Event Notification Report for March 21, 2009
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
03/20/2009 - 03/21/2009
EVENT NUMBERS
44923449244492544926
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 44923
Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: JERRY HELKER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: JERRY HELKER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 03/21/2009
Notification Time: 07:54 [ET]
Event Date: 03/21/2009
Event Time: 01:21 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/15/2009
Notification Time: 07:54 [ET]
Event Date: 03/21/2009
Event Time: 01:21 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/15/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
ANNE DEFRANCISCO (R1)
ANNE DEFRANCISCO (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | M/R | Y | 18 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM INITIATION FOLLOWING PLANNED MANUAL SCRAM
"At 0121 on Saturday, March 21, 2009, Nine Mile Point Unit One was manually scrammed from approximately 18% rated power in preparation for Refueling Outage 20. The plant scram was a planned evolution. Following the manual scram insertion at 0121, the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System automatically initiated on low Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) level. At 0123, RPV level was restored above the HPCI System low level actuation setpoint, and the HPCI System initiation signal was reset. At Nine Mile Point Unit One the HPCI system is a mode of operation of the feedwater and condensate system. It is not an Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS). A HPCI System actuation signal on low RPV level is normally received following a reactor scram, due to level shrink.
"10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) requires reporting within 8 hours when a valid actuation of the feedwater coolant injection system occurs. The event has been entered into the corrective action program. There are no other adverse impacts to the station based on this event."
All control rods fully inserted. Electrical lineup is normal and there are no safety equipment out of service.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector
* * * UPDATE FROM BRIAN FINCH TO JOE O'HARA AT 1611 ON 5/15/09 * * *
"Event notification 44923 is being retracted after further evaluation because it has been determined that the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system initiation was part of a pre-planned sequence.
"10 CFR 50.72(b)(3) requires that any event or condition that results in valid actuation of any of the systems listed in this section, including a feedwater injection system, must be reported within 8 hours. Except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation.
"The HPCI actuation that occurred after the manual scram from 18% Rated Thermal Power (RTP) was part of a pre-planned sequence in accordance with an operating procedure on plant shutdown. The HPCI initiation was also discussed during Just-in-Time training for the operating crew prior to performance of the soft shutdown.
"At Nine Mile Point Unit 1, the HPCI system is a mode of operation of the feedwater and condensate systems. The HPCI system is not an Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS). A HPCI system actuation signal on low reactor water level is normally received following a reactor scram, due to reactor water level shrink."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Holody).
"At 0121 on Saturday, March 21, 2009, Nine Mile Point Unit One was manually scrammed from approximately 18% rated power in preparation for Refueling Outage 20. The plant scram was a planned evolution. Following the manual scram insertion at 0121, the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System automatically initiated on low Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) level. At 0123, RPV level was restored above the HPCI System low level actuation setpoint, and the HPCI System initiation signal was reset. At Nine Mile Point Unit One the HPCI system is a mode of operation of the feedwater and condensate system. It is not an Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS). A HPCI System actuation signal on low RPV level is normally received following a reactor scram, due to level shrink.
"10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) requires reporting within 8 hours when a valid actuation of the feedwater coolant injection system occurs. The event has been entered into the corrective action program. There are no other adverse impacts to the station based on this event."
All control rods fully inserted. Electrical lineup is normal and there are no safety equipment out of service.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector
* * * UPDATE FROM BRIAN FINCH TO JOE O'HARA AT 1611 ON 5/15/09 * * *
"Event notification 44923 is being retracted after further evaluation because it has been determined that the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system initiation was part of a pre-planned sequence.
"10 CFR 50.72(b)(3) requires that any event or condition that results in valid actuation of any of the systems listed in this section, including a feedwater injection system, must be reported within 8 hours. Except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation.
"The HPCI actuation that occurred after the manual scram from 18% Rated Thermal Power (RTP) was part of a pre-planned sequence in accordance with an operating procedure on plant shutdown. The HPCI initiation was also discussed during Just-in-Time training for the operating crew prior to performance of the soft shutdown.
"At Nine Mile Point Unit 1, the HPCI system is a mode of operation of the feedwater and condensate systems. The HPCI system is not an Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS). A HPCI system actuation signal on low reactor water level is normally received following a reactor scram, due to reactor water level shrink."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Holody).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 44924
Facility: PALO VERDE
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: JAMES BLAZEK
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: JAMES BLAZEK
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 03/21/2009
Notification Time: 11:53 [ET]
Event Date: 03/21/2009
Event Time: 09:00 [MST]
Last Update Date: 03/21/2009
Notification Time: 11:53 [ET]
Event Date: 03/21/2009
Event Time: 09:00 [MST]
Last Update Date: 03/21/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL HAY (R4)
BRIAN HOLIAN (NRR)
MICHAEL HAY (R4)
BRIAN HOLIAN (NRR)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
VARIOUS CONTROL ROOM ANNUNCIATORS AND ALARMS OUT OF SERVICE DUE TO MAINTENANCE ON POWER SUPPLY
"The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event, additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time, a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73.
