Event Notification Report for March 12, 2009
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
03/11/2009 - 03/12/2009
Power Reactor
Event Number: 44903
Facility: FT CALHOUN
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL TURNER
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL TURNER
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 03/12/2009
Notification Time: 21:05 [ET]
Event Date: 03/12/2009
Event Time: 16:45 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/12/2009
Notification Time: 21:05 [ET]
Event Date: 03/12/2009
Event Time: 16:45 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/12/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4)
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION FOR LOW INTAKE WATER LEVEL DUE TO AN ICE JAM
"On March 12, 2009 at 1249 CDT, Fort Calhoun Station entered AOP-01, 'Acts of Nature' Section IV, 'Low River Water Level' due to lowering river level resulting from an ice jam upstream from the station. At that time, Missouri River level had lowered to 983 feet and posed a potential challenge to continued operation of the circulating water pumps. AOP-01 requires offsite notification of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to determine current river conditions, expected river levels for Fort Calhoun Station, and planned actions to alleviate the lowering levels.
"Current river level at 1900 CDT was 982' 6" with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers predicting the minimum river level to be 981' 6" feet. At this time, there has been no degradation in the circulating water pump or plant performance and compensatory measures are in place to monitor river level hourly. Barring degradation in circulator performance, additional actions will not be required if river level stays above the predicted minimum levels."
The minimum level for operating the circulating water pumps is 978'. A break in the ice jam is not expected to adversely affect the plant.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"On March 12, 2009 at 1249 CDT, Fort Calhoun Station entered AOP-01, 'Acts of Nature' Section IV, 'Low River Water Level' due to lowering river level resulting from an ice jam upstream from the station. At that time, Missouri River level had lowered to 983 feet and posed a potential challenge to continued operation of the circulating water pumps. AOP-01 requires offsite notification of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to determine current river conditions, expected river levels for Fort Calhoun Station, and planned actions to alleviate the lowering levels.
"Current river level at 1900 CDT was 982' 6" with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers predicting the minimum river level to be 981' 6" feet. At this time, there has been no degradation in the circulating water pump or plant performance and compensatory measures are in place to monitor river level hourly. Barring degradation in circulator performance, additional actions will not be required if river level stays above the predicted minimum levels."
The minimum level for operating the circulating water pumps is 978'. A break in the ice jam is not expected to adversely affect the plant.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 44904
Facility: PEACH BOTTOM
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: BRAD KIRKMON
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: BRAD KIRKMON
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 03/12/2009
Notification Time: 23:24 [ET]
Event Date: 03/12/2009
Event Time: 16:20 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/06/2009
Notification Time: 23:24 [ET]
Event Date: 03/12/2009
Event Time: 16:20 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/06/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
ANTHONY DIMITRIADIS (R1)
ANTHONY DIMITRIADIS (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
HPCI DECLARED INOPERABLE
"This non-emergency 8-hour report is pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3). On 03/12/09 at 1620, Operations performed [Standard Operating Procedure] S.O. 23.7.B-2 to swap the CST and Torus suctions in conjunction with scheduled I&C testing. While opening the HPCI Torus Inboard Suction valve MO-2-23-58, its travel stopped at approximately the 50% full open position. The HPCI system was declared inoperable per Technical Specification (T.S.) 3.5.1. The HPCI system remains available and the HPCI Torus Outboard Suction valve MO-2-23-57, was closed and de-energized for PCIV isolation as required by T.S. 3.6.1.3.
"Both MO-2-23-058 and the Unit 2 HPCl system are inoperable. The valve has been quarantined in accordance with station procedures and required Technical Specification actions have been taken. Reactor operation is unaffected and Unit 2 remains at 100% power. The inoperability of the HPCI system places the plant in a 14 day shutdown Tech Spec action statement. Further investigation of the cause of the valve failure is currently in progress."
RCIC has been verified operable.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM DAVE FOSS TO HOWIE CROUCH @ 0824 ON 5/6/09 * * *
"The purpose of this notification is to retract a previous report made on 3/12/09 at 2324 hours (EN# 44904). Notification of the event to the NRC was initially made as a result of declaring the Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system inoperable when unexpected conditions were found during performance of routine surveillance testing of HPCI. Specifically, it was noted that a motor-operated Suppression Pool suction valve for HPCI (MO-58) did not complete its stroke in the open direction during testing. The HPCI system was not operating at the time of the discovery.
