Event Notification Report for March 16, 2009
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
03/15/2009 - 03/16/2009
EVENT NUMBERS
449074490844909449104495544950
Power Reactor
Event Number: 44907
Facility: MONTICELLO
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: DAVID BARNETT
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: DAVID BARNETT
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 03/16/2009
Notification Time: 12:34 [ET]
Event Date: 03/16/2009
Event Time: 09:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/16/2009
Notification Time: 12:34 [ET]
Event Date: 03/16/2009
Event Time: 09:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/16/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
MARK RING (R3)
MARK RING (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO FISH KILL DURING ROUTINE SHUTDOWN
The licensee notified state and local authorities of a fish kill that occurred during a routine plant shutdown for refueling. The fish kill, in the Mississippi River, was monitored for a two day period.
Notifications were made to the State of Minnesota Emergency Management Agency, Wright County Sheriff's Office, and Sherburne County Sheriff's Office.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The licensee notified state and local authorities of a fish kill that occurred during a routine plant shutdown for refueling. The fish kill, in the Mississippi River, was monitored for a two day period.
Notifications were made to the State of Minnesota Emergency Management Agency, Wright County Sheriff's Office, and Sherburne County Sheriff's Office.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 44908
Facility: TURKEY POINT
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [3] [4] []
RX Type: [3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: JOSEPH MCKEE
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [3] [4] []
RX Type: [3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: JOSEPH MCKEE
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 03/16/2009
Notification Time: 13:02 [ET]
Event Date: 03/16/2009
Event Time: 10:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/16/2009
Notification Time: 13:02 [ET]
Event Date: 03/16/2009
Event Time: 10:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/16/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
REBECCA NEASE (R2)
REBECCA NEASE (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | N | 0 | Hot Shutdown | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
| 4 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO 1 GALLON OIL SPILL AT FOSSIL UNITS
"On 3/16/09 at 1045, Miami-Dade County was notified of a 1 gallon fuel oil spill from the Turkey Point Fossil Plants. This fuel oil went into a storm drain which drains into the cooling canals used for all four units. The fuel oil spill originated from a leak in a fuel oil heater. This leak has subsequently been isolated.
"At 1141, the Florida State Warning Point was also notified of the oil spill.
"Notification to the Environmental Protection Agency is not required.
"This four hour notification to the NRCOC is required per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) due to the notification to offsite government agencies."
The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector.
"On 3/16/09 at 1045, Miami-Dade County was notified of a 1 gallon fuel oil spill from the Turkey Point Fossil Plants. This fuel oil went into a storm drain which drains into the cooling canals used for all four units. The fuel oil spill originated from a leak in a fuel oil heater. This leak has subsequently been isolated.
"At 1141, the Florida State Warning Point was also notified of the oil spill.
"Notification to the Environmental Protection Agency is not required.
"This four hour notification to the NRCOC is required per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) due to the notification to offsite government agencies."
The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector.
Research Reactor
Event Number: 44909
Rep Org: ARMED FORCES RADIOBIOLOGY RSCH INST
Licensee: ARMED FORCES RADIOBIOLOGY RSCH INST
Region: 1
City: BETHESDA State: MD
County: MONTGOMERY
License #: R-84
Agreement: Y
Docket: 05000170
NRC Notified By: STEVE MILLER
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Licensee: ARMED FORCES RADIOBIOLOGY RSCH INST
Region: 1
City: BETHESDA State: MD
County: MONTGOMERY
License #: R-84
Agreement: Y
Docket: 05000170
NRC Notified By: STEVE MILLER
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 03/16/2009
Notification Time: 13:54 [ET]
Event Date: 03/16/2009
Event Time: 11:23 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/16/2009
Notification Time: 13:54 [ET]
Event Date: 03/16/2009
Event Time: 11:23 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/16/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
AL ADAMS (NRR)
AL ADAMS (NRR)
MANUAL TRIP DUE TO FAILURE OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED FUEL THERMOCOUPLE
The licensee provided an informational call to inform the NRC Operations Center that it had manually tripped the research reactor from approximately 75% power (750 KW) due to the failure of a core fuel thermocouple that provides a reactor trip function. The technical specifications for the reactor require that two fuel centerline temperature thermocouples that provide a reactor trip function be available while the reactor is operating. The two fuel centerline thermocouples were confirmed to be functioning properly during a pre-startup surveillance earlier this morning. While at power the operators noticed fluctuations in one of the two thermocouple readouts. After about 4 minutes, it was concluded that one of the thermocouples was not functioning properly and the reactor was manually tripped to be in compliance with the technical specification action statement. The licensee was within technical specifications as soon as the reactor was tripped. The reactor did not trip automatically with the failure of the thermocouple because the failed thermocouple was providing a low temperature input into the reactor protection logic.
