Event Notification Report for March 04, 2009
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
03/03/2009 - 03/04/2009
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 44890
Facility: NUCLEAR FUEL SERVICES INC.
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: HEU CONVERSION & SCRAP RECOVERY
NAVAL REACTOR FUEL CYCLE
LEU SCRAP RECOVERY
NRC Notified By: RANDY SHACKLEFORD
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: HEU CONVERSION & SCRAP RECOVERY
NAVAL REACTOR FUEL CYCLE
LEU SCRAP RECOVERY
NRC Notified By: RANDY SHACKLEFORD
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 03/04/2009
Notification Time: 15:19 [ET]
Event Date: 03/04/2009
Event Time: 14:40 [EST]
Last Update Date: 04/30/2009
Notification Time: 15:19 [ET]
Event Date: 03/04/2009
Event Time: 14:40 [EST]
Last Update Date: 04/30/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
70.74 APP. A - ADDITIONAL REPORTING REQUIREMENTS PART 70 APP A (c) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION/NEWS REL
10 CFR Section:
70.74 APP. A - ADDITIONAL REPORTING REQUIREMENTS PART 70 APP A (c) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION/NEWS REL
Person (Organization):
DANIEL RICH (R2)
MICHAEL TSCHILTZ (NMSS)
FUELS GRP EMAIL
DANIEL RICH (R2)
MICHAEL TSCHILTZ (NMSS)
FUELS GRP EMAIL
GLOVEBOX OVERFLOW DRAINS MAY BE INADEQUATE TO PERFORM THEIR SAFETY FUNCTION
"Many gloveboxes in the processing areas are equipped with overflow drains to prevent solution from exceeding an unsafe depth. These overflow drains are sized to accommodate the credible flow rates into the associated gloveboxes. During the generation of set-point analyses for overflow drains in a new process area, questions arose regarding how the drain discharge flow rates are calculated. To resolve these questions, NFS performed field tests using a glovebox on 2/26/2009 and 2/27/2009. Initial results of these tests indicated that the discharge flow rates are sensitive to drain weir height and glovebox floor flatness. This caused NFS to question the ability of the drains to perform their intended function. NFS, therefore, generated a plant-wide list of all potentially affected gloveboxes and suspended operations in them on 2/27/2009. Uranium-bearing materials were removed from the gloveboxes and all of the affected gloveboxes were tagged out of service. Engineering evaluations of the affected gloveboxes were performed and proceeded through 3/4/2009. As a result of Engineering evaluations, it was determined that in some instances a single drain alone was not capable of maintaining a solution depth to within design parameters in some localized areas within the glovebox. Modifications are being made to the drains to restore their functionality.
"There were no actual or potential safety consequences to the public or the environment. The potential criticality consequences to the workers were low due to the conservatisms included in the analyses."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT 1350 EDT ON 04/30/09 FROM RANDY SHACKLEFORD TO S. SANDIN * * *
The licensee will issue a press release to summarize the results of NRC Special Inspection Report No. 2009-007.
The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Ernstes), NMSS (Bjorkman) and Fuels Grp via email.
"Many gloveboxes in the processing areas are equipped with overflow drains to prevent solution from exceeding an unsafe depth. These overflow drains are sized to accommodate the credible flow rates into the associated gloveboxes. During the generation of set-point analyses for overflow drains in a new process area, questions arose regarding how the drain discharge flow rates are calculated. To resolve these questions, NFS performed field tests using a glovebox on 2/26/2009 and 2/27/2009. Initial results of these tests indicated that the discharge flow rates are sensitive to drain weir height and glovebox floor flatness. This caused NFS to question the ability of the drains to perform their intended function. NFS, therefore, generated a plant-wide list of all potentially affected gloveboxes and suspended operations in them on 2/27/2009. Uranium-bearing materials were removed from the gloveboxes and all of the affected gloveboxes were tagged out of service. Engineering evaluations of the affected gloveboxes were performed and proceeded through 3/4/2009. As a result of Engineering evaluations, it was determined that in some instances a single drain alone was not capable of maintaining a solution depth to within design parameters in some localized areas within the glovebox. Modifications are being made to the drains to restore their functionality.
"There were no actual or potential safety consequences to the public or the environment. The potential criticality consequences to the workers were low due to the conservatisms included in the analyses."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT 1350 EDT ON 04/30/09 FROM RANDY SHACKLEFORD TO S. SANDIN * * *
The licensee will issue a press release to summarize the results of NRC Special Inspection Report No. 2009-007.
The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Ernstes), NMSS (Bjorkman) and Fuels Grp via email.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 44891
Facility: SURRY
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: THOMAS OLIVER
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: THOMAS OLIVER
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 03/04/2009
Notification Time: 15:53 [ET]
Event Date: 03/04/2009
Event Time: 14:40 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/04/2009
Notification Time: 15:53 [ET]
Event Date: 03/04/2009
Event Time: 14:40 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/04/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
DANIEL RICH (R2)
DANIEL RICH (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
RELIEF VALVE FAILURE RESULTS IN TRITIUM AND CESIUM SPILL
"At 1100 on March 3rd, 2009 the Main Control Room received a report from the Health Physics Shift Supervisor that 1-BR-RV-114B ( 'B' PG tank heater relief valve) was relieving to the RCA yard near the Primary Grade (PG) tanks. At 1115 an operator confirmed the initial report, stating the relief valve appeared to be full open and relieving at approximately 20 gallons per minute. 0-AP-35.01 (Radioactive Liquid Release Control) was then entered and executed. At 1120 the PG line was then isolated by closing isolation valves, thereby stopping the release.
