Event Notification Report for February 16, 2009
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
02/15/2009 - 02/16/2009
EVENT NUMBERS
44857448544485545236
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 44857
Facility: HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC.
Region: 2 State: IL
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE PRODUCTION
NRC Notified By: BOB STOKES
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 2 State: IL
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE PRODUCTION
NRC Notified By: BOB STOKES
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 02/17/2009
Notification Time: 13:52 [ET]
Event Date: 02/16/2009
Event Time: 10:30 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/17/2009
Notification Time: 13:52 [ET]
Event Date: 02/16/2009
Event Time: 10:30 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/17/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
40.60(b)(1) - UNPLANNED CONTAMINATION
10 CFR Section:
40.60(b)(1) - UNPLANNED CONTAMINATION
Person (Organization):
CHARLIE PAYNE (R2)
THOMAS HILTZ (NMSS)
CHARLIE PAYNE (R2)
THOMAS HILTZ (NMSS)
24-HOUR REPORT INVOLVING AN UNPLANNED CONTAMINATION EVENT
"An unplanned contamination event occurred on February 16th, 2009. This is a reportable event in accordance with 10CFR40.60 paragraph (1) based on an unplanned event that results in additional radiological controls being required for more than 24 hours. The 24 hour period ended at 1030 on February 17th, 2009. The additional controls imposed was wearing a half-face respirator in the basement of the Feed Materials Building. The Feed Materials Building converts uranium ore concentrates into uranium hexafluoride. Air samples from the basement were analyzed and the airborne radioactivity average was approximately 8.27 e-11 microCi/ml. The airborne radioactivity exceeded the MTW action level of 30% of a DAC (5.0 e-11 microCi/ml). One DAC is 1.7e-10. Uranium Tetrafluoride (green salt) was the material that was airborne in the basement. An elevator that is used to transport green salt to different levels of the Feed Materials Building was leaking around an inspection cover which caused the airborne radioactive material."
The licensee attributes the contamination to a failed gasket. The airborne contamination was discovered during routine air sampling which is performed daily. There is no plan to perform personnel testing for uptake or ingestion at this time.
"An unplanned contamination event occurred on February 16th, 2009. This is a reportable event in accordance with 10CFR40.60 paragraph (1) based on an unplanned event that results in additional radiological controls being required for more than 24 hours. The 24 hour period ended at 1030 on February 17th, 2009. The additional controls imposed was wearing a half-face respirator in the basement of the Feed Materials Building. The Feed Materials Building converts uranium ore concentrates into uranium hexafluoride. Air samples from the basement were analyzed and the airborne radioactivity average was approximately 8.27 e-11 microCi/ml. The airborne radioactivity exceeded the MTW action level of 30% of a DAC (5.0 e-11 microCi/ml). One DAC is 1.7e-10. Uranium Tetrafluoride (green salt) was the material that was airborne in the basement. An elevator that is used to transport green salt to different levels of the Feed Materials Building was leaking around an inspection cover which caused the airborne radioactive material."
The licensee attributes the contamination to a failed gasket. The airborne contamination was discovered during routine air sampling which is performed daily. There is no plan to perform personnel testing for uptake or ingestion at this time.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 44854
Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JOE BENNETT
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JOE BENNETT
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL
Notification Date: 02/16/2009
Notification Time: 09:45 [ET]
Event Date: 02/16/2009
Event Time: 05:13 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/16/2009
Notification Time: 09:45 [ET]
Event Date: 02/16/2009
Event Time: 05:13 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/16/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
JONATHAN BARTLEY (R2)
JONATHAN BARTLEY (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | M/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO LOSS OF STATOR COOLING WATER
"At 0513 on 2/16/09, the Unit 2 reactor was manually scrammed in accordance with alarm response procedure 2-ARP-9-8A 'TURBINE TRIP TIMER INITIATED'. Other associated alarms and indications both locally and in the Main Control Room indicated a failure of the stator cooling water system. The exact cause of the failure is still being investigated.
"All systems responded as expected to the insertion of the manual scram. No ECCS injection was initiated or required, and all expected containment isolation and initiation signals were received.
"This event is reportable within 4 hours per 10CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) 'any event or condition that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation'. It is also reportable within 8 hours per 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) and requires an LER within 60 days per 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)."
All rods inserted fully into the reactor. The electrical power system is in a normal shut down configuration. Decay heat removal is through the main condenser via the turbine bypass valves. There is no impact on Units 1 and 3.
The NRC resident inspector has been notified.
"At 0513 on 2/16/09, the Unit 2 reactor was manually scrammed in accordance with alarm response procedure 2-ARP-9-8A 'TURBINE TRIP TIMER INITIATED'. Other associated alarms and indications both locally and in the Main Control Room indicated a failure of the stator cooling water system. The exact cause of the failure is still being investigated.
"All systems responded as expected to the insertion of the manual scram. No ECCS injection was initiated or required, and all expected containment isolation and initiation signals were received.
"This event is reportable within 4 hours per 10CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) 'any event or condition that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation'. It is also reportable within 8 hours per 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) and requires an LER within 60 days per 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)."
All rods inserted fully into the reactor. The electrical power system is in a normal shut down configuration. Decay heat removal is through the main condenser via the turbine bypass valves. There is no impact on Units 1 and 3.
