Event Notification Report for October 23, 2008
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/22/2008 - 10/23/2008
EVENT NUMBERS
44595445964459744598
Power Reactor
Event Number: 44595
Facility: GRAND GULF
Region: 4 State: MS
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: FRANK WEAVER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 4 State: MS
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: FRANK WEAVER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 10/23/2008
Notification Time: 11:44 [ET]
Event Date: 10/23/2008
Event Time: 07:20 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/23/2008
Notification Time: 11:44 [ET]
Event Date: 10/23/2008
Event Time: 07:20 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/23/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
RICK DEESE (R4)
RICK DEESE (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | A/R | Y | 10 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM WITH MANUAL RCIC INITIATION
"'A' Reactor Feed Pump speed decreased to zero with no trip signal evident in the Control Room for the 'A' Reactor Feed Pump. The reactor scrammed due to loss of feedwater flow on a Level 3 (11.4") RPS scram signal as designed. Operators implemented appropriate off normal event procedures to mitigate the transient with all systems responding as designed. Lowest reactor water level observed was -35" wide range. All withdrawn control rods fully inserted to position '00'. The Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System was manually initiated and was used to restore water level to within the normal band. No ECCS initiations were received and all systems responded as designed. Additionally, no SRVs lifted as a result of this event.
"Level 3 is also a setpoint for Group 2 (RHR to Radwaste) and Group 3 (Shutdown Cooling Isolation) automatic isolation. No valves isolated in these systems due to them being in their normally CLOSED position prior to the event. Currently, reactor water level is being maintained by the condensate system in normal level band and reactor pressure is being controlled to limit cool down."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"'A' Reactor Feed Pump speed decreased to zero with no trip signal evident in the Control Room for the 'A' Reactor Feed Pump. The reactor scrammed due to loss of feedwater flow on a Level 3 (11.4") RPS scram signal as designed. Operators implemented appropriate off normal event procedures to mitigate the transient with all systems responding as designed. Lowest reactor water level observed was -35" wide range. All withdrawn control rods fully inserted to position '00'. The Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System was manually initiated and was used to restore water level to within the normal band. No ECCS initiations were received and all systems responded as designed. Additionally, no SRVs lifted as a result of this event.
"Level 3 is also a setpoint for Group 2 (RHR to Radwaste) and Group 3 (Shutdown Cooling Isolation) automatic isolation. No valves isolated in these systems due to them being in their normally CLOSED position prior to the event. Currently, reactor water level is being maintained by the condensate system in normal level band and reactor pressure is being controlled to limit cool down."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 44596
Facility: DAVIS BESSE
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-R-LP
NRC Notified By: ERIC HORVATH
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-R-LP
NRC Notified By: ERIC HORVATH
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 10/23/2008
Notification Time: 11:59 [ET]
Event Date: 10/23/2008
Event Time: 09:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/23/2008
Notification Time: 11:59 [ET]
Event Date: 10/23/2008
Event Time: 09:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/23/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
HIRONORI PETERSON (R3)
HIRONORI PETERSON (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO SUMP DISCHARGE LINE LEAKAGE
"This is a report of a situation, related to the protection of the environment, for which a notification to other government agencies is being made, as described in 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi).
"On October 22, 2008, excavation within the Protected Area was ongoing to identify a leak in the Fire Protection System. At approximately 1600 hours, the Turbine and Water Treatment Building sump discharge line was identified as leaking. This three-inch carbon steel pipe routes the sump discharge to the settling basins, where it is eventually discharged via a monitored outfall to the environment.
"The cause of the leakage is unknown, but due to the condition of the piping, it is believed to have existed prior to the excavation activities. The amount of leakage is therefore conservatively assumed to be more than 100 gallons, but this cannot be quantified at this time. Analysis of a water sample from the sump discharge line leak determined that the water leaking from the pipe contains approximately 37,500 picocuries per liter (pCi/l) tritium. These tritium levels are consistent with tritium levels in the Condensate/Feedwater Systems in the Turbine Building.
"Actions are underway to remove the piping from service and re-route the sump pump discharge. Analysis of routine groundwater well samples taken earlier this month is being expedited, and additional well samples are being planned.
