Event Notification Report for February 05, 2009

UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO LOSS OF CONTROL ROOM ANNUNCIATORS

At 1413 EST Ginna Station declared an Unusual Event due to the Loss of Main Control Board Annunciators E, F, G and H. There was ongoing maintenance at the time, however, no specific cause for the loss has been identified. The licensee confirmed that they have redundant indication available to monitor plant parameters. The unit is currently stable and operating at 100% power.

The licensee informed state and local agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE FROM DOUG GOMEZ TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 0458 ON 2/6/09 * * *

Based on testing, troubleshooting, and restoration of power to the Main Control Board Annunciators, Ginna Station exited the Unusual Event at 0435 hours on 2/6/09.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified RDO (Gray), NRR EO (Hiland), IRD MOC (Grant), DHS (Kettles), and FEMA(LaForty).

UNIT 1 MANUALLY TRIPPED DUE TO CONTROL ROD DRIVE MOTOR HIGH TEMPERATURES

"Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 1 was manually tripped from 61% power due to Control Rod Drive motor (CRD) high temperatures due to a loss of cooling water flow from Non-Nuclear Intermediate Cooling Water (ICW). No significant equipment issues were observed. No primary safeties lifted. Secondary safeties lifted for ~18 seconds. Emergency feedwater did not actuate and was not needed. Post trip response was normal and the plant is stable in mode 3. Post transient review is in progress."

All control rods fully inserted into the core. There is no known primary-secondary steam generator tube leakage. The offsite electrical grid is stable. The loss of ICW flow is attributed to the mechanical failure of service air compressor C-3A. Decay heat removal is via main feedwater to the steam generator and steam to the main condenser.

The licensee informed state, other government agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector and will inform local government agencies. No press release is planned.

STEAM EXCLUSION DOOR GAP

"At 1539 on 02/05/2009 it was identified that a Steam Exclusion door seal was not flush with the door. The door seal gap was noted during a Fire Zone Inspection. It was determined that the door exceeded the allowed limit. This could have allowed steam from the Turbine Drive Auxiliary Feed Pump room into the emergency safeguards bus area. This could have resulted in both trains of ESF Equipment failing to perform their required functions. Upon discovery Specification 3.0.c was entered at 1539. Work was completed on the door to return it to functional status at 1601, and Technical Specification 3.0.c was exited at that time.

"The NRC Resident inspector has been notified."

* * * RETRACTION PROVIDED BY JACK GADZALA TO JASON KOZAL ON 3/26/09 AT 1102 * * *

"Retraction of EN 44832, both trains of Engineered Safeguards Features (ESF) equipment inoperable due to a degraded steam exclusion boundary door.

"EN 44832 provided notification that both trains of ESF equipment were inoperable due to degradation of a steam exclusion boundary door in the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump room on February 5, 2009.

"Subsequent engineering evaluation determined that the degraded door remained capable of fulfilling its steam exclusion function during the period when it was degraded. A degraded door seal had resulted in a slight gap to exist between the door and the sill. This gap could have allowed steam from the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump room into the emergency safeguards bus area. However, the force that would be exerted on the door by steam overpressure postulated under accident conditions, would compress the door seal sufficiently to reduce the gap such that the total allowed leak path criteria would not be exceeded.

"Therefore, the door remained functional and the supported ESF equipment in the emergency safeguards bus area remained operable.

"Consequently, this condition did not meet the reportabllity criteria in 10 CFR 50.72. As a result, the notification made on 02/05/2009 (EN 44832) is hereby retracted."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R3DO (Peterson).

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION TO LOCAL FIRE DEPARTMENTS FOR ASSISTANCE

"At 1828 CST, a fire alarm in the Administration Building was reported to the Fort Calhoun Station Control Room. The Administration Building is located outside of the Protected Area on Owner Controlled Property. An Equipment Operator was dispatched to investigate the cause of the alarm. The Control Room entered AOP-06 Fire Emergency at 1830 CST.

"At 1832 CST, a report was received from a building occupant that smoke was emanating from a Mechanical Equipment Room located on the first floor of the building. At that time, personnel in the building attempted to extinguish the fire using a portable fire extinguisher but were unsuccessful. Local Fire Departments in the City of Blair and Fort Calhoun were dispatched.

"At 1840 CST, the Operator arrived at the scene, found light smoke coming from the Mechanical Equipment Room and proceeded to de-energize the ventilation equipment. At 1844 CST, the fire was then extinguished using portable fire extinguishers. It was at that time that Blair and Fort Calhoun Fire Companies arrived on site to assist.

"At 1911 CST, AOP-06 was exited. Preliminary investigation shows that filter media had become dislodged and contacted duct heaters in the ventilation system. The fire ignited secondary material in the area. The Protected Area of Fort Calhoun Station was not affected at any time during this incident.

"This event may cause heightened public or government concern related to the health and safety of on-site personnel. Therefore, this report is being made in reference to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi)."

The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector and plans to issue a press release.