Event Notification Report for April 01, 2009
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
03/31/2009 - 04/01/2009
Power Reactor
Event Number: 44951
Facility: HARRIS
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: DAVID KING
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: DAVID KING
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 04/01/2009
Notification Time: 14:49 [ET]
Event Date: 04/01/2009
Event Time: 14:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/01/2009
Notification Time: 14:49 [ET]
Event Date: 04/01/2009
Event Time: 14:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/01/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2)
BRIAN BONSER (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION TO STATE/LOCAL AGENCIES REGARDING TRITIUM RELEASE ONSITE
"On April 1, 2009, the results of an ongoing hydrology study being conducted by Harris Nuclear Plant as part of the voluntary Industry Groundwater Protection Initiative revealed that a pipe leak in the buried Cooling Tower Blowdown line was releasing water containing tritium into surrounding soil. The maximum tritium activity level discovered was 2,120 pCi/L, well below maximum levels allowed by regulation. While the leak rate has not been determined, it appears to be small. The Cooling Tower Blowdown line is used for liquid effluent dilution as part of permitted, routine releases. The permitted liquid effluent release point is the discharge from the Cooling Tower Blowdown line into Harris Lake. This line is leaking upstream of the permitted release point. All leaking water is contained within the site boundary, and based on studies performed by an independent hydrologist, offsite migration is not anticipated.
"Immediate corrective actions include voluntary notifications, installation of additional monitoring wells at various locations to determine groundwater flow and to check for the presence of tritium. The water containing low levels of tritium is in a localized area immediately surrounding the Cooling Tower Blowdown line.
"The health and safety of the public are not affected by this event, as the activity levels discovered are significantly below maximum levels allowed by regulation. Harris Nuclear Plant is following the guidance contained in NEI 07-07 and has initiated this Event Notification as a result of our voluntary communication to State agencies in accordance with the Groundwater Protection Initiative."
The licensee informed the State of North Carolina (Division of Radiation Protection and Department of Water Quality) and the NRC Resident Inspector. The licensee will also inform local agencies.
"On April 1, 2009, the results of an ongoing hydrology study being conducted by Harris Nuclear Plant as part of the voluntary Industry Groundwater Protection Initiative revealed that a pipe leak in the buried Cooling Tower Blowdown line was releasing water containing tritium into surrounding soil. The maximum tritium activity level discovered was 2,120 pCi/L, well below maximum levels allowed by regulation. While the leak rate has not been determined, it appears to be small. The Cooling Tower Blowdown line is used for liquid effluent dilution as part of permitted, routine releases. The permitted liquid effluent release point is the discharge from the Cooling Tower Blowdown line into Harris Lake. This line is leaking upstream of the permitted release point. All leaking water is contained within the site boundary, and based on studies performed by an independent hydrologist, offsite migration is not anticipated.
"Immediate corrective actions include voluntary notifications, installation of additional monitoring wells at various locations to determine groundwater flow and to check for the presence of tritium. The water containing low levels of tritium is in a localized area immediately surrounding the Cooling Tower Blowdown line.
"The health and safety of the public are not affected by this event, as the activity levels discovered are significantly below maximum levels allowed by regulation. Harris Nuclear Plant is following the guidance contained in NEI 07-07 and has initiated this Event Notification as a result of our voluntary communication to State agencies in accordance with the Groundwater Protection Initiative."
The licensee informed the State of North Carolina (Division of Radiation Protection and Department of Water Quality) and the NRC Resident Inspector. The licensee will also inform local agencies.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 44952
Facility: SAINT LUCIE
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: NOEL PITONIAK
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: NOEL PITONIAK
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 04/01/2009
Notification Time: 20:51 [ET]
Event Date: 04/01/2009
Event Time: 18:05 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/01/2009
Notification Time: 20:51 [ET]
Event Date: 04/01/2009
Event Time: 18:05 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/01/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2)
BRIAN BONSER (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | M/R | Y | 92 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
UNPLANNED MANUAL REACTOR TRIP
"At 1805, due to lowering Condenser Vacuum caused by ingress of algae and seaweed, Unit 2 was manually tripped. Power had been reduced to 94% for the securing of one Circulating Water Pump (2A1). It was then identified that 2A2 Circulating Water Debris filter differential pressure was above administrative limits of 200 inches water. While the station was making preparations to reduce Circulating water flow on the 2A2 Circulating Water Pump, the unit began losing condenser vacuum. Plant was manually tripped at 92% power. All CEA's fully inserted on the trip. Auxiliary Feedwater automatically initiated on Low Steam Generator Level. No PZR PORVS opened. RCS Heat removal is now being maintained with Main Feedwater and Steam Bypass control system. All systems functioned normally, and plant is stabilized at normal operating Temperature and Pressure. This non-emergency notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) due to manual RPS actuation and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B) due to PWR auxiliary feedwater system actuation."
There was no impact on Unit 1.
The licensee informed the Resident Inspector.
"At 1805, due to lowering Condenser Vacuum caused by ingress of algae and seaweed, Unit 2 was manually tripped. Power had been reduced to 94% for the securing of one Circulating Water Pump (2A1). It was then identified that 2A2 Circulating Water Debris filter differential pressure was above administrative limits of 200 inches water. While the station was making preparations to reduce Circulating water flow on the 2A2 Circulating Water Pump, the unit began losing condenser vacuum. Plant was manually tripped at 92% power. All CEA's fully inserted on the trip. Auxiliary Feedwater automatically initiated on Low Steam Generator Level. No PZR PORVS opened. RCS Heat removal is now being maintained with Main Feedwater and Steam Bypass control system. All systems functioned normally, and plant is stabilized at normal operating Temperature and Pressure. This non-emergency notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) due to manual RPS actuation and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B) due to PWR auxiliary feedwater system actuation."
There was no impact on Unit 1.
The licensee informed the Resident Inspector.