"On March 21, 2009, from approximately 09:00 Mountain Standard Time (MST) until 14:00 MST, Palo Verde maintenance personnel will be performing scheduled maintenance to repair one of two redundant 120 VAC power supplies in Unit 2 that provides power to various alarms in the main control room. This work will require both power supplies to be de-energized resulting in approximately 50 percent of the Unit 2 plant annunciators being unavailable.
"The following compensatory measures will be in place for the duration of the scheduled work:
Other assessment indications will remain available:
Plant Monitoring System
Qualified Safety Parameter Display System
Emergency Response Facility Data Acquisition System
No changes in plant power or operating mode are planned.
A third licensed operator will be in the control room.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of the scheduled outage and this ENS call."
* * * UPDATE FROM JAMES BLAZEK TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1821 EDT ON MARCH 21, 2009 * * *
The power supply was successfully repaired and all annunciators were restored to normal as of 1515 MST.
The Licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R4DO (Hay) and NRR EO (Holian).
"The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event, additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time, a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73.
"On March 21, 2009, from approximately 09:00 Mountain Standard Time (MST) until 14:00 MST, Palo Verde maintenance personnel will be performing scheduled maintenance to repair one of two redundant 120 VAC power supplies in Unit 2 that provides power to various alarms in the main control room. This work will require both power supplies to be de-energized resulting in approximately 50 percent of the Unit 2 plant annunciators being unavailable.
"The following compensatory measures will be in place for the duration of the scheduled work:
Other assessment indications will remain available:
Plant Monitoring System
Qualified Safety Parameter Display System
Emergency Response Facility Data Acquisition System
No changes in plant power or operating mode are planned.
A third licensed operator will be in the control room.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of the scheduled outage and this ENS call."
* * * UPDATE FROM JAMES BLAZEK TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1821 EDT ON MARCH 21, 2009 * * *
The power supply was successfully repaired and all annunciators were restored to normal as of 1515 MST.
The Licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R4DO (Hay) and NRR EO (Holian).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 44925
Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL D. HUNTER
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL D. HUNTER
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 03/21/2009
Notification Time: 11:50 [ET]
Event Date: 03/21/2009
Event Time: 04:06 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/21/2009
Notification Time: 11:50 [ET]
Event Date: 03/21/2009
Event Time: 04:06 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/21/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
MARVIN SYKES (R2)
MARVIN SYKES (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
UNEXPECTED LOGIC LOCKOUT OF DIVISION I RHR DURING SURVEILLANCE TESTING
"Operations was performing 1-SR-3.3.5.1.6(BI), Functional Testing of RHR Loop I Pump and Minimum Flow Valve Logic, which rendered Division I of RHR INOPERABLE. While placing a jumper in accordance with procedural direction. Unit 1 received RHR Pump Initiate Lockout amber lights 1-IL-74-28 and 1-IL-74-39 for 1B and 1D RHR pumps (Division II). This was immediately recognized as being unexpected and action was taken to restore the 1B and 1D RHR pump auto start capability. The 1B and 1D RHR pumps were prevented from auto starting for approximately 1 minute. The Logic functioned as designed; however, this condition was caused by a procedure error. Entered TS LCO 3.0.3 based on TS LCO 3.5.1 Condition H - Two or more Low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystems inoperable for reasons other than Condition A. TS 3.0.3 was exited after approximately one minute when the auto start capability of 1B and 1D RHR pumps was restored. 1B and 1D RHR pumps were available for manual initiation and remained OPERABLE for Containment Cooling and Shut Down Cooling Functions.
"This event is reportable within 8 hours per 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) 'any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.'
"The NRC resident inspector has been notified.
"At 0407, the condition requiring this report was removed and safety function capability was restored."
"Operations was performing 1-SR-3.3.5.1.6(BI), Functional Testing of RHR Loop I Pump and Minimum Flow Valve Logic, which rendered Division I of RHR INOPERABLE. While placing a jumper in accordance with procedural direction. Unit 1 received RHR Pump Initiate Lockout amber lights 1-IL-74-28 and 1-IL-74-39 for 1B and 1D RHR pumps (Division II). This was immediately recognized as being unexpected and action was taken to restore the 1B and 1D RHR pump auto start capability. The 1B and 1D RHR pumps were prevented from auto starting for approximately 1 minute. The Logic functioned as designed; however, this condition was caused by a procedure error. Entered TS LCO 3.0.3 based on TS LCO 3.5.1 Condition H - Two or more Low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystems inoperable for reasons other than Condition A. TS 3.0.3 was exited after approximately one minute when the auto start capability of 1B and 1D RHR pumps was restored. 1B and 1D RHR pumps were available for manual initiation and remained OPERABLE for Containment Cooling and Shut Down Cooling Functions.
