Event Notification Report for September 25, 2008

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

A moisture density gauge was stolen from the J.A. Cesare company in Henderson, NV between 0300 and 0500 on 9/25/2008. A state investigator is at the scene but has not reported details of the theft at this time.

Serial Number: MD90204856
Sources: 10 mCi Cs-137 and 50 mCi Am-241/Be

Additional information will be reported on 9/26/2008.

* * * UPDATE ON 9/26/08 AT 1713 EDT FROM MATUS TO HUFFMAN * * *

The State reports that the stolen moisture density gauge has been recovered by police at a pawn shop. The gauge had not been tampered with and has been returned to the licensee's RSO.

It was determined that the gauge was left in a company vehicle in the licensee's parking lot when it was originally stolen. The State also noted that the gauge was actually a CPN Model MC-1DR (preliminary information had indicated that the gauge was a Troxler).

Notified R4DO (Jones), FSME (Tadesse), and ILTAB (e-mail).


THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

24 HOUR NOTIFICATION OF THE DISCOVERY THAT A SPARK ARRESTOR FOR HEPA FILTER FIRE CONTROL WAS NOT INSTALLED

Event Description
"At 0720 hours on 9/25/2008, the Engineer responsible for the HVAC system informed a member of the EHS&L ISA Staff that the K-3 ventilation system did not have one of the two required wire-mesh spark arrestors, which we believe had never been installed.

Safety Significance
"The safety significance of this condition is low. The missing wire-mesh spark arrestor is one of the components of IROFS [Item Relied On For Safety] 4530, which is one of two IROFS associated with an intermediate consequence environmental release as defined in 10CFR 70.61. The initiating event for this accident sequence includes failure of IROFS 4502 (control of combustible material and ignition sources) and a resulting fire that destroys a primary HEPA filter. This initiating event is listed as a 100-year event in the facility ISA. IROFS 4530 is expected to prevent a significant radiological release if the initiating event, a small fire that destroys a primary filter, occurs thereby challenging the integrity of the final bank of HEPA filters. The components of IROFS 4530 include HEPA filters which meet the resistance to heated air and spot flame resistance requirements of sections FC-5150 and 5160 respectively of ASME AG-1, and wire-mesh spark arrestors between the primary and final HEPA filters.

"ASME AG-1 section FC-5150 requires filters meeting this design criterion to be exposed to air heated to 700 +/- 50 degrees for not less than 5 minutes without catching fire. Section FC-5160 requires filters meeting this design criterion to have the frame, filter media, filter pack, and sealing materials exposed to a 2.5 inch blue flame (1750 +/- 50 degrees F) for not less than 5 minutes without sustaining combustion.

"In addition, if these IROFS are not available to perform their function, the enabling condition needed for an intermediate environmental consequence event is more than a total of 116 kg of uranium be present in the primary and final HEPA filters involved in the postulated fire. The uranium is conservatively assumed to be relatively higher activity blended low-enriched uranium (BLEU), i.e. high enriched uranium blended down to 5% 235U or less. The likelihood of all the uranium on the filters being BLEU material is low.

"Since 1995, primary HEPA filters in the K-3 system have been replaced over 1,600 times. Of these, only 6 have contained more than 2 kg of U. The highest contained about 2.7 kg.

Immediate Corrective Actions
"The differential pressures of the HEPA filters in the K-3 system were verified to be in acceptable ranges, indicating normal loading.

"A fire-watch was instituted to further limit potential ignition sources and to assure minimal amounts of combustible materials are used near, or in areas serviced by, the K-3 system.

"Wire-mesh to be used in fabricating a spark arrestor has been ordered for expedited installation.

Planned Actions
"A wire-mesh spark arrestor is expected to be installed Saturday, October 4."

CALIFORNIA AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LEAKING NI-63 SOURCE

"On September 25, 2008, a leak test was performed on a nickel-63 source in an Electron Capture Device (ECD) which was found to have removable contamination of 89 nanoCuries, which is above the reporting requirement of 5 nanoCuries in CA Title 17, section 30275. The ECD is not in service, it has been in storage for two years and in the Environmental Health and Safety waste facility [at the University of California - San Diego (UCSD)], awaiting disposal. We [the California Department of Public Health] have notified UCSD to return the device to Agilent Technologies, in Delaware for their analysis.

"Manufacturer: Hewlett Packard; original activity: 15 mCi; current activity: 13.44 mCi; reference date 12/1/1992, source model number G1223A, serial number F5350.

"SSD registry NR-0348-D-111-B, currently made by Agilent Technologies in Delaware under NRC authority.

"Gas Chromatograph Information: Manufacturer- Hewlett Packard, Model 5890 Series II."

The State of California considers this a potential Part 21 issue.

California Incident Number: 5010-093008.

* * * UPDATE RECEIVED VIA E-MAIL FROM B. HAMRICK TO JOE O'HARA AT 1257 EDT ON 10/16/08 * * *

"This is to update the report made 10/1/08 regarding a leaking Agilent Ni-63 source. After review, it was determined that this event is not a 24-hour reportable event for the California Agreement State program, and should have been reported pursuant to 10 CFR 31.5 (30-day report). By copy of this email, we are also notifying Randy Erickson, in Region IV, since the event may require NRC review, because the SS&D sheet for this source was issued by NRC to an NRC licensee."

Notified R4DO(Hay), FSME(VonTill)

LOOSE CONNECTION CAUSES HALF SCRAM WHILE SHUTDOWN

"On 9/25/2008 at approximately 0241 [EDT], the James A. Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power Plant was Shutdown in the refueling mode. The 'A' Reactor Protective System (RPS) Motor-Generator (MG) Set tripped. This resulted in a half-scram signal and Group II Primary Containment Isolation System [PCIS] actuation. The Group II PCIS isolation actuated valves in multiple systems.

"During the event all systems operated as designed.

"Power was restored to 'A' RPS using the alternate power supply and the Group II PCIS isolation was reset.

"The cause of the event was determined to be a loose connection on the 'A' RPS MG Set voltage regulator. The Voltage regulator was replaced and the RPS System was returned to its normal line-up.

"The event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) 'Any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of ... (B)(2) general containment isolation signals affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system'. A telephone notification is being made in lieu of an LER, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(1) as an invalid signal."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.