There were no other issues with the research reactor and the licensee noted that it was not required to make an immediate notification to the NRC Operations Center per its license. The licensee had also notified the NRC inspector for this facility (Pat Isaac) of this event.
The licensee provided an informational call to inform the NRC Operations Center that it had manually tripped the research reactor from approximately 75% power (750 KW) due to the failure of a core fuel thermocouple that provides a reactor trip function. The technical specifications for the reactor require that two fuel centerline temperature thermocouples that provide a reactor trip function be available while the reactor is operating. The two fuel centerline thermocouples were confirmed to be functioning properly during a pre-startup surveillance earlier this morning. While at power the operators noticed fluctuations in one of the two thermocouple readouts. After about 4 minutes, it was concluded that one of the thermocouples was not functioning properly and the reactor was manually tripped to be in compliance with the technical specification action statement. The licensee was within technical specifications as soon as the reactor was tripped. The reactor did not trip automatically with the failure of the thermocouple because the failed thermocouple was providing a low temperature input into the reactor protection logic.
There were no other issues with the research reactor and the licensee noted that it was not required to make an immediate notification to the NRC Operations Center per its license. The licensee had also notified the NRC inspector for this facility (Pat Isaac) of this event.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 44910
Facility: BRUNSWICK
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: WILLIAM WOODBURY
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: WILLIAM WOODBURY
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 03/16/2009
Notification Time: 20:17 [ET]
Event Date: 03/16/2009
Event Time: 12:25 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/30/2009
Notification Time: 20:17 [ET]
Event Date: 03/16/2009
Event Time: 12:25 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/30/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
Person (Organization):
REBECCA NEASE (R2)
REBECCA NEASE (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
SHORT TERM LOSS OF SUPPLEMENTAL SPENT FUEL COOLING
"On 3/16/2009 at 1225, Unit 2 was in Mode 5 (Refueling), during natural circulation mode to support maintenance on the common suction line to both loops of Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Systems, both Secondary Side Supplemental Spent Fuel Pool Cooling pumps tripped. Earlier on the same day at 0550, the unit had been placed into natural recirculation mode when the RHR Loop 'A' was secured from the Shutdown Cooling mode of operation. In this mode the 'A' loop of Supplemental Spent Fuel Pool Cooling coupled with the 'A' loop of the Fuel Pool Cooling system was designated as the primary decay heat removal system and the 'B' loop of both systems were designated as the backup decay heat removal system. At the time of the secondary pump trips, the RHR Common loop suction was being placed under clearance.
"The trip of the Secondary Side pumps caused a loss of the entire ('A' and 'B' loops) Supplemental Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System and resulted in a partial loss of the decay heat removal system. Both 'A' and 'B' loops of the Fuel Pool Cooling System remained in service. In addition, Unit 2 remained in an Active LCO for Technical Specification 3.9.7 due to securing all loops of Shutdown Cooling at 0550. The Supplemental Spent Fuel Pool Cooling system was restored to operation at 1245, and actions to restore RHR to the Shutdown Cooling Mode of operation were in progress.
"RHR 'A' Loop was restored to on available status at 1259, and placed in the Shutdown Cooling mode of operation at 1447.
"Based on the combination of systems out of service, and no supporting calculation to ensure Spent Fuel Pool Temperature remains below 150 degrees Fahrenheit (as described In the UFSAR), this could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function for Decay Heat Removal.
"The safety significance of the loss of primary decay heat removal was minimal. During the loss of the Supplemental Spent Fuel Pool Cooling system, reactor vessel temperature rose by approximately 0.5 degrees Fahrenheit. Total heatup of the Spent Fuel Pool was less than 2 degree Fahrenheit. Allowed Technical Specification Heatup rate is limited to 100 degrees Fahrenheit per hour which the was not approached, or exceeded, at any time. Calculated time to boil (with no cooling supplied) was greater than 24 hours; transient was brief in duration and did not challenge time to boil. At all times, the Fuel Pool Cooling System remained in service. There were no challenges to the reactor pressure vessel, or the fuel, due to the loss of decay heat removal.
"The Supplemental Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System was restored to operation at 1245. RHR was restored to service in the shutdown cooling made of operation at 1447."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT 1342 EDT ON 04/30/09 FROM MARK TURKAL TO S. SANDIN * * *
The licensee is retracting this report based on the following:
"On March 16, 2009, at 2017 hours, the Control Room Supervisor made a notification (Event Number 44910) to the NRC Operations Center in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) (i.e., any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to remove residual heat). The notification was made as a result of a loss of the secondary side Supplemental Spent Fuel Pool Cooling (SSFPC) system pumps. At the time of the loss, both loops of Residual Heat Removal (RHR) shutdown cooling were out of service to support maintenance. In this mode, the 'A' loop of the SSFPC system coupled with the 'A' loop of the Fuel Pool Cooling (FPC) system was designated as the primary decay heat removal system and the 'B' loop of both systems were designated as the backup decay heat removal system. Loss of the secondary side SSFPC system pumps impaired the ability to remove decay heat; both the 'A' and 'B' loops of the FPC system remained in service.