"Since the initial report, Engineering has determined that HPCI was capable of performing its safety function. The evaluation determined that the MO-58 valve was capable of opening to a position sufficient to ensure that the HPCI safety function was met for design basis conditions. Additionally, since the torque switch is bypassed during actual design events, full motor torque would have been available which was sufficient to allow the valve to reach its full open position. It has also been determined that the valve was capable of closing on a signal to close automatically.
"During resolution of the HPCI MO-58 concern, the suction source from the Suppression Pool was isolated in accordance with Technical Specifications since MO-58 is considered as a Primary Containment Isolation Valve. This action was performed in accordance with station procedures and is considered planned maintenance.
"The NRC resident has been informed of the retraction."
Notified R1DO (Caruso).
"This non-emergency 8-hour report is pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3). On 03/12/09 at 1620, Operations performed [Standard Operating Procedure] S.O. 23.7.B-2 to swap the CST and Torus suctions in conjunction with scheduled I&C testing. While opening the HPCI Torus Inboard Suction valve MO-2-23-58, its travel stopped at approximately the 50% full open position. The HPCI system was declared inoperable per Technical Specification (T.S.) 3.5.1. The HPCI system remains available and the HPCI Torus Outboard Suction valve MO-2-23-57, was closed and de-energized for PCIV isolation as required by T.S. 3.6.1.3.
"Both MO-2-23-058 and the Unit 2 HPCl system are inoperable. The valve has been quarantined in accordance with station procedures and required Technical Specification actions have been taken. Reactor operation is unaffected and Unit 2 remains at 100% power. The inoperability of the HPCI system places the plant in a 14 day shutdown Tech Spec action statement. Further investigation of the cause of the valve failure is currently in progress."
RCIC has been verified operable.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM DAVE FOSS TO HOWIE CROUCH @ 0824 ON 5/6/09 * * *
"The purpose of this notification is to retract a previous report made on 3/12/09 at 2324 hours (EN# 44904). Notification of the event to the NRC was initially made as a result of declaring the Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system inoperable when unexpected conditions were found during performance of routine surveillance testing of HPCI. Specifically, it was noted that a motor-operated Suppression Pool suction valve for HPCI (MO-58) did not complete its stroke in the open direction during testing. The HPCI system was not operating at the time of the discovery.
"Since the initial report, Engineering has determined that HPCI was capable of performing its safety function. The evaluation determined that the MO-58 valve was capable of opening to a position sufficient to ensure that the HPCI safety function was met for design basis conditions. Additionally, since the torque switch is bypassed during actual design events, full motor torque would have been available which was sufficient to allow the valve to reach its full open position. It has also been determined that the valve was capable of closing on a signal to close automatically.
"During resolution of the HPCI MO-58 concern, the suction source from the Suppression Pool was isolated in accordance with Technical Specifications since MO-58 is considered as a Primary Containment Isolation Valve. This action was performed in accordance with station procedures and is considered planned maintenance.
"The NRC resident has been informed of the retraction."
Notified R1DO (Caruso).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 44901
Facility: BYRON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ED BENDIS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ED BENDIS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 03/12/2009
Notification Time: 12:31 [ET]
Event Date: 03/12/2009
Event Time: 04:20 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/12/2009
Notification Time: 12:31 [ET]
Event Date: 03/12/2009
Event Time: 04:20 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/12/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
JULIO LARA (R3)
JULIO LARA (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
PROCESS COMPUTER AND ERDS UNAVAILABLE FOR GREATER THAN 60 MINUTES
"Byron Unit 1 Process Computer was unavailable for use from 0420 to 0814 EDT on 3/12/09. This resulted in a loss of Unit 1's ability to send Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) to the NRC for greater than 60 minutes. The Unit 1 Process Computer and ERDS was restored at 0814 on 3/12/09. Byron's reportabllity procedure defines a loss of ERDS for greater than 60 minutes as being a major loss of emergency preparedness capability."
NRC Resident Inspector was notified by licensee. Notified R3DO (Julio Lara)
"Byron Unit 1 Process Computer was unavailable for use from 0420 to 0814 EDT on 3/12/09. This resulted in a loss of Unit 1's ability to send Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) to the NRC for greater than 60 minutes. The Unit 1 Process Computer and ERDS was restored at 0814 on 3/12/09. Byron's reportabllity procedure defines a loss of ERDS for greater than 60 minutes as being a major loss of emergency preparedness capability."
NRC Resident Inspector was notified by licensee. Notified R3DO (Julio Lara)