Event Notification Report for January 28, 2009

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - TWO MISSING STATIC ELIMINATORS

The following report was received from the State via facsimile:

"Precix [the licensee] called the Agency [the State] on 1/28/09 to report 2 missing static eliminator devices. A follow-up letter dated 1/29/09 was received on 1/30/09. The letter indicates the missing devices are 'NRD' model P-2021 devices having serial numbers A2DR562 and A2EZ592. The licensee reports that at the end of their one year useful life, the units were removed from the system along with others and set aside in preparation for returning them to NRD for disposal. The licensee states they have conducted several searches for the missing devices and have not had any success finding them. The licensee thinks the 2 units inadvertently got separated from the other units being held for return to NRD and were disposed off in the non-hazardous waste stream."

This model static eliminator typically contains approximately 10 millicuries of Po-210.

* * * UPDATE ON 2/26/09 AT 1453 FROM JOHN SUMARES TO KARL DIEDERICH * * *

The following report was received from the State via facsimile:

"In a follow up telephone conversation with Precix, the Agency [the State] determined that the static eliminators became missing a few years prior to [the] Precix report of missing GL [Generally Licensed] devices to the Agency [the State]. Precix stated that corrective action as described above has been in place for a few years.

"The Agency [the State] considers this event closed."

Informed R1DO (Cahill), FSME EO (Bubar), and ITLAB via e-mail.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

UNANALYZED CONDITION RELATED TO A POSTULATED APPENDIX R FIRE SCENARIO

"A postulated Appendix R fire scenario has been identified which could result in the plant being in an unanalyzed condition that may degrade plant safety. The unanalyzed condition involves a potential loss of power to the credited train of fire safe shutdown equipment for postulated fires in two areas of the Auxiliary Building.

"Safety-related loads on the 6.9KV Shutdown Boards (Centrifugal Charging Pumps, Safety Injection Pumps, Containment Spray Pumps, Motor-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps, and Residual Heat Removal Pumps) are equipped with local control switches to allow starting or stopping the pumps from the Auxiliary Building. The DC control circuit wiring for these local switches is routed in the same area as the power cables for pump motors. If the fire damages the control circuit cables, the control circuit fuses may fail, resulting in loss of trip capability for the associated 6.9KV breaker. If the breaker is already closed (due to a spurious signal or a previous valid start signal), then the breaker could be disabled in the closed position. If the fire damages the power cables resulting in a phase-to-phase fault with the load breaker trip capability disabled, then the Shutdown Board feeder breaker is designed to trip open on overcurrent to provide backup protection. This could result in the shutdown board being de-energized.

"In two areas in the Auxiliary Building (elevation 669 and 690 common areas), the above scenario could result in a condition which is outside the fire safe shutdown analysis due to loss of power to the credited train of fire safe shutdown equipment (e.g. Centrifugal Charging Pump, Essential Raw Cooling Water Pump, and motor-operated valves).

"As a result of this condition, Sequoyah has entered the Fire Protection Report Limiting Condition for Operation 3.7.12 for inoperable fire barriers. In accordance with this LCO action, the operability of fire detectors in the affected areas has been verified and an hourly fire watch has been established in the affected areas.

"This issue has been entered into the corrective action program. A permanent resolution is being evaluated."

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - PATIENT LEAVES RADIATION THERAPY TREATMENT WITHOUT RECEIVING REQUIRED INSTRUCTIONS

Received from the state by facsimile:

The patient left the hospital without receiving the required radiation therapy instruction. "The patient and her husband were adamant about leaving without waiting any longer. This was an unreasonable patient's husband driving this situation and we [Swedish Hospital] see no need to change our release criteria or procedures because of aberrant behavior of a family member. The patient had this procedure twice before [September 2005 and April 2006]. The implant in 2005 delivered 0.99 GBq. At the time the exposure reading at one meter was 0.25 mR/hr. This most recent procedure delivered less activity, and I would anticipate an even smaller exposure risk at one meter."