"The State of Ohio, Lucas County and Ottawa County government agencies were contacted regarding the above information at 0900 on October 23, 2008. The Resident Inspector has also been briefed on the issue."
"This is a report of a situation, related to the protection of the environment, for which a notification to other government agencies is being made, as described in 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi).
"On October 22, 2008, excavation within the Protected Area was ongoing to identify a leak in the Fire Protection System. At approximately 1600 hours, the Turbine and Water Treatment Building sump discharge line was identified as leaking. This three-inch carbon steel pipe routes the sump discharge to the settling basins, where it is eventually discharged via a monitored outfall to the environment.
"The cause of the leakage is unknown, but due to the condition of the piping, it is believed to have existed prior to the excavation activities. The amount of leakage is therefore conservatively assumed to be more than 100 gallons, but this cannot be quantified at this time. Analysis of a water sample from the sump discharge line leak determined that the water leaking from the pipe contains approximately 37,500 picocuries per liter (pCi/l) tritium. These tritium levels are consistent with tritium levels in the Condensate/Feedwater Systems in the Turbine Building.
"Actions are underway to remove the piping from service and re-route the sump pump discharge. Analysis of routine groundwater well samples taken earlier this month is being expedited, and additional well samples are being planned.
"The State of Ohio, Lucas County and Ottawa County government agencies were contacted regarding the above information at 0900 on October 23, 2008. The Resident Inspector has also been briefed on the issue."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 44597
Facility: BEAVER VALLEY
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: KEN TIEFENTHAL
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: KEN TIEFENTHAL
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 10/23/2008
Notification Time: 18:25 [ET]
Event Date: 10/23/2008
Event Time: 18:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/24/2008
Notification Time: 18:25 [ET]
Event Date: 10/23/2008
Event Time: 18:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/24/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
Person (Organization):
CHRISTOPHER CAHILL (R1)
CHRISTOPHER CAHILL (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 99 | Power Operation |
INFORMATION ONLY NOTIFICATION REGARDING PLANT SHUTDOWN
"This is an information only notification that Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No. 2 has initiated a plant shutdown as of 1800 on 10/23/08, a proactive measure, to complete repairs on the Train 'A' Low Head Safety Injection (LHSI) Pump 2SIS-P21A. On 10/19/08 at 2326, Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No. 2 removed 2SIS-P21A from service for routine preventive maintenance. Technical Specification 3.5.2, Condition A was entered during this maintenance activity with the Required Action A.1 to restore 2SIS-P21A to operable status within 72 hours (2326 on 10/22/08). On 10/20/08, during this maintenance; the pump shaft was unable to be rotated by hand after approximately 3/4 revolution. The pump was then disassembled and the apparent cause was determined to be that the pump rotating assembly was not centralized in the casing bore resulting in minimal clearance between the pump wear rings. On 10/22/08, First Energy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC) requested enforcement discretion from the NRC to permit an additional 36 hours of time to complete repairs on the pump. The NRC verbally granted FENOC's request for enforcement discretion on 10/22/08 at 1105. The enforcement discretion period will expire on 10/24/08 at 1126. Since unexpected difficulties have delayed the reassembly of the pump, FENOC management decided to proactively shutdown Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No.2 beginning at 1800 on 10/23/08. While pump reassembly and testing to restore operability may still be completed by the end of the enforcement discretion period, FENOC management determined that it was more prudent to shutdown the unit at this time so that the Operations crews are not placed under undue time pressure to reach Mode 3 conditions.
