Event Notification Report for February 17, 2009
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
02/16/2009 - 02/17/2009
Power Reactor
Event Number: 44859
Facility: PRAIRIE ISLAND
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: STEVE INGALLS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: STEVE INGALLS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 02/17/2009
Notification Time: 18:28 [ET]
Event Date: 02/17/2009
Event Time: 11:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/17/2009
Notification Time: 18:28 [ET]
Event Date: 02/17/2009
Event Time: 11:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/17/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
DAVID HILLS (R3)
DAVID HILLS (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
BOTH EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS DECLARED INOPERABLE AFTER REVIEW OF WORK BOUNDARY ISOLATION
"At 1100 on 2/17/2009 with D5 Diesel Generator (A-Train EDG) out of service for planned maintenance, it was discovered that an isolation had been hung that inadvertently disabled the D5 Fuel Oil Storage Tanks Transfer Pumps. These transfer pumps provide the primary fuel oil supply to D5 EDG Day Tank and the secondary supply to D6 (B Train EDG) Day Tank. With D5 Fuel Oil Storage Tanks Transfer Pumps not functional, their ability to transfer fuel oil to the D6 Diesel Generator (B-Train EDG) Fuel Oil Storage Tanks was disabled. Although D6 had both of its primary fuel oil transfer pumps available with approximately 50,000 gallons of diesel fuel, this left PINGP Unit Two with less than the Tech Spec required 65,000 gallons available to maintain Unit Two EDG operability. Therefore, at 1100 on 2/17/2009 D6 EDG was declared inoperable. Thus, both trains of Unit 2 EDGs were inoperable (safety function was lost) for ~34 hours. 65,000 gallons fuel oil inventory is to ensure the EDGs have enough inventory to mitigate the probable maximum flood which would result in being unable to get new fuel oil on site for ~14 days. There is no flooding predicted per the National Weather Service Advanced Hydrologic Prediction Service. The observed level at Lock & Dam #3 is more than 12 feet below flood stage with river level decreasing the last four days. This isolation had been in place since 0129 on 2/16/2009.
"At 1145 on 2/17/2009 the 21 and 23 D5 Fuel Oil Transfer Pumps were returned to service and D6 Diesel Generator was declared Operable."
This did not affect Unit 1. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
"At 1100 on 2/17/2009 with D5 Diesel Generator (A-Train EDG) out of service for planned maintenance, it was discovered that an isolation had been hung that inadvertently disabled the D5 Fuel Oil Storage Tanks Transfer Pumps. These transfer pumps provide the primary fuel oil supply to D5 EDG Day Tank and the secondary supply to D6 (B Train EDG) Day Tank. With D5 Fuel Oil Storage Tanks Transfer Pumps not functional, their ability to transfer fuel oil to the D6 Diesel Generator (B-Train EDG) Fuel Oil Storage Tanks was disabled. Although D6 had both of its primary fuel oil transfer pumps available with approximately 50,000 gallons of diesel fuel, this left PINGP Unit Two with less than the Tech Spec required 65,000 gallons available to maintain Unit Two EDG operability. Therefore, at 1100 on 2/17/2009 D6 EDG was declared inoperable. Thus, both trains of Unit 2 EDGs were inoperable (safety function was lost) for ~34 hours. 65,000 gallons fuel oil inventory is to ensure the EDGs have enough inventory to mitigate the probable maximum flood which would result in being unable to get new fuel oil on site for ~14 days. There is no flooding predicted per the National Weather Service Advanced Hydrologic Prediction Service. The observed level at Lock & Dam #3 is more than 12 feet below flood stage with river level decreasing the last four days. This isolation had been in place since 0129 on 2/16/2009.
"At 1145 on 2/17/2009 the 21 and 23 D5 Fuel Oil Transfer Pumps were returned to service and D6 Diesel Generator was declared Operable."
This did not affect Unit 1. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 44856
Facility: CALVERT CLIFFS
Region: 1 State: MD
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: KENT MILLS
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL
Region: 1 State: MD
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: KENT MILLS
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL
Notification Date: 02/17/2009
Notification Time: 11:16 [ET]
Event Date: 02/17/2009
Event Time: 10:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/17/2009
Notification Time: 11:16 [ET]
Event Date: 02/17/2009
Event Time: 10:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/17/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
TODD JACKSON (R1)
TODD JACKSON (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 93 | Power Operation | 93 | Power Operation |
LOSS OF SAFETY PARAMETER DISPLAY SYSTEM DUE TO PLANNED MAINTENANCE
"At 04:05 hours EST, on February 17, 2009, the Plant Process Computer System was removed from service to perform a planned maintenance on the inverter power supply. The plant computer provides monitoring capability for the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS). The expected duration of plant computer inoperability is approximately 16 hours. The loss of the plant computer requires alternate methods, as described in plant procedures, to be used. Therefore, appropriate assessment of plant conditions, notifications and communications can still be made, if required, during the time that the plant computer is inoperable.
"This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) which is any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability or offsite communications capability. As previously stated, alternate means remain available to assess plant conditions, make notifications and accomplish required communications, as necessary. An additional notification will be provided when plant computer operability is restored.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."
* * * UPDATE AT 1600 EST ON 02/17/09 FROM KENT MILLS TO S. SANDIN * * *
The SPDS was restored at 1545 EST.
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Jackson).
"At 04:05 hours EST, on February 17, 2009, the Plant Process Computer System was removed from service to perform a planned maintenance on the inverter power supply. The plant computer provides monitoring capability for the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS). The expected duration of plant computer inoperability is approximately 16 hours. The loss of the plant computer requires alternate methods, as described in plant procedures, to be used. Therefore, appropriate assessment of plant conditions, notifications and communications can still be made, if required, during the time that the plant computer is inoperable.
"This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) which is any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability or offsite communications capability. As previously stated, alternate means remain available to assess plant conditions, make notifications and accomplish required communications, as necessary. An additional notification will be provided when plant computer operability is restored.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."
* * * UPDATE AT 1600 EST ON 02/17/09 FROM KENT MILLS TO S. SANDIN * * *
The SPDS was restored at 1545 EST.
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Jackson).