"The release amount was then determined per 0-AP-35.01. Using the tank level initial indication of 87.5% taken on operator rounds at 1050 and a final level indication of 87.25%, approximately 450 gallons of water was released. This volume of water coincides with the initial report of an approximate 20 gpm release rate over the 20 minute duration of the event.
"A sample of the water released was evaluated for tritium and cesium as part of the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) Ground Water Protection Initiative. Sample analysis results showed that tritium concentration was 4,810 picoCuries per liter and cesium concentration was 25.1 picoCuries per liter. These concentrations of tritium and cesium pose no threat to employees or the public. Even though the concentrations are well below reportable limits for groundwater, a spill or leak to soil greater than 100 gallons containing licensed material requires that notification be made per VPAP-2103S (Offsite Dose Calculation Manual) as part of our commitment to the NEI Ground Water Protection Initiative.
"This leak has been contained and relief valve will remain isolated until repaired.
"This notification is being transmitted due to Notification of Other Government Agencies under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi). The Surry County Administrator was notified. The Senior NRC Resident, Virginia Department of Health, Virginia Department of Emergency Management and Virginia Department of Environmental Quality has or will be notified."
"At 1100 on March 3rd, 2009 the Main Control Room received a report from the Health Physics Shift Supervisor that 1-BR-RV-114B ( 'B' PG tank heater relief valve) was relieving to the RCA yard near the Primary Grade (PG) tanks. At 1115 an operator confirmed the initial report, stating the relief valve appeared to be full open and relieving at approximately 20 gallons per minute. 0-AP-35.01 (Radioactive Liquid Release Control) was then entered and executed. At 1120 the PG line was then isolated by closing isolation valves, thereby stopping the release.
"The release amount was then determined per 0-AP-35.01. Using the tank level initial indication of 87.5% taken on operator rounds at 1050 and a final level indication of 87.25%, approximately 450 gallons of water was released. This volume of water coincides with the initial report of an approximate 20 gpm release rate over the 20 minute duration of the event.
"A sample of the water released was evaluated for tritium and cesium as part of the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) Ground Water Protection Initiative. Sample analysis results showed that tritium concentration was 4,810 picoCuries per liter and cesium concentration was 25.1 picoCuries per liter. These concentrations of tritium and cesium pose no threat to employees or the public. Even though the concentrations are well below reportable limits for groundwater, a spill or leak to soil greater than 100 gallons containing licensed material requires that notification be made per VPAP-2103S (Offsite Dose Calculation Manual) as part of our commitment to the NEI Ground Water Protection Initiative.
"This leak has been contained and relief valve will remain isolated until repaired.
"This notification is being transmitted due to Notification of Other Government Agencies under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi). The Surry County Administrator was notified. The Senior NRC Resident, Virginia Department of Health, Virginia Department of Emergency Management and Virginia Department of Environmental Quality has or will be notified."
General Information or Other
Event Number: 44919
Rep Org: PA BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: SAY PLASTICS, INC.
Region: 1
City: McSHERRYSTOWN State: PA
County:
License #: GL
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID J. ALLARD
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Licensee: SAY PLASTICS, INC.
Region: 1
City: McSHERRYSTOWN State: PA
County:
License #: GL
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID J. ALLARD
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 03/19/2009
Notification Time: 19:32 [ET]
Event Date: 03/04/2009
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/19/2009
Notification Time: 19:32 [ET]
Event Date: 03/04/2009
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/19/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
ANNE DEFRANCISCO (R1)
LARRY CAMPER (FSME)
ILTAB VIA EMAIL
ANNE DEFRANCISCO (R1)
LARRY CAMPER (FSME)
ILTAB VIA EMAIL
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING A MISSING GENERAL LICENSED SOURCE
The following information was received from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania via fax:
"PA DEP Bureau of Radiation Protection [BRP] was notified in writing, dated March 9, 2009, by the Purchasing / Customer representative of Say Plastics. The device has not been found but they will continue to search for it. To prevent future incidents, they have created a sign out sheet that is to be signed when a worker checks the device out and returns the device.
"The State has an inspection scheduled for March 19, 2009 and will continue to keep NRC informed of the status of our investigation.
"Event description: Lost a model P2021 Nuclecel Static Eliminator
"City, State: McSherrystown, PA
"Description: (Serial Number A2GB696) (Manufacturer NRD, LLC) Device was discovered missing on March 4, 2009.
"Eliminator containing Po-210 (originally 10 mCi; decayed to approximately 1.4 mCi)
"PA Event Report ID No: PA090012"
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
The following information was received from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania via fax:
"PA DEP Bureau of Radiation Protection [BRP] was notified in writing, dated March 9, 2009, by the Purchasing / Customer representative of Say Plastics. The device has not been found but they will continue to search for it. To prevent future incidents, they have created a sign out sheet that is to be signed when a worker checks the device out and returns the device.
"The State has an inspection scheduled for March 19, 2009 and will continue to keep NRC informed of the status of our investigation.
"Event description: Lost a model P2021 Nuclecel Static Eliminator
"City, State: McSherrystown, PA
"Description: (Serial Number A2GB696) (Manufacturer NRD, LLC) Device was discovered missing on March 4, 2009.
"Eliminator containing Po-210 (originally 10 mCi; decayed to approximately 1.4 mCi)
"PA Event Report ID No: PA090012"
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.