Event Notification Report for April 03, 2009

MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO INCREASING REACTOR WATER LEVEL DURING CALIBRATION

"This report is being made under [10 CFR] 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for inserting a manual reactor scram due to indicated reactor water level of 205 inches and rising. The exact cause of the reactor water level increase is not known at this time. However, STP [Surveillance Test Procedure] 3.3.3.2-09, 'Reactor Water Level and Pressure Instruments Calibration' was in progress at the time and is likely the cause of the level transient.

"In addition, this report is being made under [10 CFR] 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) due to PCIS [Primary Containment Isolation System] groups 2, 3 and 4 being received when reactor water level dropped below 170 inches following the reactor scram. All isolations went to completion. This level response is considered normal following a reactor scram from power and reactor water level is currently being controlled in the normal band. All PCIS group isolations were reset."

All rods fully inserted during the scram. The plant is in a normal shutdown electrical lineup with offsite sources powering the safety busses. No safety or relief valves lifted during the transient. Decay heat is being removed via the steam bypass to condenser valves.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

LOST NI-63 SOURCE

The licensee was performing their annual registration inventory when they discovered that a gas chromatograph detector was missing. A search of the premises was conducted and they were unable to locate the device thus it is considered lost.

The detector contained a Ni-63 source with an original source strength of 15 mCi (on 11/15/87). Its original use was in a Hewlett-Packard model 19233B Gas Chromatograph, serial number L-3031.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source

MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO LOSS OF 21 MBFP

"At 1136 hours on April 3, 2009 with the plant in mode 1, Indian Point Energy Center Unit 2 experienced a 21 Main Boiler Feed Pump (MBFP) trip. Following the MBFP trip the turbine runback circuit did not actuate as expected. The plant operators attempted to perform a manual main turbine runback and inserted a manual reactor trip based on the impending trip signal of Steam Generator low level. Auxiliary feedwater automatically started as expected. Troubleshooting of the cause of the transient is in progress. Unit 2 is stable in mode 3 with AFW in service. Heat removal is to the main condenser via the steam dumps. Offsite power is available and supplying all safeguards busses. Unit 3 is not affected and remains in mode 6 for 3R15.

"The [NRC] Resident Inspector has been notified."

PLANNED MAINTENANCE ON SPDS AND ERDS

"At 1630 hours on 04/03/2009, the SPDS and ERDS system was removed from service to support activities for a planned maintenance outage on the UPS vital bus power supply. The duration of work is expected to be approximately 24 hours. During this time, Control Room indications and alternate methods will be available. Since the SPDS computer system will be unavailable for greater than 8 hours, this is considered a Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability and reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii)."

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY J. GROFF TO J. KOZAL ON 04/09/09 AT 1257 * * *

"Update to event #44968 regarding SPDS and ERDS system removed from service to support planned outage on the UPS vital power supply. Planned work which resulted in the removal from service of the SPDS and ERDS has been completed."

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Daley).

MEDIA RELEASE DUE TO ACID SPILL

"At approximately 4:00 p.m. on April 3, an acid leak occurred [on top of Building 5A] at the B&W Mount Athos facility in Campbell County, Va. As a result of the incident, employees were evacuated from the immediate area in accordance with the company's operating procedure.

"The B&W Emergency Team was immediately dispatched and secured the area and the leak. Two company employees were exposed to the acid and treated on the scene.

"There was no release of radioactive material during this incident. No danger was posed to the public, and there was no release of the acid into the environment. B&W is investigating the incident."

The acid was nitric acid, 69% concentration. The affected employees washed off the acid with water and required no further medical treatment.

NRC Resident Inspector was notified.

MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO HIGH VIBRATIONS IN THE TURBINE

"The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event, additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time, a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73.

"On April 3, 2009, at approximately 2345 Mountain Standard Time (MST), Palo Verde Unit 3 operators manually tripped the reactor from approximately 29% rated thermal power in response to increasing vibration on the main turbine. The unit was being shutdown from 100% power for a refueling outage at the time of the trip.

"Following the manual reactor trip, all CEAs fully inserted into the reactor core. This was an uncomplicated reactor trip. No emergency classification was required per the Emergency Plan. No automatic ESF actuations occurred and none were required. Safety related buses remained energized during and following the reactor trip. The Emergency Diesel Generators did not start and were not required. The offsite power grid is stable. No LCOs have been entered as a result of this event. No major equipment was inoperable prior to the event that contributed to the event."

No relief or safety valves lifted during the event. Decay heat is being removed via the steam dump to condenser valves. The licensee will continue to cool the plant down to support their planned refueling outage. There was no effect on Unit 1 or Unit 2.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE FROM DANIEL HAUTALA TO JOHN KNOKE AT 1429 EDT ON 05/22/09 * * *

"This notification is being made to retract Event Notification (EN 44970) made by Arizona Public Service Company (APS) on April 4, 2009, that reported a reactor protection system actuation in Unit 3 during a planned shutdown for a refueling outage. Further review of the reporting guidance in NUREG 1022 (revision 2) has concluded that since the manual trip was not initiated to mitigate an event and the decision to trip the reactor was at the discretion of the licensed operators the reporting threshold was not met. The procedure for a normal reactor shutdown directs that a manual reactor trip be initiated at approximately 20% rated thermal power. Due to prior issues with vibration of the main turbine monoblock rotor during power reductions related to plant shutdown, just-in-time training was provided to the plant operators which included action to trip the reactor if main turbine bearing vibration increased. Without the pre-determined discretion provided through the just-in-time training, the main turbine alone could have been tripped, followed by lowering reactor power to 20%, and then tripping the reactor. The plant design does not include an automatic reactor trip when the main turbine is tripped.

"Event Summary: On April 3, 2009, at approximately 23:45 Mountain Standard Time (MST) Palo Verde Unit 3 operators manually tripped the reactor from approximately 29% rated thermal power in response to increasing vibration on the main turbine. The unit was being shutdown from 100% power for a refueling outage at the time of the trip.

"Following the manual reactor trip all CEAs fully inserted into the reactor core. This was an uncomplicated reactor trip. No emergency classification was required per the Emergency Plan. No automatic ESF actuations occurred and none were required. Safety related buses remained energized during and following the reactor trip. The Emergency Diesel Generators did not start and were not required. The offsite power grid is stable. No LCOs have been entered as a result of this event. No major equipment was inoperable prior to the event that contributed to the event."

NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R4DO (William Jones)