Source: Y-90 SIR Spheres at approximately 0.9 GBq

NOTIFICATION TO SC-DHEC CONCERNING EXCEEDANCE OF BIOLOGICAL OXYGEN DEMAND (BOD5) LIMIT

"On January 28, 2009, the composite sample from our waste treatment facility analyzed by our NPDES certified vendor laboratory indicated that wastewater discharged from the Westinghouse Columbia plant (to Congaree River) during the 24 hour period contained 60.8 pounds of BOD5 (56 mg/l BOD5) which exceeded the Daily Maximum Permit Limit of 60 # of BOD5 per day. The daily average for BOD5 discharges during January was approximately 23.6 pounds per day and is within permit limitations (30 #/D). Other BOD5 results for the month were less than 12 # BOD5/day.

"Following recognition of the problem on 2/3/09, Westinghouse immediately responded to evaluate the waste treatment facility including the sanitary package plant, the sanitary lagoon, process lagoons, and final discharge tanks. All systems were operating properly and producing clear effluent with no unusual odors or solids present. Waste treatment operations logs were inspected and no unusual problems were noted. All dissolved oxygen results for the month of January were greater than 10.0 mg/l indicating satisfactory performance of the wastewater treatment facility. Visual analysis of the entire waste treatment facility on 2/3/09 indicated that all processes were operating normally and no problems were being experienced.

"Investigation samples for BOD5 were collected on 2/3/09 from process source locations prior to the final discharge. All precursor investigation BOD5 samples were analyzed to contain less than 11.0 mg/l BOD5.

"Based on our information and discussions with [South Carolina - Department of Health and Environmental Control (SC-DHEC)], we are reporting the exceedance data, but believe the sample was anomalous (or contaminated) due to the lack of any elevated source of BOD5 (based on investigation samples) or process upsets noted in the entire waste treatment facility.

"Westinghouse remains deeply committed to continuous compliance with all NPDES requirements."

HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM INOPERABLE

"On January 28, 2009 at 0730 the Division 2 Emergency Equipment Cooling Water System (EECW) was declared inoperable due to a blown control power fuse in the bucket for the P4400F604 - Div 2 EECW Supply to Control Rod Drive (CRD) pumps. This is a normally open valve and is required to close upon EECW initiation to remove non-essential loads. The blown control power fuse would have prevented this action from occurring. The ECCW System cools various safety related components including the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System Area Cooler. An unplanned HPCI inoperability occurred due to the Division 2 EECW inoperability based on a loss of the HPCI System Area Cooler. A 14 day Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) was entered for HPCI per LCO 3.5.1. The control power fuse was replaced, EECW and HPCI were declared operable, and LCO 3.5.1 exited on January 28, 2009 at 1025. This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident, based on loss of a single train safety system.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

* * * RETRACTION FROM JIM KONRAD TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1449 ON 3/11/09 * * *

"The As-Found condition of the Division 2 Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) Control Rod Drive (CRD) Pump Supply Valve and High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System Room Cooler were evaluated.

"The HPCI System Room Cooler was operable with P4400-F604, Division 2 EECW to the CRD supply valve open. Based on an Engineering evaluation of EECW flow during a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) and Non-LOCA conditions with the valve open, there is adequate flow margin in the EECW system.

"The HPCI Room Cooler had adequate cooling flow to perform its design function. The HPCI room temperature would have been maintained below the HPCI equipment room high temperature isolation setpoint. Additionally, plant procedures provide directions for bypassing the HPCI equipment room high temperature trip. Consequently, there was no loss of HPCI safety function. Declaring HPCI inoperable was conservative and based on initial considerations. Therefore, event notification 44811 is retracted."

The Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R3DO (Lara).

STEAM EXCLUSION DOOR INAPPROPRIATELY HELD OPEN BY A DOOR CHOCK

"At 0834 on 01/28/2009 it was identified that a Steam Exclusion door was held open by a door chock installed on the door for less than 15 minutes. The door was open to ventilate the room during venting of carbon dioxide piping for routine maintenance. A Maintenance Mechanic was stationed at the door as per procedure. This door would have allowed steam into the emergency safeguards bus area from the Carbon Dioxide Tank room. This could have resulted in both Trains of ESF Equipment failing to perform their required functions. Upon discovery the door chock was disengaged to allow the door to self-close if required."

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.