Event Notification Report for October 30, 2008

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - ACCIDENTIAL EXPOSURE TO I-131

"A veterinarian was exposed to Iodine-131 after administering a dose to a cat. The incident occurred on Thursday, October 30, at about 10:45 AM. The (19 millicuries of I-131) dose had been given to the cat, and the user accidentally poked his left index finger with the syringe which contained a residue of I-131. The user's protective glove was penetrated by the needle, but the needle did not appear to have penetrated the skin. The user contacted the RSO a few minutes after the incident. Efforts were made to remove or displace the radioactive Iodine with partial success, reducing the beta measurements about 50%. The licensee estimated that about 20 nanocuries of I-131 were remaining after efforts to decontaminate. Finger swabs show a very small amount 0.5 nanocuries or less) of removable contamination. The contamination is concentrated on an area less than 1 mm square on the user's left index finger near the tip. The user's fingertip is being kept bandaged to prevent spread of contamination.

"The licensee contacted DEQ promptly after the initial response. The exposed individual was taken to the University Medical Center where the physician is giving treatment based on NCRP 65. Nonradioactive iodine is being administered in an attempt to block absorption by the thyroid.

"Since the skin did not appear to be penetrated, the licensee believed that there would be no internal dose, but the exposed individual was directed to collect his urine for analysis. This report to NRC was held up in anticipation of the results. Analysis of the exposed individual's urine (about 2 liters collected overnight) shows a distinct I-131 peak that the licensee preliminarily estimated at about 90 picocuries/liter. A longer count with more precision is being made. The exposed individual will continue to collect all urine for analysis for at least five days.

"The situation has been complicated by the death of an immediate relative of the RSO. A Certified Health Physicist who is on the University Radiation Safety Committee is now acting for the RSO."

* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY MIKE BRODERICK TO JASON KOZAL ON 11/12/08 AT 1110 EST * * *

The following was provided by the licensee via e-mail:

"The licensee has conducted an extensive follow-up investigation, including collection an analysis of urine for five days, and bioassay of the individual's thyroid. The licensee calculated a thyroid dose of 2.1 mrem for the incident, not enough to have measurable health effects. It is not clear whether the Iodine was absorbed through an undetected skin puncture or through direct skin absorption. The licensee is working with DEQ to analyze their process to minimize the chances of a similar future incident."

Notified R4DO (Whitten), and FSME (Burgess).

EMERGENCY RESPONSE DATA SYSTEM (ERDS) OUT OF SERVICE

"This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as a condition that results in a major loss of emergency offsite communications capability. On October 30, 2008, at approximately 0020 hours EDT, 120 VAC non-essential electrical power was lost to the plant computer due to high temperature in the computer room (approximately 80 degrees F). This resulted in the Integrated Computer System (ICS), the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS), and the automatic mode calculation of the Computer Aided Dose Assessment Program (CADAP) being out of service.

"At 0028 hours, back-up computer room ventilation equipment was placed in service, and at 0040 hours, the electrical system high temperature shutdown was reset with the computer room temperature at 77 degrees F. At 0217 hours, the computer room high temperature alarm was reset with the room at 72 degrees F. The 120 VAC electrical power was restored to the plant computer room at approximately 0245 hours. The ICS, SPDS, and CADAP equipment functions are in process of restoration. Restoration is expected during dayshift hrs. on 10/30/08. A follow up to this notification will be made when ERDS is restored.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

* * * UPDATE FROM DAVE O'DONNELL TO JOE O'HARA AT 1406 EDT ON 10/30/08 * * *

The ERDS system has been tested and restored to service.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

Notified R3DO(Kozak).

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED EXIT SIGNS.

"On 10/30/08 the Agency [state] received a written report of damaged Tritium exit signs from Richard Dailey, RSO of Wal-Mart Stores. The 2 exit signs, manufactured by SRB Lite, are identified as S/N's 249470 and 249477 each containing 20 curies.

"During an inventory on 9/29/08 at the Northampton store, Wal-Mart's contractor discovered 2 damaged signs that failed the glow test. Additionally, one of the signs, S/N 249477, had a cracked face plate. Interviews with the store manager and associates indicated the signs were probably damaged during a recent remodel project. Wal-Mart hired Dade Moeller to assess the radiological impact of the damaged signs. A wipe survey was performed and the survey indicated no high levels of contamination. The signs were packaged per the protocols of Isolite, a specific licensee authorized to receive Tritium exit signs for disposal and transferred to Isolite. Wal-Mart will send the Agency a report of the transfers."

* * * UPDATE FROM JOHN SUMARES TO JOE O'HARA VIA EMAIL AT 0838 ON 1/29/09 * * *

"On January 28, 2009, the [Commonwealth of Massachusetts] has received a report of these transfers, completed this NMED report, and considers this event to be closed."

MA NMED# 080732

Notified R1DO( W.Schmidt) and FSME (M. Burgess)

REACTOR MANUALLY TRIPPED DUE TO FAILURE IN ROD CONTROL SYSTEM

"During the performance of 030 (post refueling start-up testing), control rods were being inserted for dynamic rod worth measurement. An urgent failure occurred in the rod control system which caused Group 1 rods in Control Bank A to stop inserting while Group 2 rods continued to insert.

"Reactor was manually tripped following the receipt of rod control alarms due to rod misalignment within Control Bank A. All rods inserted as expected."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

NON-FUNCTIONAL STEAM EXCLUSION BARRIER

"On 10/30/08 at 0930 an RP Technician transiting though a steam exclusion door found a kickplate degraded. The kickplate is held on by two screws and one screw was missing. When the door was opened, the kickplate rotated and became lodged in the staircase grating. This prevented the door from closing until the technician physically lifted the plate out of the way to close the door. The door was open for less than a minute. This kickplate is not part of the door seal itself so when the door is closed it is functional. The kick plate was taped up as a temporary fix and access was restricted through the door until permanent repairs were complete. Permanent repairs were completed on the door at 1116 on 10/30/08. While the door was open and could not close automatically, the barrier was non-functional. In accordance with TRM 3.0.9 Section A.1 all equipment supported by that steam exclusion barrier was immediately declared inoperable. This zone includes both trains of ECCS and support equipment (i.e., SI, RHR, ICS, CCW, etc ). TS 3.0.c was entered and exited during the time the door was open with both trains of ECCS inoperable.

"Therefore, this is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v), 'Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function', and under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) 'any event or condition that results in the nuclear plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety'."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.