Event Notification Report for September 23, 2008

SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE DUE TO LOSS OF POWER

"At 0937 CDST, on 09/23/08 the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that C-315 (tails withdrawal facility) had lost power due to a fault on a 14 KV feeder. As a result of the power loss, the C-315 High Voltage Process Gas Leak Detection (PGLD) System was rendered inoperable. This PGLD System contains detectors that cover the C-315 UF6 condensers, accumulators, and piping heated housing. At the time of this loss of power, these areas were operating above atmospheric pressure. TSR 2.3.4.4 requires that all of detector heads in this system be operable during operations above atmospheric pressure. This PGLD System was declared inoperable. TSR LCO 2.3.4.4.A.1 was entered and a continuous smoke watch was put in place within one hour. This event is reportable as a 24 hour event in accordance with 10CFR 76.120(c)(2)(i). This is an event in which equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed when: a.) the equipment is required by a TSR to prevent releases, prevent exposures to radiation and radioactive materials exceeding specified limits, mitigate the consequences of an accident, or restore this facility to a pre-established safe condition after an accident; b.) the equipment is required by a TSR to be available and operable and either should have been operating or should have operated on demand; and, c.) no redundant equipment is available and operable to perform the required safety function. Once the source of the fault was identified, power was restored to the C-315 facility. The High Voltage PGLD system was tested, and the system was declared operable. Power was restored at 1039 hours and the High Voltage PGLD System was declared operable at 1118 hours.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.

"PGDP Assessment and Tracking Report No. ATR-08-2371; PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2008-29; Responsible Division: Operations."

DEGRADED CONDITION DUE TO RECIRC NOZZLE WELD AXIAL CRACK

"On September 23, 2008 at approximately 1500 [EDT] the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant was shutdown and operating in the refueling mode (Mode 5). During an ISI inspection of the dissimilar metal weld on recirc nozzle N2-C, an indication was identified. Preliminary analysis of the data indicates a flaw in the nozzle weld that extends into the 'butter', is axially oriented, approximately 0.5 inches in length and 0.4 inches in depth. There is no approved method for predicting crack growth in axially oriented flaws. Therefore, the flaw can not evaluated in accordance with ASME Section XI. This deficiency meets reporting criterion 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii).

"At this time four of the eight N2 Recirc Nozzles have been inspected with no other flaws or indications identified. The remaining four N2 Nozzles are being inspected during this outage.

"The event has been entered into the corrective action program and a Licensee Event Report (LER) will be filed within 60 Days as required by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii).

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been briefed and the state Public Service Commission (PSC) will also be notified."

EMERGENCY OPERATING FACILITY UNAVAILABLE

"PPL Susquehanna is installing a backup diesel to supply power to the Emergency Operating Facility (EOF) during loss of power conditions. A power outage is required to tie-in the transfer switch for the new power supply. The scope of work includes connection of offsite power to a new transformer, connection from the transformer to the transfer switch and connection of power from the transfer switch to the building's distribution panel. This power outage, which is expected to be approximately 3 hours, is required to make final connections and to test the new service.

"During the outage, temporary power will be supplied to the phone lines only. HVAC, lighting and computer terminals will be without power. This condition is a loss of emergency response capability and is reportable to the NRC as an 8 hour ENS notification per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii)."

The licensee contacted the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE FROM R. KLINEFELTER TO J. KNOKE AT 1303 EDT ON 09/23/08 * * *

This is a follow-up courtesy notification to EN# 44513. As of 12:20, on 09/23/08, power has been restored to the Susquehanna Emergency Operating Facility (EOF).

Licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the state. Notified R1DO (Conte)

MEDIA INQUIRY CONCERNING UPCOMING LICENSEE PERFORMANCE REVIEW

"Below are the responses to questions BWXT received from [DELETED] at the News & Advance of Lynchburg, VA, and the BWXT responses.

"Q: In the past year, there have been a number of 'notices of violation' from NRC regarding events at BWXT. Several of these violations or apparent violations involved Raschig Ring-filled Vacuum Cleaners - one overturned from a forklift last year and spilled some nuclear material; later there was a situation in which one of the RRVCs did not have enough raschig rings in it, etc.-and one other incident involved an employee being splashed with a solution that contained some nuclear material. In what ways has the company responded to these events? What measures have been taken to correct procedures and prevent further occurrences?

"A: The company has performed detailed incident investigations and identified corrective actions to prevent reoccurrence of these types of incidents. For example, in the case of the RRVCs we have developed and are implementing a new vacuum cleaner design that no longer requires the use of Raschig rings. In the case of the chemical spill, the company has strengthened its chemical spill response procedures.

"Q: How does the company anticipate the performance review to go?

"A: We appreciate the opportunity to receive feedback from the NRC on our performance on an annual basis. This feedback is valuable to us as we strive to continuously improve our operating and safety performance. We look forward to discussing our safety and operational successes and improvements at the meeting.

"Q: Some of BWXT's operations are classified; Do you know how detailed the performance review presentation will be?

"A: For specifics about the NRC's presentation, it would be better to contact the NRC. I can tell you that the information we plan to present will be detailed enough to explain our successes and improvements without revealing any classified information.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - EQUIPMENT FAILURE / RADIOGRAPHY SOURCE DISCONNECT

The following information was received via fax:

"Notifications: DEP [Department of Environmental Protection] received a phone call September 24, 2009 about the incident.

"On Wednesday, September 24, 2008 the PA DEP SWRO [Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection Southwest Regional Office] received a telephone call from TEI Analytical Services in Washington, PA notifying them of a source disconnect at a facility in Houston, PA. At approximately 1005 pm, Tuesday, September 23, 2008, a 99 curie Ir-192 source became disconnected from the cable while performing radiography on a gas extraction facility along PA Route 519. The source became separated from the guide tube and could not be returned to the camera. The company was notified and sent a rescue team to assist in the recovery and control of the source. No overexposures occurred and the team managed to get the source back into its camera via tongs. This operation was concluded at 12:08am. Doses are as follows: radiographer 51 millirem whole body; assistant 25 millirem; rescue radiographer 42 millirem whole body, 800 millirem extremity; second member of rescue team 160 millirem whole body, no extremity dose. The cause was found to be limitations of the work environment, i.e., the positioning of the exposure device was very limiting and darkness reduced visibility. No modifications in operating procedures to prevent a re-occurrence were mentioned."

Event Report ID No: PA080025