"This event is reportable within 8 hours per 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) 'any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.'
"The NRC resident inspector has been notified.
"At 0407, the condition requiring this report was removed and safety function capability was restored."
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 44926
Facility: PEACH BOTTOM
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [] [3] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: CHRIS LALLY
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [] [3] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: CHRIS LALLY
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 03/21/2009
Notification Time: 18:15 [ET]
Event Date: 03/21/2009
Event Time: 12:07 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/06/2009
Notification Time: 18:15 [ET]
Event Date: 03/21/2009
Event Time: 12:07 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/06/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
ANNE DEFRANCISCO (R1)
ANNE DEFRANCISCO (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
HPCI DECLARED INOPERABLE FOLLOWING FAILURE OF VALVE TO FULLY OPEN DURING SURVEILLANCE TEST
"The Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Unit 3 High Pressure Coolant Injection System (HPCI) was declared inoperable at 12:07 on March 21. 2009 when HPCI Outboard Suppression Pool Suction Valve, MO-3-23-057, failed to fully open during testing. At this time the cause of the failure of MO-3-23-057 to stroke fully open is unknown. Investigation is in progress."
This places Unit 3 in two (2) Tech Spec LCO Action Statements; 3.5.1 (14 day restoration with HPCI inop) and 3.6.1.3, Condition A (4 hour immediate action with verification every 31 days of Primary Containment Isolation Valves). Actions required by both have been completed.
The failure occurred during performance of the quarterly surveillance test.
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM DAVE FOSS TO HOWIE CROUCH @ 0824 ON 5/6/09 * * *
"The purpose of this notification is to retract a previous report made on 3/21/09 at 1815 hours (EN# 44926). Notification of the event to the NRC was initially made as a result of declaring the Unit 3 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system inoperable when unexpected conditions were found during performance of routine surveillance testing of HPCI. Specifically, it was noted that a motor-operated Suppression Pool suction valve for HPCI (MO-57) did not complete its stroke in the open direction during testing. The HPCI system was not operating at the time of the discovery.
"Since the initial report, Engineering has determined that HPCI was capable of performing its safety function. The evaluation determined that the MO-57 valve was capable of opening to a position sufficient to ensure that the HPCI safety function was met for design basis conditions. Additionally, since the torque switch is bypassed during actual design events, full motor torque would have been available which was sufficient to allow the valve to reach its full open position. It has also been determined that the valve was capable of closing on a signal to close automatically.
"During resolution of the HPCI MO-57 concern, the suction source from the Suppression Pool was isolated in accordance with Technical Specifications since MO-57 is listed as a Primary Containment Isolation Valve. This action was performed in accordance with station procedures and is considered planned maintenance.
"The NRC resident has been informed of the retraction."
"The Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Unit 3 High Pressure Coolant Injection System (HPCI) was declared inoperable at 12:07 on March 21. 2009 when HPCI Outboard Suppression Pool Suction Valve, MO-3-23-057, failed to fully open during testing. At this time the cause of the failure of MO-3-23-057 to stroke fully open is unknown. Investigation is in progress."
This places Unit 3 in two (2) Tech Spec LCO Action Statements; 3.5.1 (14 day restoration with HPCI inop) and 3.6.1.3, Condition A (4 hour immediate action with verification every 31 days of Primary Containment Isolation Valves). Actions required by both have been completed.
The failure occurred during performance of the quarterly surveillance test.
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM DAVE FOSS TO HOWIE CROUCH @ 0824 ON 5/6/09 * * *
"The purpose of this notification is to retract a previous report made on 3/21/09 at 1815 hours (EN# 44926). Notification of the event to the NRC was initially made as a result of declaring the Unit 3 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system inoperable when unexpected conditions were found during performance of routine surveillance testing of HPCI. Specifically, it was noted that a motor-operated Suppression Pool suction valve for HPCI (MO-57) did not complete its stroke in the open direction during testing. The HPCI system was not operating at the time of the discovery.
"Since the initial report, Engineering has determined that HPCI was capable of performing its safety function. The evaluation determined that the MO-57 valve was capable of opening to a position sufficient to ensure that the HPCI safety function was met for design basis conditions. Additionally, since the torque switch is bypassed during actual design events, full motor torque would have been available which was sufficient to allow the valve to reach its full open position. It has also been determined that the valve was capable of closing on a signal to close automatically.
"During resolution of the HPCI MO-57 concern, the suction source from the Suppression Pool was isolated in accordance with Technical Specifications since MO-57 is listed as a Primary Containment Isolation Valve. This action was performed in accordance with station procedures and is considered planned maintenance.
"The NRC resident has been informed of the retraction."