"Basis for Retraction
"Event Notification 44910 was conservatively made because, although the FPC system remained capable of removing decay heat, there was no documented calculation which demonstrated that the FPC system could maintain the fuel pool and reactor cavity temperature at or below 150 degrees F, as described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report. An Engineering Calculation (i.e., 0041-0021. 'Fuel Pool Cooling Heat Removal Capability') demonstrating that the FPC system was capable of maintaining temperature below 150 degrees F, at that point in the outage, has been completed. As such, the March 16, 2009, loss of the secondary side SSFPC system pumps does not represent a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function and this event is not reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B).
"Investigation of this condition is documented in the corrective action program in Nuclear Condition Report (NCR) 325496.
"The NRC Resident was notified of this retraction." Notified R2DO (Ernstes).
"On 3/16/2009 at 1225, Unit 2 was in Mode 5 (Refueling), during natural circulation mode to support maintenance on the common suction line to both loops of Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Systems, both Secondary Side Supplemental Spent Fuel Pool Cooling pumps tripped. Earlier on the same day at 0550, the unit had been placed into natural recirculation mode when the RHR Loop 'A' was secured from the Shutdown Cooling mode of operation. In this mode the 'A' loop of Supplemental Spent Fuel Pool Cooling coupled with the 'A' loop of the Fuel Pool Cooling system was designated as the primary decay heat removal system and the 'B' loop of both systems were designated as the backup decay heat removal system. At the time of the secondary pump trips, the RHR Common loop suction was being placed under clearance.
"The trip of the Secondary Side pumps caused a loss of the entire ('A' and 'B' loops) Supplemental Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System and resulted in a partial loss of the decay heat removal system. Both 'A' and 'B' loops of the Fuel Pool Cooling System remained in service. In addition, Unit 2 remained in an Active LCO for Technical Specification 3.9.7 due to securing all loops of Shutdown Cooling at 0550. The Supplemental Spent Fuel Pool Cooling system was restored to operation at 1245, and actions to restore RHR to the Shutdown Cooling Mode of operation were in progress.
"RHR 'A' Loop was restored to on available status at 1259, and placed in the Shutdown Cooling mode of operation at 1447.
"Based on the combination of systems out of service, and no supporting calculation to ensure Spent Fuel Pool Temperature remains below 150 degrees Fahrenheit (as described In the UFSAR), this could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function for Decay Heat Removal.
"The safety significance of the loss of primary decay heat removal was minimal. During the loss of the Supplemental Spent Fuel Pool Cooling system, reactor vessel temperature rose by approximately 0.5 degrees Fahrenheit. Total heatup of the Spent Fuel Pool was less than 2 degree Fahrenheit. Allowed Technical Specification Heatup rate is limited to 100 degrees Fahrenheit per hour which the was not approached, or exceeded, at any time. Calculated time to boil (with no cooling supplied) was greater than 24 hours; transient was brief in duration and did not challenge time to boil. At all times, the Fuel Pool Cooling System remained in service. There were no challenges to the reactor pressure vessel, or the fuel, due to the loss of decay heat removal.
"The Supplemental Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System was restored to operation at 1245. RHR was restored to service in the shutdown cooling made of operation at 1447."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT 1342 EDT ON 04/30/09 FROM MARK TURKAL TO S. SANDIN * * *
The licensee is retracting this report based on the following:
"On March 16, 2009, at 2017 hours, the Control Room Supervisor made a notification (Event Number 44910) to the NRC Operations Center in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) (i.e., any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to remove residual heat). The notification was made as a result of a loss of the secondary side Supplemental Spent Fuel Pool Cooling (SSFPC) system pumps. At the time of the loss, both loops of Residual Heat Removal (RHR) shutdown cooling were out of service to support maintenance. In this mode, the 'A' loop of the SSFPC system coupled with the 'A' loop of the Fuel Pool Cooling (FPC) system was designated as the primary decay heat removal system and the 'B' loop of both systems were designated as the backup decay heat removal system. Loss of the secondary side SSFPC system pumps impaired the ability to remove decay heat; both the 'A' and 'B' loops of the FPC system remained in service.
"Basis for Retraction
"Event Notification 44910 was conservatively made because, although the FPC system remained capable of removing decay heat, there was no documented calculation which demonstrated that the FPC system could maintain the fuel pool and reactor cavity temperature at or below 150 degrees F, as described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report. An Engineering Calculation (i.e., 0041-0021. 'Fuel Pool Cooling Heat Removal Capability') demonstrating that the FPC system was capable of maintaining temperature below 150 degrees F, at that point in the outage, has been completed. As such, the March 16, 2009, loss of the secondary side SSFPC system pumps does not represent a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function and this event is not reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B).