"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY DANIEL SCHWER TO JASON KOZAL ON 10/24/08 AT 0922 * * *
"This 4-hour notification is to report that Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No. 2 has initiated a manual reactor shutdown at 0600 on 10/24/08 in accordance with Technical Specification 3.5.2, 'ECCS - Operating'. On 10/19/08 at 2326 Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No. 2 removed 2SIS-P21A (Train 'A' Low Head Safety Injection [LHSI] Pump) from service for routine preventive maintenance. Technical Specification 3.5.2 was not met during this maintenance activity for two operable trains of Emergency Core Cooing System and Condition A was entered with the Required Action A.1 to restore 2SIS-P21A to operable status within 72 hours (2326 on 10/22/08). Problems were unexpectedly encountered during this maintenance; the pump shaft was unable to be rotated by hand after approximately 3/4 revolution. The pump was disassembled and the apparent cause was determined to be that the pump rotating assembly was not centralized in the casing bore resulting in minimal clearance between the pump wear rings. On 10/22/08 FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company requested enforcement discretion from the NRC to permit an additional 36 hours of time to complete reassembly of the pump. The NRC verbally granted FENOC's request for enforcement discretion on 10/22/08 at 1105. The enforcement discretion period would have expired on 10/24/08 at 1126. Since unexpected difficulties have delayed the reassembly of the pump, FENOC management decided to proactively shutdown Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No.2 beginning at 1800 on 10/23/08 (reference Information Only EN#44597). Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No. 2 entered Mode 3 at 0519 on 10/24/08 as part of the planned controlled shutdown. On 10/24/08 at 0600, Technical Specification 3.5.2, Condition B was entered based on a determination that the projected work completion time for restoring 2SIS-P21A to operable status would not meet the conditions of the enforcement discretion. Technical Specification 3.5.2, Required Action B.1 was met since the plant was in Mode 3, the plant is continuing the cooldown to be in Mode 4 within 12 hours per Required Action B.2. This event is being reported as a Technical Specification required shutdown pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i).
"No radiological release occurred due to this event.
"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
Notified R1DO (Cahill).
"This is an information only notification that Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No. 2 has initiated a plant shutdown as of 1800 on 10/23/08, a proactive measure, to complete repairs on the Train 'A' Low Head Safety Injection (LHSI) Pump 2SIS-P21A. On 10/19/08 at 2326, Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No. 2 removed 2SIS-P21A from service for routine preventive maintenance. Technical Specification 3.5.2, Condition A was entered during this maintenance activity with the Required Action A.1 to restore 2SIS-P21A to operable status within 72 hours (2326 on 10/22/08). On 10/20/08, during this maintenance; the pump shaft was unable to be rotated by hand after approximately 3/4 revolution. The pump was then disassembled and the apparent cause was determined to be that the pump rotating assembly was not centralized in the casing bore resulting in minimal clearance between the pump wear rings. On 10/22/08, First Energy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC) requested enforcement discretion from the NRC to permit an additional 36 hours of time to complete repairs on the pump. The NRC verbally granted FENOC's request for enforcement discretion on 10/22/08 at 1105. The enforcement discretion period will expire on 10/24/08 at 1126. Since unexpected difficulties have delayed the reassembly of the pump, FENOC management decided to proactively shutdown Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No.2 beginning at 1800 on 10/23/08. While pump reassembly and testing to restore operability may still be completed by the end of the enforcement discretion period, FENOC management determined that it was more prudent to shutdown the unit at this time so that the Operations crews are not placed under undue time pressure to reach Mode 3 conditions.
"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY DANIEL SCHWER TO JASON KOZAL ON 10/24/08 AT 0922 * * *
"This 4-hour notification is to report that Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No. 2 has initiated a manual reactor shutdown at 0600 on 10/24/08 in accordance with Technical Specification 3.5.2, 'ECCS - Operating'. On 10/19/08 at 2326 Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No. 2 removed 2SIS-P21A (Train 'A' Low Head Safety Injection [LHSI] Pump) from service for routine preventive maintenance. Technical Specification 3.5.2 was not met during this maintenance activity for two operable trains of Emergency Core Cooing System and Condition A was entered with the Required Action A.1 to restore 2SIS-P21A to operable status within 72 hours (2326 on 10/22/08). Problems were unexpectedly encountered during this maintenance; the pump shaft was unable to be rotated by hand after approximately 3/4 revolution. The pump was disassembled and the apparent cause was determined to be that the pump rotating assembly was not centralized in the casing bore resulting in minimal clearance between the pump wear rings. On 10/22/08 FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company requested enforcement discretion from the NRC to permit an additional 36 hours of time to complete reassembly of the pump. The NRC verbally granted FENOC's request for enforcement discretion on 10/22/08 at 1105. The enforcement discretion period would have expired on 10/24/08 at 1126. Since unexpected difficulties have delayed the reassembly of the pump, FENOC management decided to proactively shutdown Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No.2 beginning at 1800 on 10/23/08 (reference Information Only EN#44597). Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No. 2 entered Mode 3 at 0519 on 10/24/08 as part of the planned controlled shutdown. On 10/24/08 at 0600, Technical Specification 3.5.2, Condition B was entered based on a determination that the projected work completion time for restoring 2SIS-P21A to operable status would not meet the conditions of the enforcement discretion. Technical Specification 3.5.2, Required Action B.1 was met since the plant was in Mode 3, the plant is continuing the cooldown to be in Mode 4 within 12 hours per Required Action B.2. This event is being reported as a Technical Specification required shutdown pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i).
