Skip to main content

Event Notification Report for December 09, 2008

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

EVENT REPORTS FOR
12/08/2008 - 12/09/2008

EVENT NUMBERS
449804470744711

General Information or Other
Event Number: 44980
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: BECKMAN INSTRUMENTS
Region: 4
City: FULLERTON   State: CA
County:
License #: 1313-30GL
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KATHLEEN HARKNESS
HQ OPS Officer: DAN LIVERMORE
Notification Date: 04/09/2009
Notification Time: 17:07 [ET]
Event Date: 12/09/2008
Event Time: 00:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 04/09/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
LAWRENCE DOERFLEIN (R1)
MARK DELLIGATTI (FSME)
BLAIR SPITZBERG (R4)
Event Text
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LEAKING CS-137 SCINTILLATION COUNTER CHECK SOURCE

Received the following information via fax:

"On April 2, 2009, [deleted] Radiation Safety and Control Services, a New Hampshire Health Physics company [located in Stratham, NH] reported that a Beckman scintillation counter (model 3801, # 7014048) owned by them is believed to have a leaking Cs-137 check source. The instrument was not operating properly. In December 2008, a technical support person was called, who determined the source was not reaching the sample. During an inspection of the source mechanism, a smear of the exposed spring that push[e]s the source revealed 500 cpm of removable contamination by direct frisk of the Q-tip. More smears were taken and two near the spring indicated 4,285 and 5,586 dpm beta when counted on a LSC on December 10, 2008. This LSC contains a 40 microCi cesium 137 check source, part number 598860, # 60219005-A originally dated August 18, 1986. The device was taken out of service immediately and labeled as internally contaminated. Follow-up with Beckman Instruments will take place regarding replacement of the source and decontamination efforts."


Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 44707
Rep Org: DOW AGROSCIENCES
Licensee: DOW AGROSCIENCES
Region: 3
City: INDIANAPOLIS   State: IN
County:
License #: 13-26398-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ROBEN ROBERTS
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 12/09/2008
Notification Time: 16:30 [ET]
Event Date: 12/09/2008
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/09/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X
Person (Organization):
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3)
MARK THAGGARD (FSME)
Event Text
LOST TRITIUM EXIT SIGNS

"[This is] notification of two missing tritium exit signs from Dow AgroSciences, LLC. The signs were confirmed to be missing and potentially disposed of as hazardous waste on 12/9/2008.

"The two self luminous tritium signs were manufactured by Isolite: Model Number: 2040-01R-12, Serial Number: A67502, manufacture date July 3, 1996. Model Number: 2040-01R-12, Serial Number: A67503, manufacture date July 3, 1996. At the time of notification the activity for each sign would be 4748.59 mCi. At the time of removal of the signs the activity would have been 5023.79 mCi, each.

"The two exit signs were to be replaced by the Radiation Safety Officer and the Site Operation Manager and it was discovered that they had previously been replaced by a Site Manager. This Site Manager, who is no longer with the company, had replaced the above signs with new self luminous signs on 12/6/2007. The RSO and Site Operation Manager contacted waste management to confirm potential disposal and confirmed that work had been performed on 12/6/07 for sign replacement. Currently the RSO and Site Manager are investigating the disposal path of the signs as it is not documented that the signs were returned to the manufacturer. The RSO has notified the Radiation Safety Chair, the Environmental Health and Safety Leader, and the Site Operation Leader. A full root cause investigation is scheduled for December 11, 2008. A final notification report will be submitted within 30 days as required by the NRC."

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source


!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 44711
Facility: BWX TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
Region: 2     State: VA
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
NRC Notified By: BARRY COLE
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 12/10/2008
Notification Time: 15:57 [ET]
Event Date: 12/09/2008
Event Time: 16:30 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/23/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (b)(2) - LOSS OR DEGRADED SAFETY ITEMS
Person (Organization):
MIKE ERNSTES (R2)
PETER HABIGHORST (NMSS)
FUELS GROUP (OUO) (E-MA)
Event Text
AS-BUILT DEPTH OF LOW LEVEL DISSOLVER SYSTEM DISSOLVER TRAYS EXCEEDED MAXIMUM DESIGN DEPTH

"Event Description: Planned upgrades to the Low Level Dissolver System in the BWXT's Uranium Recovery Facility were undergoing a safety review as part of the change management process. One of the upgrades involved replacement of the dissolver trays to utilize trays of the same length, width, and depth throughout the dissolution process. During the evaluation process a Recovery process engineer questioned differences between the tray heights in the current safety basis and the change review documentation. The ISA summary listed the tray geometry as an Item Relied on For Safety (IROFS). This limit was the same as that discussed in the text of the change management documentation.