"Investigation of this condition is documented in the corrective action program in Nuclear Condition Report (NCR) 325496.
"The NRC Resident was notified of this retraction." Notified R2DO (Ernstes).
General Information or Other
Event Number: 44955
Rep Org: NE DIV OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS
Licensee: ELKHORN VALLEY ETHANOL
Region: 4
City: NORFOLK State: NE
County:
License #: GL0692
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TRUDY HILL
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Licensee: ELKHORN VALLEY ETHANOL
Region: 4
City: NORFOLK State: NE
County:
License #: GL0692
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TRUDY HILL
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 04/02/2009
Notification Time: 12:57 [ET]
Event Date: 03/16/2009
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/02/2009
Notification Time: 12:57 [ET]
Event Date: 03/16/2009
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/02/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
RICK DEESE (R4)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
ILTAB Email
RICK DEESE (R4)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
ILTAB Email
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISSING TRITIUM EXIT SIGNS
The following information was received from the State of Nebraska via email:
"H-3 exits signs were shipped to the ethanol facility in December of 2006. Fagan was the contractor for the ethanol plant. The new Plant Manager did an inventory of the facility in March of 2009 and discovered two missing exit signs. SRB Technologies Model BX-20-BK, Serial # C061306 and C061307, containing 17.51 Ci of H-3. The Manager was not sure if a physical inventory had been done before. He contacted Fagan to see if they had any information concerning the signs. They did not. Nebraska has reported missing H-3 exit signs that Fagan ordered for other ethanol plants in Nebraska. No one is sure if the signs were ever installed in the plant."
NE Report Number NE090008
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source
The following information was received from the State of Nebraska via email:
"H-3 exits signs were shipped to the ethanol facility in December of 2006. Fagan was the contractor for the ethanol plant. The new Plant Manager did an inventory of the facility in March of 2009 and discovered two missing exit signs. SRB Technologies Model BX-20-BK, Serial # C061306 and C061307, containing 17.51 Ci of H-3. The Manager was not sure if a physical inventory had been done before. He contacted Fagan to see if they had any information concerning the signs. They did not. Nebraska has reported missing H-3 exit signs that Fagan ordered for other ethanol plants in Nebraska. No one is sure if the signs were ever installed in the plant."
NE Report Number NE090008
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source
Hospital
Event Number: 44950
Rep Org: DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS
Licensee: VA TENNESSEE VALLEY HEALTHCARE
Region: 4
City: LITTLE ROCK State: AR
County:
License #: 03-23853-01VA
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: THOMAS HUSTON
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Licensee: VA TENNESSEE VALLEY HEALTHCARE
Region: 4
City: LITTLE ROCK State: AR
County:
License #: 03-23853-01VA
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: THOMAS HUSTON
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 04/01/2009
Notification Time: 13:55 [ET]
Event Date: 03/16/2009
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/01/2009
Notification Time: 13:55 [ET]
Event Date: 03/16/2009
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/01/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X
Person (Organization):
STEVE ORTH (R3)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
ILTAB email
STEVE ORTH (R3)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
ILTAB email
LOSS OF 30 MILLICURIES OF TECHNICIUM-99m
"A loss of permitted material by VA Tennessee Valley Healthcare System at Nashville, Tennessee, occurred on March 16, 2009. The loss involved a unit dosage of 30 millicuries of Technicium-99m, in the form of a liquid radiopharmaceutical used for cardiac stress tests. Efforts were undertaken to find the lost dosage but were unsuccessful.
"As corrective action, the permittee (VA Tennessee Valley Healthcare System) has performed an in-service on the security of radioactive materials with its nuclear medicine technologists. The in-service emphasized that radioactive materials must be controlled through direct supervision/attention or be locked in a secure area at all times."
VA Tennessee Valley Healthcare System Permit No. 41-00104-04
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source
"A loss of permitted material by VA Tennessee Valley Healthcare System at Nashville, Tennessee, occurred on March 16, 2009. The loss involved a unit dosage of 30 millicuries of Technicium-99m, in the form of a liquid radiopharmaceutical used for cardiac stress tests. Efforts were undertaken to find the lost dosage but were unsuccessful.
"As corrective action, the permittee (VA Tennessee Valley Healthcare System) has performed an in-service on the security of radioactive materials with its nuclear medicine technologists. The in-service emphasized that radioactive materials must be controlled through direct supervision/attention or be locked in a secure area at all times."
VA Tennessee Valley Healthcare System Permit No. 41-00104-04
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source