The NRC resident inspector has been notified.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 44855
Facility: FARLEY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: BILL ARENS
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: BILL ARENS
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 02/16/2009
Notification Time: 22:09 [ET]
Event Date: 02/16/2009
Event Time: 16:55 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/16/2009
Notification Time: 22:09 [ET]
Event Date: 02/16/2009
Event Time: 16:55 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/16/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
JONATHAN BARTLEY (R2)
JONATHAN BARTLEY (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
INADVERTENT RELAY ACTUATION RESULTS IN AUTO START OF 1C EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR
"No release of radiation has occurred as a result of this event."
"At 1655 CST, the Unit One 'H' 4160V bus phase two differential relay actuated when the relay panel was inadvertently bumped. This resulted in the de-energization and lockout of the 1H 4160V bus and the auto start of the 1C Emergency Diesel Generator [EDG]. Recovery actions have been successful in restoring power to the affected switchgear. All equipment functioned as expected. Normal equipment lineup has been restored. Unit One remained at full power during this event."
The 1C EDG never picked up any loads because of the lockout on the 1H bus. Some loads were lost including an air compressor and some oil pumps but this equipment was either re-started or backups were started within about two hours.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"No release of radiation has occurred as a result of this event."
"At 1655 CST, the Unit One 'H' 4160V bus phase two differential relay actuated when the relay panel was inadvertently bumped. This resulted in the de-energization and lockout of the 1H 4160V bus and the auto start of the 1C Emergency Diesel Generator [EDG]. Recovery actions have been successful in restoring power to the affected switchgear. All equipment functioned as expected. Normal equipment lineup has been restored. Unit One remained at full power during this event."
The 1C EDG never picked up any loads because of the lockout on the 1H bus. Some loads were lost including an air compressor and some oil pumps but this equipment was either re-started or backups were started within about two hours.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 45236
Rep Org: AREVA NP INC
Licensee: AREVA NP INC
Region: 4
City: RICHLAND State: WA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ALAN MEGINNIS
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Licensee: AREVA NP INC
Region: 4
City: RICHLAND State: WA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ALAN MEGINNIS
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 07/29/2009
Notification Time: 17:06 [ET]
Event Date: 02/16/2009
Event Time: 00:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 07/29/2009
Notification Time: 17:06 [ET]
Event Date: 02/16/2009
Event Time: 00:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 07/29/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
JAMES MOORMAN (R2DO)
ROBERT DALEY (R3DO)
PART 21 COORD (NRR)
JAMES MOORMAN (R2DO)
ROBERT DALEY (R3DO)
PART 21 COORD (NRR)
PART 21 REPORT - THERMO-HYDRAULIC LIMITS BASED ON INCORRECT FUEL LIFTOFF ASSUMPTIONS
Measurements obtained from LaSalle spent fuel indicates that the liftoff [corrosion film and coolant system crud deposit thickness] on LaSalle fuel may be greater than assumed in thermal-hydraulic calculations for MCPR (Minimum Critical Power Ratio) and LHGR (Linear Heat Generation Rate). Thickness measurements of liftoff on ATRIUM-10 fuel at LaSalle are as high as 93 micrometers whereas the maximum value observed for other facilities is less than 60 micrometers. The greater than expected liftoff present on LaSalle fuel has been attributed to the operation with zinc levels that exceeded EPRI guidelines for reactor water chemistry. AREVA thermal-hydraulic analyses for LaSalle did not account for the higher liftoff.
Following discovery of the deviation, AREVA supplied an operability assessment to Exelon that identified limitations on the operating limit MCPR and rod average exposure. Revised operating limits are being provided to Exelon based on liftoff values that are lower than used in the original operability assessments. These limits are scheduled to be provided by July 31, 2009. Actions have been identified where AREVA will obtain information from the licensees on the anticipated water chemistry environment to be implemented for the next operating cycle, in advance of AREVA core design efforts supporting that cycle. This will assure that AREVA can adequately project the impact of this chemistry environment on liftoff, and to account for it during the design activities.
AREVA states that this defect affects only LaSalle Units 1 and 2. Data from other plants currently operating with fuel licensed using AREVA methods indicate that the liftoff is low and within historical levels.
Measurements obtained from LaSalle spent fuel indicates that the liftoff [corrosion film and coolant system crud deposit thickness] on LaSalle fuel may be greater than assumed in thermal-hydraulic calculations for MCPR (Minimum Critical Power Ratio) and LHGR (Linear Heat Generation Rate). Thickness measurements of liftoff on ATRIUM-10 fuel at LaSalle are as high as 93 micrometers whereas the maximum value observed for other facilities is less than 60 micrometers. The greater than expected liftoff present on LaSalle fuel has been attributed to the operation with zinc levels that exceeded EPRI guidelines for reactor water chemistry. AREVA thermal-hydraulic analyses for LaSalle did not account for the higher liftoff.
Following discovery of the deviation, AREVA supplied an operability assessment to Exelon that identified limitations on the operating limit MCPR and rod average exposure. Revised operating limits are being provided to Exelon based on liftoff values that are lower than used in the original operability assessments. These limits are scheduled to be provided by July 31, 2009. Actions have been identified where AREVA will obtain information from the licensees on the anticipated water chemistry environment to be implemented for the next operating cycle, in advance of AREVA core design efforts supporting that cycle. This will assure that AREVA can adequately project the impact of this chemistry environment on liftoff, and to account for it during the design activities.
AREVA states that this defect affects only LaSalle Units 1 and 2. Data from other plants currently operating with fuel licensed using AREVA methods indicate that the liftoff is low and within historical levels.