Event Notification Report for February 23, 2009

AIRBORNE CONTAMINATION OVER THE LIMIT IN THE FEED MATERIALS BUILDING

"An unplanned contamination event occurred on February 22, 2009. This is a reportable event in accordance with 10 CFR 40.60 paragraph (b)(1) based on an unplanned event that results in additional radiological control being required for more than 24 hours. The 24 hour period ended at 10:30 on February 23, 2009. The additional control imposed was wearing a half face respirator in the 6th floor of the Feed Materials Building. The Feed Materials Building converts uranium ore concentrates into uranium hexafluoride. Air samples from the 6th floor were analyzed and the airborne radioactivity average was approximately 6.73 e-11 microCi/ml. The airborne radioactivity exceeded the MTW [Honeywell Metropolis Facility] action level of 30% of a DAC (5.00 e-11 microCi/ml). One DAC is 1.7e-10 microCi/ml. Uranium tetrafluoride (green salt) was the material that was airborne on the 6th floor. A release point could not be determined. The air samples indicate that the air emission occurred on the northwest side of the building likely to be from a release of material from the green salt elevator and conveyor system."

See similar event number 44857 on 2/17/09.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - PARTIALLY LOST AM-241 SOURCE

The following was provided by the state via email:

The licensee discovered a damaged Am-241 alpha source during a routine sealed source inventory and leak test on Monday February 23, 2009. A pinhole leak was discovered through the source active area. After further assessment on February 24, 2009, it was determined that more than half of the source activity cannot be located.

The Am-241 source was manufactured by North American Scientific (model # CAL2702, source #67250) with an activity of 845.8 nCi (nanocuries) as of October 1, 2005. Currently there is 160 nCi remaining on the Am-241 source and 160 nCi of contamination on the sponge insert in the source container. 521 nCi of the activity cannot be accounted for.

The licensee has performed preliminary contamination surveys of the source storage area, source use area, and the common lab area. The survey were performed using GM survey meters with pancake detectors and wipes counted with a liquid scintillation counter. No significant contamination was found.

The licensee will perform additional surveys and continue to investigate the cause of this incident.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

INADVERTENT ACTUATION OF THE TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP

"The Turbine Driven Auxiliary/Emergency Feedwater pump auto started when power was lost to the steam admittance solenoid valves. Additional feedwater to the steam generators caused an increase in power; in response, turbine load was manually decreased. At no time were any power limits exceeded. Power level is currently at 87% and stable."

Maximum power, as determined by core delta temperatures, did not exceed 100%.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATED AT 1048 EST ON 02/26/09 FROM JOEL HOWARD TO S. SANDIN * * *

"Event Report 44869 Retraction:

"On February 23, 2009, McGuire Nuclear Station notified the NRC of an inadvertent actuation of the Unit 1 Turbine Driven Auxiliary/Emergency Feedwater (TDAFW) Pump (reference Event Report 44869). This event occurred when power was removed to the steam admittance solenoid valves for the Unit 1 TDAFW Pump prior to isolating the steam supply to the pump. Removing power to the steam admittance valves caused them to fail open, starting the pump. As per the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), this event was reported as a valid actuation of the Unit 1 TDAFW Pump.

"Further evaluation of the event concluded that the actuation of the Unit 1 TDAFW Pump was not the result of a valid signal initiated in response to actual plant conditions or parameters satisfying the requirements for initiation of the safety function provided by the pump. In addition, the actuation of the Unit 1 TDAFW Pump was not the result of an intentional manual initiation. Therefore, actuation of the Unit 1 TDAFW Pump represented an invalid actuation which is not reportable per the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). Therefore, McGuire is retracting Event Report 44869. Note that McGuire will report this event in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73.

"The licensee has notified the Resident Inspector."

Notified R2DO (Musser).

INADVERTENT ACTUATION OF TURBINE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP

"On February 23, 2009 at 0406, with Unit 1 at 100% power level, McGuire Nuclear Station experienced an inadvertent actuation of the Unit 1 Turbine Driven Auxiliary/Emergency Feedwater (TDAFW) Pump. This event occurred when power was removed to the steam admittance solenoid valves for the Unit 1 TDAFW Pump prior to isolating the steam supply to the pump. Removing power to the steam admittance valves caused them to fail open, starting the pump and injecting water into all four Unit 1 Steam Generators (S/Gs). Flow to the S/Gs was isolated by manually closing the Unit 1 TDAFW discharge isolation valve to each S/G. During recovery from the event, power was restored to the steam admittance solenoid valves for the running Unit 1 TDAFW Pump. Restoration of power generated a pump auto start signal which resulted in inadvertent automatic closure of both trains of blowdown containment isolation valves and both trains of sample containment isolation valves for each Unit 1 S/G.

"Subsequent evaluation of the event concluded that the actuation of the Unit 1 TDAFW Pump, S/G blowdown containment isolation valves, and S/G sample containment isolation valves was not the result of a valid signal initiated in response to actual plant conditions or parameters satisfying the requirements for initiation of the safety function provided by the respective component. In addition, the actuation of these components was not the result of an intentional manual initiation. Therefore, actuation of the Unit 1 TDAFW Pump, S/G blowdown containment isolation valves, and S/G sample containment isolation valves represented invalid actuations which are not reportable per the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). Although the actuation of these components represented invalid actuations, they were not pre-planned, the systems were not removed from service, and the safety function provided by the components had not already been completed. Therefore, McGuire is reporting actuation of the Unit 1 TDAFW Pump, S/G blowdown containment isolation valves, and S/G sample containment isolation valves in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). Note that closing the Unit 1 TDAFW Pump discharge isolation valve to each S/G to isolate flow rendered the Unit 1 TDAFW inoperable. However, these valves were opened and the Unit 1 TDAFW Pump was restored to an operable status within the required completion time specified in the Auxiliary Feedwater System Technical Specification.

"As indicated in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), in the case of an invalid actuation reported under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) other than actuation of the Reactor Protection System when the reactor is critical, the licensee may, at its option, provide a telephone notification to the NRC within 60 days after discovery of the event instead of submitting a written LER. In these cases the telephone report is not considered an LER. McGuire is exercising this option by providing this telephone notification. The following additional information is being provided as part of the telephone notification of this event:

"The Unit 1 TDAFW Pump injected water into all four Unit 1 S/Gs for approximately 3 and 1/2, minutes before flow was isolated by manually closing the Unit 1 TDAFW discharge isolation valve to each S/G. Subsequent evaluation determined that Unit 1 reactor power did not exceed 100% during the event. The actuation of the Unit 1 TDAFW Pump was complete and successful.

"This event actuated both trains of blowdown containment isolation valves and both trains of sample containment isolation valves for each Unit 1 S/G. Each train's actuation was complete and successful.

"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

The TDAFW pump was being removed from service, and the steam admittance solenoid valves should have been isolated prior to removing power to them.