Event Notification Report for March 03, 2009

DEGRADATION OF ITEM RELIED ON FOR SAFETY (IROFS)

"Area F is part of the solvent extraction uranium recovery process. The solvent extraction process removes usable uranium and strips out impurities from the solution. An organic solvent and nitric acid are used as part of this process. Column-0F13 is a strip column which has organic solvent flowing into the bottom and usable uranium/nitric acid entering from the top. After passing down through the solvent, the nitric acid exits Column-0F13 from the bottom, into feed Column-0G04. Column-0G04 then feeds into evaporator Column-0G05. If solvent were to enter Column-0G05 and begin reacting with the heated nitric acid while the system was closed (i.e., no vent relief) then a potential overpressurization or 'red oil' accident could occur. The scenario assumes that the reaction continues (self-heating) even though the heaters are shut off.

"IROFS FAF-19 consists of flow switch FS-0F13, located in Column-0F13, which is interlocked to PUMPMT-0F19. This IROFS is in place to prevent a red oil accident by isolating organic solvent in-flow to evaporator Column 0G05 (via feed Column 0G04) upon loss of solvent-nitric acid interface in strip Column 0F13. If flow switch FS-0F13 senses loss of Column 0F13 interface, PUMPMT-0F19 shuts off which stops flow into Column 0G04 and thus into Column-0G05.

"The equipment associated with IROFS FAF-19 is designated as Safety Related Equipment (SRE) and is functionally tested monthly. The regularly scheduled SRE Test was performed on March 3, 2009, and the purpose of the test is to demonstrate that the flow switch will fall when interface is lost and thus will shut off PUMPMT-0F13. The test failed because the flow switch did not fall, so the pump did not stop (PIRCS Problem #17584). Though there are defense in depth factors such as procedural requirements for operators to verify that no solvent is present in feed Column-0G04 prior to operation of evaporator Column-0G05, it was determined that IROFS FAF-19 was degraded and that the performance criteria of 10CFR70.61 were not met.

"IROFS FAG-12 is an open vent that is credited as an additional control that is in place to prevent overpressurization due to self-heating. However IROFS FAF-19 is also required to be available in order to the performance criteria.

"Previous SRE testing of the flow switch in January 2009 identified a potential problem with the flow switch sticking. As follow-up to that occurrence, the area process engineer reduced the SRE testing frequency from semi-annual to its current frequency of monthly in order to provide better indication if a problem was developing. Area F is currently in a safe condition and is operating under approved compensatory measures."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

FAILURE TO FULLY RETRACT SOURCE OF RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA

Radiography technicians were performing pipeline corrosion shots on piping in the North Slope of Alaska when they inadvertently locked the source outside of the shielded position in the camera while retracting the source. The technicians were using an Industrial Nuclear Corporation (INC) IR-100 camera which contains a nominal 120 Curie (original strength) Ir-192 source.

When the technicians realized what had occurred, they immediately cordoned off the area and requested help. A trained camera technician arrived and, after shielding the source, was able to manipulate the key lock and retract the source into the safe (shielded) position. The highest radiation reading observed behind the camera was 40 mR/hr. Exposures to all personnel involved in the recovery of the source was less than 20 mR. Since the radiography was being performed in a remote location, there was no chance of exposure to any members of the general public.

Currently, the camera has been removed from service and is being sent to INC for inspection and maintenance.

* * * RETRACTION FROM KEENAN REMELE TO JOE O'HARA VIA E-MAIL ON 3/4/09 AT 1443 * * *

"After receiving all the reports by the parties concerned it was not a malfunction of the exposure device that caused this event. The event occurred due to snow and ice build up in the locking mechanism and the radiographer turning the key inadvertently.

"This report will be forwarded to Region IV."

Notified R4DO (Proulx) and FSME (McIntosh).

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST TRITIUM EXIT SIGN

The following information was received from the State of Nebraska via email:

"The owner of the building requested that the exit signs be removed when the store closed. The store had all of the exit signs removed. One sign was not located. They do not know where the sign is or if they ever had the sign. Records indicate that the sign had been shipped 5-6-1998 from SRB Technologies but it is unknown whether it was ever installed at this location. It contained 9.21 Ci of H-3 and Model number was BXU1-GS and serial number 205249"

NE Report # 090007


THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source