"No radiological release occurred due to this event.
"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
Notified R1DO (Cahill).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 44598
Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: QUENTIN HICKS
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: QUENTIN HICKS
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL
Notification Date: 10/24/2008
Notification Time: 00:48 [ET]
Event Date: 10/23/2008
Event Time: 21:26 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/24/2008
Notification Time: 00:48 [ET]
Event Date: 10/23/2008
Event Time: 21:26 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/24/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
CHRISTOPHER CAHILL (R1)
.
CHRISTOPHER CAHILL (R1)
.
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | M/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO LOSS OF THE ELECTRONIC PRESSURE REGULATOR
"Control Room Operators observed slight [reactor] pressure rise during panel walk down. Investigation of pressure indication led Control room staff to determine that [the] EPR (Electronic Pressure Regulator) was not functioning properly (noise in the output signal). Control Room Staff entered Special Operating Procedure for failed pressure regulator. EPR could not be moved and this was confirmed by operators in the field. Control Room Staff [then] inserted a manual scram.
"Immediately after the scram reactor water level reached a low of 36", Emergency Operating Procedures for Level (EOP-2) were entered. HPCI initiated on the turbine trip to control water level. After the turbine tripped, all turbine bypass valves failed open; MSIVs (main steam isolation valve) were manually shut to control pressure. [The] EPR eventually disengaged from control, allowing the operator control of the turbine bypass valves. MSIVs were then reopened. [The] Scram has been reset. [The] turbine driven shaft pump did not initially disengage, pump [was] manually tripped after turbine speed reduced to 1500 rpm. All other systems responded correctly.
"[The] plant is not currently in any SOPs or EOPs and is proceeding to cold shutdown using normal operating procedures."
All control rods fully inserted as expected. The plant is in a normal shutdown electrical lineup. At the time of the event, containment spray loop 1-12 was out of service for routine surveillance. The plant is currently cooling down and is at 365 psi.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"Control Room Operators observed slight [reactor] pressure rise during panel walk down. Investigation of pressure indication led Control room staff to determine that [the] EPR (Electronic Pressure Regulator) was not functioning properly (noise in the output signal). Control Room Staff entered Special Operating Procedure for failed pressure regulator. EPR could not be moved and this was confirmed by operators in the field. Control Room Staff [then] inserted a manual scram.
"Immediately after the scram reactor water level reached a low of 36", Emergency Operating Procedures for Level (EOP-2) were entered. HPCI initiated on the turbine trip to control water level. After the turbine tripped, all turbine bypass valves failed open; MSIVs (main steam isolation valve) were manually shut to control pressure. [The] EPR eventually disengaged from control, allowing the operator control of the turbine bypass valves. MSIVs were then reopened. [The] Scram has been reset. [The] turbine driven shaft pump did not initially disengage, pump [was] manually tripped after turbine speed reduced to 1500 rpm. All other systems responded correctly.
"[The] plant is not currently in any SOPs or EOPs and is proceeding to cold shutdown using normal operating procedures."
All control rods fully inserted as expected. The plant is in a normal shutdown electrical lineup. At the time of the event, containment spray loop 1-12 was out of service for routine surveillance. The plant is currently cooling down and is at 365 psi.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.