"Once it was determined that the discrepancy in the documentation also represented an as-built condition in the field, the Low Level Dissolution process was immediately shutdown pending further evaluation of the safety concern. The IROFS tray geometry was degraded.

"Evaluation of the Event: A review of related safety release documentation indicated the original trays installed in 1999 met the NCS requirements. The requirements limited the tray or allowed modification of the tray (drilling holes, cutting slots) to limit the solution height. Due to the corrosive nature of the process, the trays degrade over time and are replaced when a minimum wall thickness is achieved. The replacement trays were intended to be of like kind. The current fabrication drawing attached to the change management documentation shows no additional features to limit the solution height.

"The initial review of the accident scenario for a geometry upset indicated that although an IROFS was degraded, other IROFS (operator control of mass, operator control of moderator, and poisoning by the tray materials of construction) remained available to assure double contingency. This is a qualitative evaluation that does not analyze the magnitude of the upset condition. The original NCS analysis of the Low Level Dissolver trays conducted in 1999 evaluated tray height; the impact of a range of tray heights was not considered.

"The as-found condition in the field, including tray height, was subsequently modeled using BWXT's validated NCS codes and approved methodology. The normal operating condition was determined to be within the k-effective limit of 0.92 in BWXT's NRC License SNM-42 for a high enriched uranium (HEU) system. When a fully flooded moderation upset condition was analyzed, although the resulting k-effective was shown to
be subcritical, it exceeded the safety limit of 0.95 in BWXT's license for a HEU system. This determination was reached at 4:30 pm on December 9, 2008.

"There was no immediate risk of a criticality or threat to the safety of workers or the public as a result of this event. A fully flooded condition in the Low Level Dissolver is extremely unlikely. The equipment is located on a mezzanine, well above the main process area.

"There are no water sources (e.g., sprinklers) in the area, and the dissolvers are not contained in water tight enclosures. However, with the degradation of the IROFS of tray height, and demonstration that the as-found condition exceeded the license limit for a single upset condition, double contingency could no longer be assured.

"Notification Requirements: BWXT is making this 24 hour report in accordance with 10 CFR 70, Appendix A, (b)(2) loss or degradation of items relied on for safety that results in failure to meet the performance requirement of 70.61.

"Status of Corrective Actions: An investigation of the root causes of this event is ongoing. Corrective actions will be determined as a result of the investigation."

The Low Level Dissolution process remains shutdown.

The licensee documented this event in their condition report CR#1027010.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE FROM BARRY COLE TO KARL DIEDERICH ON 12/11/2008 AT 1013 EST * * *

The analysis of a fully flooded moderation upset condition showed the resulting k-effective exceeded the safety limit of 0.95 in BWXT's license for a HEU system showed a k-effective of 0.96.

Notified R2DO (Ernstes), NMSS (Habighorst), and Fuels Group (via e-mail).

* * * RETRACTION @ 1234 EST ON 12/23/08 FROM BARRY COLE TO RYAN ALEXANDER * * *

"This report was made based on the assumption that the tray dimensions on the drawing were representative of as-built tray dimensions in the field. Subsequent to the report, measurements were taken of the Low Level Dissolver trays in use at the time of discovery. Using the same methodology used to determine the initial reportability of the event, the moderation upset was reevaluated for the as-built tray dimensions. The resulting k-effective was 0.94, which is below the safety limit of 0.95 in BWXT's license for a HEU system. Evaluation of the as-built tray dimensions demonstrated although there was a loss or degradation of Items Relied On For Safety, BWXT did not fail to meet the performance requirement of 10 CFR 70.61. BWXT is therefore withdrawing the 10 CFR 70, Appendix A, (b)(2) notification, #44711."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R2DO (Hopper), NMSS EO (Benner), and Fuels OUO Group (via email).