Event Notification Report for October 28, 2008

MAINTENANCE ON PUBLIC PROMPT NOTIFICATION SYSTEM EMERGENCY SIRENS

"The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of the event, additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at the time, a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73.

"From October 28, 2008 until October 31, 2008, Palo Verde personnel will be performing maintenance on public prompt notification system sirens. One siren at a time will be removed from service, and will be restored prior to continuing to the next siren.

"Siren #42 provides notification to approximately 558 members of the public within 5 miles of Palo Verde.
"Siren #44 provides notification to approximately 210 members of the public within 5 miles of Palo Verde.
"Siren #25 provides notification to approximately 302 members of the public within 5 miles of Palo Verde.
"Siren #23 provides notification to approximately 498 members of the public within 5 miles of Palo Verde.
"Siren #22 provides notification to approximately 855 members of the public within 5 miles of Palo Verde.
"Siren #18 provides notification to approximately 396 members of the public within 5 miles of Palo Verde
"Siren #17 provides notification to approximately 1106 members of the public within 5 miles of Palo Verde.
"Siren #36 provides notification to approximately 301 members of the public within 5 miles of Palo Verde.
"Siren #15 provides notification to approximately 940 members of the public within 5 to 10 miles of Palo Verde.

"Each of these are considered by Palo Verde to be a 'large segment of the population.'

"The Palo Verde Emergency Plan has a contingency for dispatching Maricopa County Sheriff's Office (MCSO) vehicles, during an actual event, with loud speakers to alert persons within the affected area when sirens are inoperable.

"There are no events in progress that require siren operation. A follow-up call will be placed when the affected sirens are returned to service.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of the siren maintenance and this ENS call."

These sirens are utility owned.

* * * UPDATE AT 1335 EDT ON 10/31/08 FROM FARA BURDICK TO S. SANDIN * * *

The following information was received as an update to this report:

"This is an update of ENS call # 44606. At this time, maintenance on the Palo Verde public prompt notification for sirens identified in ENS #44606, has been completed, siren testing was successful and the sirens are operable and in service at this time.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of the siren maintenance and this ENS call."

Notified R4DO (Spitzberg).

PROCESS GAS LEAK DETECTION SYSTEM INOPERABLE

"At 0849 CDST, on 10-28-08 the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that an alarm was received for the C-337 Unit 1 Cell 2 UF6 Release Detection (PGLD) System. Operators responded and found that the READY and MANUAL lights for this system were not illuminated. This PGLD System contains detectors that cover C-337 Unit 1 Cell 2 and Section 1 of the cell bypass piping. At the time of this alarm, Unit 1 Cell 2 and some areas of Sections 1 of the cell bypass were operating above atmospheric pressure. TSR 2.4.4.1 requires that at least the minimum number of detector heads in the cell and in each defined section of the cell bypass are operable during steady state operations above atmospheric pressure. With the Unit 1 Cell 2 PGLD system inoperable, none of the required cell heads and only 2 of the required 3 heads in Sections 1 of the cell bypass were operable. This PGLD System was declared inoperable. TSR LCO 2.4.4.1.A.1 and 2.4.4.1.C.1 were entered and a continuous smoke watch was put in place within one hour. Engineering has determined that the system would not have been able to perform its intended safety function when this alarm came in. This event is reportable as a 24 hour event in accordance with 10CFR76.120(c)(2)(i). This is an event in which equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed when: a.) the equipment is required by a TSR to prevent releases, prevent exposures to radiation and radioactive materials exceeding specified limits, mitigate the consequences of an accident, or restore this facility to a pre-established safe condition after an accident; b.) the equipment is required by a TSR to be available and operable and either should have been operating or should have operated on demand, and c.) no redundant equipment is available and operable to perform the required safety function.

"PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2008-033.

"The NRC Resident lnspector has been notified of this event."

CS-137 SOURCE DISCONNECTED FROM LEVEL DETECTOR OPERATING ROD

"At 1515 on 10/28/08, the Agency was notified by the licensee of an event involving a Thermo Measure Tech Model 5191 level measurement gauge. The licensee had noted that the gauge was no longer reading properly and sent a maintenance crew to the area to perform repairs. While conducting repairs, an individual from the safety group came by to perform radiation surveys. The survey indicated elevated levels of radiation so the safety representative had the area evacuated and roped off. The licensee contacted the manufacturer who sent technicians to the facility to investigate. They found that radiation levels were in fact elevated and determined that the source had separated from the operating rod. The source is still located in the gauge housing, but is not currently shielded. The source is a 260 milliCurie (calculated based on decay) Cesium (Cs) -137 source. The licensee has started their investigation including time and distance studies with workers who were in the area. The gauge is located in an area of the plant not frequented by workers. The manufacturer is scheduled to remove the gauge from the vessel and send it to their facilities for further inspection on 10/29/08."

* * * UPDATE FROM ART TUCKER TO PETE SNYDER ON 10/30/08 AT 0833 EDT * * *

The Agreement State of Texas provided the following information via e-mail:

"The licensee contacted the [Texas Department of State Health Services (TDSHS)] on October 29, 2008, and informed them that the gauge had been removed from the tank it was mounted on by the manufacturer. The Cs-137 source was found in the gauge housing. The gauge and source were packaged for transportation back to the manufacturer's facility for inspection and repair. The [TDSHS] will be provided the results of the inspection when it is completed."

Texas Event Number: I - 8576.

Notified R4DO (Spitzberg), FSME (Burgess).

PART 21 - 18" VALVE ASSEMBLY BEARINGS NOT DEDICATED PARTS

The following report was received via facsimile:

"Items provided to Duke Energy - Oconee per Fisher Order Number 033-B800163810, Items 010A- 10L (Duke Energy Order DP16655). This equipment included 18" CL150 Fisher A31A valve assemblies (quantity 12). The equipment is identified by Fisher Serial Numbers 16986219 through 16986230 (Duke Energy Item Number DMV-1409).

"Fisher Controls has determined that the subject items were provided with parts that were not properly processed per active valve requirements specified by the Duke Energy Order DP16655. Specifically, Fisher provided commercial grade bearings and thrust bearings instead of commercial grade dedicated items per EPRI 5652.

"We are reviewing the situation and will pursue a corrective action investigation to prevent problems like this in the future.

"Arrangements have been made with Duke Energy to retrofit the correctly processed parts on the subject serial numbers. This is a formal notification; Duke Energy was notified of this situation on October 28, 2008."