Event Notification Report for February 03, 2009

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING A DAMAGED TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

The following information was received from the State of Mississippi Division of Radiological Health (DRH) via email:

"Location of Incident: Petal, Mississippi (temporary jobsite off Hwy. 42)

"Description of Incident: Approximately 2:30 pm on 2-3-09, an employee who uses the nuclear gauge with Dunn Roadbuilders notified the Radiation Safety Officer that a Troxler 3440 moisture/density gauge, SN# 23209, had been run over by a company pick-up and dragged about 5 feet. The operator told the RSO that the plastic case of the gauge was broken and a battery was outside the device. The area was blocked off with a 15 foot radius around the damaged gauge until the RSO arrived. When the RSO arrived, he surveyed the gauge with a TroxlerAlert survey meter, SN# 2163, and observed readings of 16 mR/hr at gauge surface. He observed that the sources were still shielded and the source rod was not bent or broken. The gauge was put in the transport box and taken back to the company facility. A leak test was performed on the sources and sent to Troxler for analysis. DRH was notified of the incident at 4:30 pm on 2-3-09.

"Pictures of the gauge were taken by the RSO and emailed to the Division of Radiological Health.

"Upon further review of the incident, the authorized user for the moisture/density gauge was trained and certificates are on file with the Division of Radiological Health. The gauge was also last leak tested on 10/08.

"Isotope(s) and Activity: Cesium-137 (8 mCi) and Americium-241:Be (40 mCi)

"Describe clean-up actions taken by DRH: DRH did not respond to incident after RSO confirmed normal survey readings observed and pictures showed only gauge plastic cover damaged."

Incident No.: MS 09002

SAFETY PARAMETER DISPLAY SYSTEM INOPERABLE

"This 8-hour non-emergency report is being made based upon requirements of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) which states, 'The licensee shall notify the NRC as soon as practical and in all cases within eight hours of the occurrence of any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications capability (e.g., significant portion of control room indication, Emergency Notification System, or offsite notification system)'.

"At 0539 EST on Tuesday, February 3, 2009, the Control Room discovered that the plant process computer was not updating and subsequently observed the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) Computer Display was not updating data. This was discovered during periodic Control Room monitoring. The last data update on the SPDS display was at 0537 EST.

"Information Technology Department personnel are investigating the cause of the loss of SPDS capability. The Information Technology Department personnel have been unsuccessful in recovering within the 8 hour restriction.

"No other Control Room emergency assessment capabilities have been adversely affected. All Control Room panel indicators and annunciators are responding properly."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE FROM HICKS TO KLCO @ 2215 EST ON 02/04/09

"On Wednesday, February 04, 2009 at 1319 EST, the Plant Process Computer (PPC) was successfully restarted. The performance of the PPC and SPDS was monitored for approximately eight hours. SPDS was declared operable at 2130, restoring full emergency assessment capability."

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (White).

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - POTENTIAL OVEREXPOSURE TO THE LUNGS

The following report was received from the state of Washington via e-mail:

"On February 9 2009, a worker was sent for a lung count at the Battelle (Pacific Northwest National Laboratory) lung counter for a bioassay measurement. The lung count was ordered due to the worker working in an area where airborne contamination levels could cause more then 2.5 DAC-hrs (with respiratory protection factors applied), and greater then 520 DAC-hrs assuming no respiratory protection was worn in one day. The reason for requiring this count was to ensure that measures used to protect the workers were functioning properly. The workers first lung count detected approximately 0.2 nCi of Am-241. Assuming the exposure was from 10 days prior, the intake was approximately 1.9 nCi Am-241. The annual limit of intake for Am-241 is 6 nCi (1micron AMAD particle size). The estimated dose was about 1/3 of the annual limit, or 16 REM CDE (Annual limit 50 REM). The worker had previous whole body exposure, but this added amount did not cause a limit to be exceeded.

"On March 25, 2009 the licensee informed the Washington State Department of Health [DOH] that further testing by Battelle caused a revision to the original calculated dose and the new calculated dose would exceed the 50 REM CDE limit. The date of exposure (February 3, 2009) was assumed by the licensee, based on air sample data and the use of respiratory protection that may not have provided adequate coverage (use of filtering respirator instead of supplied air). On February 3, the worker was in a containment in which air sample results were about 1e-8 microCi/ml gross alpha activity concentration for several hours and was wearing a Powered Air Purifying Respirator (PAPR, protection factor of 1000). Bioassay results (fecal) from one other worker who was also in the containment showed a small amount of activity, and a dose was assigned to this second worker that did not exceed the legal limit. The second workers lung count was less than detection limits.

"The cause is still unknown.

"Contributing factors: High airborne activity, loss of respiratory protection.

"DOH is conducting an investigation of this incident.

"Corrective action : Curtailment of work in containment, training on removal of anti contamination clothing and respirator, investigation of respiratory protection failure.

"There was no media coverage of this incident.

"Activity and isotope(s) involved: Am-241, Pu-240/241

Overexposures: (number of workers/members of public; dose estimate; body part receiving dose; consequence): There was one potential overexposed worker, no members of the public were exposed, estimated dose to the worker is about 100 REM CDE and 5 REM CEDE. This value will change following further measurements, investigation and calculations.

"Worker was removed from the restricted area, work in the area where the intake was assumed to occur was stopped, pending the outcome of further investigation."

Washington State Incident Number: WA-09-013

* * * UPDATE PROVIDED VIA EMAIL FROM KETTER TO PARK AT 0823 EDT ON 7/1/09 * * *

"On June 22, 2009 the licensee informed the Washington State Department of Health that the Committed Effective Dose Equivalent (CEDE) for the worker was 6.8 cSv (6.8 REM) and the Committed Dose Equivalent (CDE) was 120 cSv (120 REM) to the bone surface. The workers Deep Dose Equivalent (DDE) from his dosimetry for the first quarter 2009 was 0.3mSv (30 mRem). The dose calculation was completed by a consultant for the licensee. Intake was calculated using methodology of ICRP 30, modified for clearance function. Intake for Am-241 was calculated from lung deposition and calculated clearance rates. Intake of Plutonium (Pu) was inferred from excreta bioassay results and assumed ratios of Am-241 to Pu. Dose was calculated using CINDY code version 1.2. The particle size was considered, and a 1micron Activity Median Aerodynamic Diameter (AMAD) was chosen as the best fit. The total calculated intakes are: Am-241 153 Bq (4.14 nCi), Pu239/240 89.9 Bq (2.43 nCi),Pu 238 16.8 Bq (0.455 nCi).

"The exact cause of the incident is unknown. The assumed cause is a failure of the respiratory protection system. The licensees corrective actions to prevent reoccurrence are to test each worker with a challenge gas prior to high risk work, increased engineering controls to mitigate airborne contaminants, specific training using phosphorescent powder and black lights for workers, more frequent bioassay samples, inclusion of nasal smears for immediate detection of intakes, use of supplied air respirators over air filtering respirators for high risk work, and training for workers, managers and health physics staff. Note that work was resumed in the area, and no further exposures have occurred.

"Worker was removed from the restricted area, work in the area where the intake was assumed to occur was stopped, changes to operations and training methods, changes to engineering controls, changes to testing of respirators prior to use.

"Contributing factors [are] high airborne activity, [and] loss of respiratory protection.

"DOH has completed an investigation of this incident.

"There was no media coverage of this incident.

"There was one overexposed worker. No members of the public were exposed. Estimated dose to the worker was 120 REM CDE and 6.8 REM CEDE."

Notified the R4DO (Pick) and FSME EO (McIntosh).