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Event Notification Report for January 01, 2009

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

EVENT REPORTS FOR
12/31/2008 - 01/01/2009

EVENT NUMBERS
4474744748

Power Reactor
Event Number: 44747
Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1     State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: ERIC KELSEY
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 01/01/2009
Notification Time: 10:55 [ET]
Event Date: 01/01/2009
Event Time: 00:42 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/01/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
GLENN DENTEL (R1)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
SAFETY PARAMETER DISPLAY SYSTEM INOPERABLE

"This 8-hour non-emergency report is being made based upon requirements of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) which states, 'The licensee shall notify the NRC as soon as practical and in all cases within eight hours of the occurrence of any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, off site response capability, or offsite communications capability (e.g., significant portion of control room indication, Emergency Notification System, or off site notification system)'.

"At 0430 ET on Thursday, January 01, 2009, Operators discovered that the Plant Process Computer (PPC) typer display output was not updating. In addition all keyboard control was lost. The Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) Computer Display was updating, but the operators were not able to change the display to alternate views rendering the SPDS system degraded to the point of not being able to perform its monitoring function. This condition initially began at 0042 on 01 January 2009.

"All Control Room panel indicators and annunciators continued to respond properly providing operators with non-computer based emergency assessment capability. The PPC was secured for troubleshooting at 0746 on 01 January 2009."

"An update to this notification will be made after repairs are completed and the SPDS is returned to service."

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

* * * UPDATE AT 1431 EST ON 01/01/09 FROM ERIC KELSEY TO S. SANDIN * * *

"On Thursday, January 01, 2009 at 1140 ET, the Plant Process Computer (PPC) was successfully restarted. The performance of the PPC and SPDS was monitored for approximately one hour. SPDS was declared operable at 1300, restoring full emergency assessment capability."

The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Dentel).


!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 44748
Facility: BRUNSWICK
Region: 2     State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: C. DUNSMORE
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 01/01/2009
Notification Time: 21:06 [ET]
Event Date: 01/01/2009
Event Time: 14:30 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/02/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
MARK LESSER (R2)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
TWO EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO COMPONENT FAILURE

"EVENT DESCRIPTION: During return to service testing for Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) #3, it was noted that the fuel rack limiting cylinder was not returning to its non-limiting position. The fuel rack limiting cylinder is designed to limit the stroke distance of the fuel rack assembly during the initial EDG start sequence. Once the EDG is at rated speed, ~10 seconds, the fuel rack limiting cylinder should return to its non-limiting position. Failure of this component to operate as expected may have prevented EDG #3 from fulfilling its safety function during the postulated Loss of Off Site Power and/or Loss of Coolant Accident conditions. As a result, EDG #3 remains inoperable.

"During performance of subsequent surveillance testing on the remaining EDG's (#1, #2, and #4), in accordance with Technical Specifications, a similar condition as described above existed on EDG #4. EDG's #1 and #2 did not exhibit the same behavior and therefore, these EDG's remained operable during this sequence of events. Consequently, EDG #4 was declared inoperable at 1430 on 1/01/09. Failure of this component to operate as expected may have prevented EDG #4 from fulfilling its safety function during the postulated Loss of Off Site Power and/or Loss of Coolant Accident conditions. The concurrent failure of this component on EDG #3 and EDG #4 may have prevented on-site emergency power to Emergency busses 3 & 4 and thus the fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.

"INITIAL SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE EVALUATION: Plant operation is being maintained within the limiting conditions of the license expected. However, transient analyses relating to accident mitigation could have been impacted due to the inability to ensure emergency on-site power supply to Emergency busses 3 & 4. Off-site power and the grid have been stable during the time period both EDG's were inoperable.

"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: The fuel rack limiting cylinder for EDG #4 was repaired and EDG #4 was restored to Operable on January 1, 2009 at 1755 EST. Actions required per technical specifications for 2 EDG's were exited within the required time frame. Repair efforts are in progress for EDG #3."

The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * RETRACTION PROVIDED BY LEE GRZECK TO JASON KOZAL AT 1530 ON 3/2/09 * * *

"On January 1, 2009, at 2106 hours, the Control Room Shift Manager made a notification (i .e. Event Number 44748) to the NRC Operations Center in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b) (3) (v) (D) (i.e., any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident). The notification was made due to two Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) being declared inoperable. During return to service testing for BSEP's EDG 3, it was noted that the fuel rack limit cylinder was not returning to its non-limiting position in a timeframe consistent with prior observations. The fuel rack limit cylinder is designed to limit the stroke of the fuel rack during the initial EDG start sequence, preventing too much fuel from being provided to the engine cylinders on initial start. Once the EDG is at half-rated speed (i.e., in approximately 5 to 8 seconds), the fuel rack limit cylinder should be released to return to its non-limiting position. Failure of this component to operate as expected may have prevented the EDG from fulfilling its safety function during the postulated Loss of Off-site Power (LOOP) and/or Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) conditions. As a result, EDG 3 was conservatively declared inoperable due to the potential for the unexpected response of the fuel rack limit cylinder to impact Design Basis Accident (DBA) transient loading criteria.

"During performance of subsequent surveillance testing on the remaining EDG's, (i.e.,1,2, and 4), in accordance with Technical Specifications, a similar condition was identified on EDG 4. EDGs 1 and 2 did not exhibit the same behavior and therefore, these EDGs remained operable during this sequence of events. Consequently, EDG 4 was also conservatively declared inoperable at 1430 on January 1, 2009. The concurrent failure of this component on EDG 3 and EDG 4 may have prevented the onsite emergency power from fulfilling its intended safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.

"Basis for Retraction

"Further investigation has demonstrated that both EDG 3 and EDG 4 were fully operable. The EDG 3 evaluation concluded that the fuel rack limit would remain in effect for approximately seven (7) seconds after the diesel output breaker closed during a LOOP loading event or a design basis LOOP/LOCA loading event. After that, the fuel limit cylinder would not have limited the governor response in any way. The generator capacity during the first seven seconds of load acceptance at the fuel rack limited position would be sufficient to ensure proper acceleration of the 480-volt design basis loads and the Nuclear Service Water pump. These are the only loads expected to start during the first seven seconds of the EDG loading. The generator frequency response during the acceleration of these loads would be well within the EDG design limits. The Residual Heat Removal and Core Spray pumps are sequenced onto the EDG at 10 seconds and 15 seconds, respectively, following the closure of its output breaker and are not affected by the fuel limiter impairment. The EDG 4 evaluation is bounded by the above analysis.

"Therefore, the fuel rack limiter impairment would not have prevented either EDG 3 or EDG 4 from fulfilling their intended safety function. On this basis, this event is not reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b) (3) (v) (D).

"Investigation of this condition is documented in the corrective action program in Nuclear Condition Report (NCR) 312876.

"The NRC resident was notified of this retraction."

R2DO (Musser) has been notified.