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Event Notification Report for March 23, 2009

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

EVENT REPORTS FOR
03/22/2009 - 03/23/2009

EVENT NUMBERS
44956449314492844929

General Information or Other
Event Number: 44956
Rep Org: MISSISSIPPI DIV OF RAD HEALTH
Licensee: ACUREN INSPECTION
Region: 4
City: PASCAGOULA   State: MS
County:
License #: MS-784-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAYSON MOAK
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 04/02/2009
Notification Time: 11:25 [ET]
Event Date: 03/23/2009
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/02/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
RICK DEESE (R4)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
Event Text
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - SOURCE RETRACTION CHALLENGES

The following information was received from the State of Mississippi via Email:

"On 03-23-2009, Licensee's radiographic crew were unable to return the source [Source Model 424-9; SN 51178B; IR-192; 51.3 Ci] to the shielded and safe position while performing NDT radiography (RT) profile inspection at the Chevron Refinery [located in Pascagoula, MS] using a Sentinal Delta 880 radiography camera (D-2549), QSA cranks, and a QSA source tube. The radiography crew increased their barrier, notified the RSO and field operator of the situation. The two technicians maintained the security of their barrier while awaiting arrival of the RSO.

"Acuren's RSO notified the site manager, supervisor, assistant RSO, Chevron's RSO, and a Chevron company representative. Once a meeting was held to devise a plan for source retraction the source was retracted within one (1) hour. Dose received [by the RSO and the associate RSO] during the retraction of the source was 90 mR and 25 mR, respectively. The [two technician] radiography crew received a dose of 45 mR and 65 mR, respectively. There were not any non-occupational or over-exposures received.

"Licensee concluded that during the course of the source retraction and investigation, it was determined that the source tube had a crimp in it. The positioning of the source tube during radiographic operations could have been the cause of the hang up, but all equipment was shipped to QSA-Global Inspection to determine if equipment failure contributed to the incident.

"Licensee stated inspection report from QSA-Global Inspection will be reviewed and sent to DRH [Mississippi Division of Radiological Health]. Licensee has implemented safety meetings and additional training before the crew involved can resume radiographic operations, to cover proper equipment use, inspection, safety notification processes, proper inspection techniques, and equipment limitations.

"DRH received written report from licensee on 04-01-2009. DRH called licensee on 04-01-2009 to verify source activity and ask about licensee's investigation. DRH also requested 24 hr telephone notification from the licensee in the future."

MS report number - MS 09004.


Power Reactor
Event Number: 44931
Facility: PRAIRIE ISLAND
Region: 3     State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: WILLIAM BODINE
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 03/23/2009
Notification Time: 23:10 [ET]
Event Date: 03/23/2009
Event Time: 17:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/23/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
Person (Organization):
HIRONORI PETERSON (R3)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
UNANALYZED CONDITION FOR POSTULATED MISSILE HAZARD THAT COULD DISABLE BOTH TRAINS OF COMPONENT COOLING

"At 1700 on 3/23/09 Prairie Island staff declared both trains of Unit 1 Component Cooling (CC) system inoperable due to discovery that a postulated missile hazard in the Fuel Handling Area could fail a CC line to 122 Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger (SFP HX), affecting both trains of CC. This condition represented an unanalyzed condition reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) since the event might represent a significant degradation of plant safety. The inoperability of Unit 1 CC caused entry into Technical Specification LCO 3.0.3. The CC line in question does not have automatic closure and the resulting loss of CC inventory would eventually affect both trains of CC. This condition represents a loss of safety function for safe shutdown capability and is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(A).

"122 SFP HX was last modified by design change 99SF02 to allow for full redundant capacity of the 121 SFP HX. While seismic was addressed in the design change, tornado protection was not.

"The CC line to the 122 SFP HX was isolated at 1759 on 3/23/09 returning Unit 1 CC to operable status. Unit 1 remained at 100% power.

"121 SFP HX is currently in service and is in a location that meets the missile protection requirements.

"The condition was discovered during a tornado protection vulnerability walk-down. A similar line on Unit 2 was already isolated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."


Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 44928
Facility: WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION
Region: 2     State: SC
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
NRC Notified By: GERARD COUTURE
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 03/23/2009
Notification Time: 10:51 [ET]
Event Date: 03/23/2009
Event Time: 07:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/23/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (b)(2) - LOSS OR DEGRADED SAFETY ITEMS
Person (Organization):
MARVIN SYKES (R2)
JAMES RUBENSTONE (NMSS)
Event Text
DEGRADED ITEM REQUIRED FOR SAFETY IN THE PELLETING AREA

"Reason for Notification

"Notification is being made based on following criteria:

'10 CFR 70 Appendix A (b)(2) Loss or degradation of IROFS [Items Relied On For Safety] that result in failure to meet the performance requirements of 10CFR70.61'

"WEC CFFF [Westinghouse Electric Company, Commercial Fuel Fabrication Facility) has identified a degraded IROFS condition exists in the Pelleting Area. Safety Bulletin No: M-01-09-01, issued by GE FANUC has been evaluated by CFFF Engineering and this evaluation has identified a degraded IROFS condition exists in the Pelleting Area. GE PLC of the type discussed in the Safety Bulletin (IC695CPU310) is used in Pelleting Area Furnaces 1B, 2B, and 4C. This common mode failure is applicable to IROFS PELSINT-903, PELSINT-904, & PELSINT-905.

"These IROFS are preventive controls for a Hydrogen Deflagration Event in the sintering furnaces. While several potential initiating sequences can lead to this event, the only scenario where the performance requirements are not met due to this degraded condition is if the furnace is above the auto ignition temperature for hydrogen and the PLC CPU fails as the furnace is cooling, then the hydrogen shut-off valve could remain open with a potential to result in an explosive atmosphere in the furnace. This event is evaluated in the CFFF ISA-08 Summary for the Pelleting Area.

"See Reason for Notification. Impacted Pelleting Area Furnaces are 1B, 2B and 4C. Furnace 1B is currently at normal operating temperature (above auto ignition temperature) and in operation with approximately 550 kg's of Uranium. The other two Furnaces, 2B and 4C are currently at normal temperature (above auto ignition temperature) with no uranium present in either furnace."

The licensee will contact NRC Region 2.


!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 44929
Facility: KEWAUNEE
Region: 3     State: WI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: ANDREW SMOLINSKI
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 03/23/2009
Notification Time: 10:56 [ET]
Event Date: 03/23/2009
Event Time: 07:31 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/18/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
Person (Organization):
HIRONORI PETERSON (R3)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
NON-FUNCTIONAL STEAM EXCLUSION BARRIER

"On 3/23/09 at 0731 an I&C Supervisor transiting though a steam exclusion double door found the door sweep misaligned causing one side to catch and stick open. This prevented the door from closing automatically until the sweep was readjusted back to its original position. The door was then closed and monitored while permanent repairs took place. While the door was open and could not close automatically, the barrier was Non-Functional for Steam Exclusion. In accordance with TRM 3.0.9 Section A.1 all equipment supported by that steam exclusion barrier was immediately declared inoperable. This zone includes both trains of ECCS and support equipment (i.e., SI, RFIR, ICS, CCW, etc ). TS 3.0.c was entered and exited during the time the door could have stuck open (6 minutes) with both trains of ECCS inoperable. Permanent repairs were completed on the door at 0809 on 3/23/09.

"Therefore, this is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v), 'Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function, and under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) 'any event or condition that results in the nuclear plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety.'

The licensee is also reporting this event under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(D), Accident Mitigation.

"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

* * * UPDATE FROM STEVE TAYLOR TO JOE O'HARA AT 1443 ON 05/18/09 * * *

"05/18/2009 - Retraction of EN # 44929. NonÀFunctional Steam Exclusion Barrier.

"EN # 44929 provided notification that both trains of ESF equipment (e.g. SI, RHR, CCW, etc ) were inoperable due to degradation of a steam exclusion boundary door in the auxiliary building on March 23, 2009.

"Subsequent engineering evaluation determined that the degraded door remained capable of fulfilling its steam exclusion function during the brief (eight minute) period when it was degraded. The door had become degraded while being used for routine transit when the lower door sweep became misaligned, thereby preventing the door from completely closing. However, an engineering evaluation determined that the resulting gap was sufficiently small such that the total allowed leak path criteria were not exceeded. Additionally, the door swing was in the direction of postulated steam flow, such that the door would have been held in the closed direction by any steam overpressure postulated under accident conditions.

"Therefore, the door remained functional and the supported ESF equipment in the auxiliary building remained operable. Consequently, this condition did not meet the reportability criteria in 10 CFR 50.72.

"As a result, the notification made on 03/23/2009 is hereby retracted."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified the R3DO(R. Skokowski).