoperable HPCI system.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

* * * RETRACTION FROM BOB MURRELL TO JOE O'HARA AT 1417 ON 6/18/09 * * *

"The purpose of this notification is to retract a previous report made on 4/23/09 at 0233 (ET) (EN 45010). Notification of the event to the NRC was initially made as a result of declaring High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system inoperable when the Suppression Pool Suction piping was identified as being in contact with a piping support clamp. Per the design of the support, the clamp ring to pipe clearance should have been 1/2 inch. With the identified contact, the integrity of the pipe support could not be assured during a seismic event.

"Since the initial report, NextEra Energy Duane Arnold (NextEra) has determined that the HPCI system was capable of performing its safety function.

"NextEra concluded that the identified configuration, while not meeting design requirements, would not prevent HPCI from performing its intended safety function. This conclusion was based on analysis that demonstrated that the piping would remain intact during a design basis accident.

"This event is not considered a Safety System Functional Failure and is not reportable to the NRC as a Licensee Event Report (LER) per 10 CFR 50.73."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R3DO(Lipa)

AGREEMENT STATE - MEDICAL MISADMINISTRATION

The following was received from the agreement state with a state control number of KY0901:

"At 1400 on 4/22/2009, the RSO of a medical licensee reported the misadministration of a radiopharmaceutical to a seven-month-old infant. The infant was scheduled for a renal scan and was ordered to receive a 2 mCi dose tagged with Tc-99m. The patient was inadvertently administered a 35 mCi dose of Sestamibi/Tc-99M.

"Event date: 4/22/2009. Discovery date: 4/22/2009. Report date: 4/22/2009.

"Licensee Reporting Party Information: University of Kentucky, Lexington KY 40506, License number: 202-049-22.

"Site of event: Lexington, KY.

"Event type: MD2 - Medical event.

"Event cause: Human error."

The patient was informed on 4/22/2009.

The intended diagnostic study was renal-glomerular filtration with dimercaptosuccinic acid (DMSA) radiopharmaceutical, with a 2 mCi (74 MBq) Tc-99m radionuclide.

The given diagnostic study was cardiac perfusion with sestamibi/cardiolite radiopharmaceutical, with a 34.9 mCi (1291.3 MBq) Tc-99m radionuclide. The dose exceeded the prescribed dose by 1650%. It is estimated that the heart received a dose of 2.84 rem, and the whole body does was 6.84 rem. The effect on the patient is unknown at this time.

A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.

DAMAGED TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

Troxler Moisture Density Gauge model 3440, serial number 25403, was run over by a truck at the Auke Bay ferry terminal in Juno, Alaska on 4/22/09 at 1400. This gauge has Am-241 40 mCi and Cs-137 8 mCi sources. The gauge was in the retracted and shielded position when it was damaged. The cover was damaged. Surface contamination surveys following the event were negative. The licensee intends to ship the device to the manufacturer.

DISCOVERY OF AFTER-THE-FACT EMERGENCY CONDITION - ALERT - DUE TO FIRE DAMAGE TO SAFETY-RELATED BREAKER

"At 1410 hours on April 23, 2009, it was identified that an ALERT classification had not been declared on April 22, 2009 as required by EPIP-1.01. North Anna Emergency Plan, Emergency Action Level H2.1 requires the declaration of an ALERT for a fire or explosion in any safe shutdown area and either plant personnel report visible damage to any safety-related structure, system or component within the area or affected system parameter indications show degraded performance. A description of the event is provided below.

"On April 22, 2009, at approximately 0500 hours, Operations personnel identified a strong odor in the North Anna Unit 1 Cable Vault area. Subsequent investigation identified that the odor was coming from circuit breaker 01-EE-BKR-1J1-2S-J1 associated with the "D" Control Rod Drive Mechanism (CRDM) Fan (1-HV-F-37D). Operations personnel locally opened the circuit breaker to place it in a safe condition. 1-HV-F-37D had tripped approximately 30 minutes prior to the event. 1-HV-F-37D is not safety-related and not required for safe shutdown however; the supply breaker is safety-related since it is located on an emergency bus. Operation personnel then opened the circuit breaker cabinet and a small (6-inch) flame was observed. Operations personnel used a CO2 extinguisher on the internals of the circuit breaker to quickly extinguish the small fire. Appropriate levels of management were informed. The breaker has been quarantined. The cause of the circuit breaker failure has not been identified. A Root Cause Evaluation is in progress. There were no injuries. The plant continues to operate at full power. As a result of identifying that the criterion for the EAL was exceeded and no longer exists, a notification is being made to the NRC Operations Center in accordance with 10CFR50.72(a)(1)(i).

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified and the State and local governments will be notified."

* * * RETRACTION FROM KEMP TO SANDIN AT 1105 ON 07/09/09 * * *

"On April 22, 2009, at approximately 0500 hours, operations personnel identified a strong odor in the North Anna Unit 1 Cable Vault area. Subsequent investigation identified that the odor was coming from circuit breaker 01-EE-BKR-1J1-2S-J1 associated with the 'D' Control Rod Drive Mechanism (CRDM) Fan (1-HV-F-37D). Operations personnel locally opened the circuit breaker to place it in a safe condition. 1-HV-F-37D had tripped approximately 30 minutes prior to the event. 1-HV-F-37D is not safety-related and not required for safe shutdown however; the supply breaker is safety-related since it is located on an emergency bus. Operation personnel then opened the circuit breaker cabinet and a small (6-inch) flame was observed. Operations personnel used a C02 extinguisher on the internals of the circuit breaker to quickly extinguish the small fire. A root cause evaluation is in progress.

"At 1447 hours on April 23, 2009, a one hour notification was made to the NRC Operations Center in accordance with 10CFR50.72(a)(1)(i), which identified that the criterion for a ALERT EAL was exceeded due to the small fire in the circuit breaker and subsequent damage to the breaker internals. The notification also stated that the condition no longer exists.

"Subsequent reviews have determined that the 'Initiating Condition' for the Emergency Action Level was not met and the event was not required to be classified as an ALERT. The initiating condition states -Fire or explosion affecting the operability of plant safety-related structures, systems or components required to establish or maintain safe shutdown. The 'D' Control Rod Drive Mechanism is not required to establish or maintain safe shutdown and the emergency bus remained operable during the event. The notification made to the NRC on April 23, 2009 is being retracted.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

Notified the R2DO (Nease).