Event Notification Report for November 20, 2008
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
11/19/2008 - 11/20/2008
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 44671
Facility: COOPER
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: RANDY KOUBA
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: RANDY KOUBA
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 11/20/2008
Notification Time: 18:24 [ET]
Event Date: 11/20/2008
Event Time: 12:30 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/24/2008
Notification Time: 18:24 [ET]
Event Date: 11/20/2008
Event Time: 12:30 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/24/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
CHUCK CAIN (R4)
CHUCK CAIN (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY FILTRATION SYSTEM INOPERABLE
"On 20 Nov 08 at 1230, the Control Room Emergency Filtration System (CREFS) was declared inoperable due to a report that a non-running Control Room supply fan discharge damper was found partially open. Per the System Operating Procedure, the idle fan's discharge damper must be fully closed to assure operability. With the damper not closed, reasonable assurance that CREFS would fulfill its safety function could not be established.
"With the Idle Control Room supply fan discharge damper not in the closed position, some portion of the air discharged from the operating Control Room supply fan will go backwards through the idle supply fan to the suction side of both supply fans. The CREFS fan discharges to the Control Room supply fan suctions. With CREFS in this as-found line-up, there is no assurance that the flow through CREFS is high enough to meet the design requirements assumed in control room occupant dose calculations.
"The Control Room supply fans and discharge dampers are required support features for CREFS at CNS. This is a single train system and per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) an 8 hour report is required due to the fact that at the time of discovery this condition could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of an SSC that is required to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"The damper was returned to a fully closed position at the time of discovery, and CREFS was returned to operable status."
* * * RETRACTION PROVIDED BY DAVID VANDERKAMP TO JASON KOZAL AT 1054 ON 12/24/08 * * *
"This notification is being made to retract Event Notification EN# 44671 which reported a loss of safety function due to the unplanned inoperability of the Control Room Emergency Filtration (CREF) system. The CREF system was declared inoperable due to the non-running control room supply fan discharge damper found partially open on November 20, 2008. Cooper Nuclear Station has determined through further evaluation that while the CREF system was procedurally required to be declared inoperable, the ability of the CREF system to perform its safety function was not lost.
"Testing was performed on December 19, 2008, with the non-running control room supply fan discharge damper aligned in the as-found condition (~25% open) of November 20, 2008 and again tested with the damper aligned to 50% open. Technical Specifications surveillance flow requirements were met in both tests. Using the results of the test and inspection of the discharge damper it has been concluded that during the ten days the damper was out of position, the CREF system was still capable of performing its safety function and satisfying Technical Specifications requirements."
Notified R4DO (Werner).
"On 20 Nov 08 at 1230, the Control Room Emergency Filtration System (CREFS) was declared inoperable due to a report that a non-running Control Room supply fan discharge damper was found partially open. Per the System Operating Procedure, the idle fan's discharge damper must be fully closed to assure operability. With the damper not closed, reasonable assurance that CREFS would fulfill its safety function could not be established.
"With the Idle Control Room supply fan discharge damper not in the closed position, some portion of the air discharged from the operating Control Room supply fan will go backwards through the idle supply fan to the suction side of both supply fans. The CREFS fan discharges to the Control Room supply fan suctions. With CREFS in this as-found line-up, there is no assurance that the flow through CREFS is high enough to meet the design requirements assumed in control room occupant dose calculations.
"The Control Room supply fans and discharge dampers are required support features for CREFS at CNS. This is a single train system and per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) an 8 hour report is required due to the fact that at the time of discovery this condition could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of an SSC that is required to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"The damper was returned to a fully closed position at the time of discovery, and CREFS was returned to operable status."
* * * RETRACTION PROVIDED BY DAVID VANDERKAMP TO JASON KOZAL AT 1054 ON 12/24/08 * * *
"This notification is being made to retract Event Notification EN# 44671 which reported a loss of safety function due to the unplanned inoperability of the Control Room Emergency Filtration (CREF) system. The CREF system was declared inoperable due to the non-running control room supply fan discharge damper found partially open on November 20, 2008. Cooper Nuclear Station has determined through further evaluation that while the CREF system was procedurally required to be declared inoperable, the ability of the CREF system to perform its safety function was not lost.
"Testing was performed on December 19, 2008, with the non-running control room supply fan discharge damper aligned in the as-found condition (~25% open) of November 20, 2008 and again tested with the damper aligned to 50% open. Technical Specifications surveillance flow requirements were met in both tests. Using the results of the test and inspection of the discharge damper it has been concluded that during the ten days the damper was out of position, the CREF system was still capable of performing its safety function and satisfying Technical Specifications requirements."
Notified R4DO (Werner).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 44672
Facility: PILGRIM
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: JOHN WHALLEY
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: JOHN WHALLEY
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 11/20/2008
Notification Time: 21:21 [ET]
Event Date: 11/20/2008
Event Time: 16:57 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/20/2008
Notification Time: 21:21 [ET]
Event Date: 11/20/2008
Event Time: 16:57 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/20/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
JAMES DWYER (R1)
JAMES DWYER (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
UNEXPECTED HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION ISOLATION DURING TEST
"The High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system was declared inoperable on 11/20/08 at 1657 EST due to a Group 4 isolation signal generated during scheduled surveillance testing in accordance with PNPS [Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station] Procedure 8.M.2-2.5.3, Attachment 1. The HPCI testing was stopped to determine the cause of the isolation which was not part of the planned evolution. HPCI isolation was reset, and HPCI was restored to standby lineup at 1804 EST. This event is an eight-hour notification. Efforts are ongoing to determine the cause of the error during testing.
"This event had no adverse effect to the health and/or safety of the public.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector of this event.
"This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) due to the loss of a single train system required to mitigate the consequences of an accident."
"The High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system was declared inoperable on 11/20/08 at 1657 EST due to a Group 4 isolation signal generated during scheduled surveillance testing in accordance with PNPS [Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station] Procedure 8.M.2-2.5.3, Attachment 1. The HPCI testing was stopped to determine the cause of the isolation which was not part of the planned evolution. HPCI isolation was reset, and HPCI was restored to standby lineup at 1804 EST. This event is an eight-hour notification. Efforts are ongoing to determine the cause of the error during testing.
"This event had no adverse effect to the health and/or safety of the public.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector of this event.
"This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) due to the loss of a single train system required to mitigate the consequences of an accident."